AUTUMN 1963 95c.

DISSENT

364-8

HARVEY SWADOS

THE UAW AND WALTER REUTHER

Over the Top or Over the Hill?

IRVING HOWE

BLACK BOYS AND NATIVE SONS

On Wright, Ellison, and Baldwin

TOM KAHN

AFTER THE MARCH—WHAT NEXT?

MARIE SYRKIN

ARENDT: THE CLOTHES OF THE EMPRESS

STANLEY DIAMOND

OVERKILL AND UNDERSTATEMENT

PLUS: Articles and reviews on The Negro Revolution, Vietnam, Teachers, The Market System, Disarmament, Honduras, Russia vs. China, etc., etc.

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among ourselves

• Our next issue will be devoted entirely to a portrait and criticism of the American university. It promises to be remarkably interesting, both to those who are inside and those who are outside academic life. Special bundles can be arranged. University bookstores are urged to increase their orders.

• *The special issue on Africa which* DISSENT *published several years ago is now completely sold out. But copies remain of our other special issues: on Latin America, on the U.S. trade unions, on New York City.*

• We are pleased to note that the fine novel by Victor Serge, *The Case of Comrade Tulayev,* has recently been reprinted in paperback by Anchor Books, with a provocative introduction by John Roche. Serge was one of the most attractive figures of European radicalism in the decades between the two world wars, and his fictional portrait of Russia during the Stalinist terror is a work that deserves wide circulation. Another of Serge's works, his memoirs, has just been issued by Oxford Press; we hope to review it in a future issue.

• *A pleasing source of income for us has been the purchase by libraries of back copies. We find it very hard to make up complete files for the past ten years, but try to fill all orders. Would you check your library to see whether it has a full listing of back copies? Good for it; good for us.*

• Melvin Tumin, a regular DISSENT writer, has published under the auspices of the Anti-Defamation League (515 Madison Ave., N.Y.C. 22) a valuable pamphlet entitled "Race and Intelligence." It consists of discussions between Tumin and several leading scholars concerning the usual questions, mostly misunderstandings, raised about the relationship between race and intelligence. For those DISSENT readers who are active in the Civil Rights Movement, the pamphlet is highly recommended as a useful and concise storehouse of material. It sells for 75 cents.

• We want to repeat an essential fact: subscriptions, rather than stray sales, are our livelihood. If you subscribe for two years, you save us money and trouble; you save yourself money; and you do a very good deed, indeed.

• Another valuable book, edited by a DISSENT contributor: *The Quiet Battle,* edited by Mulford Sibley, which consists of an historically arranged collection of the writings on the theory and practice of Non-Violent Resistance. Published by Quadrangle Books, Chicago.

• An old friend of DISSENT—in fact, its publisher—Walter Goldwater has printed in the *Yale University Library Gazette,* April 1963, a bibliography, "Radical Periodicals in America, 1890–1950." This comprehensive listing and annotation of radical publications is a first-rate piece of scholarship and is recommended to all who may be interested. In its final form, the work will appear as a book and will contain a genealogical study of the radical movements, with a brief description of the parties and groups. In order to make the book as useful and accurate as possible, the author requests that suggestions and corrections be sent to him at the University Place Book Shop, 69 University Place, New York City 3.

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William Parrish on S.P. Ticket

For Councilman-at-Large in New York

The Socialist Party has nominated Richard Parrish for Councilman-at-Large in Manhattan.

Dick Parrish is a Negro, a working teacher, a dedicated trade unionist, and a committed Socialist. He is a vice-president of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, and National Treasurer of the Negro American Labor Council. He has been closely associated with A. Philip Randolph in the fight for civil rights ever since the original March on Washington Movement in 1941, and participated actively in organizing the Prayer Pilgrimage in 1955, the two Youth Marches for Integrated Schools, and, of course, the 1963 March on Washington. He spent this summer leading a task force of teachers in running a summer school for the children of Prince Edward County, Va., where racists had closed the schools rather than permit integration.

Dick Parrish is the only civil rights candidate running in New York City. He is the only candidate running on a platform of low-cost integrated public housing, a public works program for full employment, and the $2.00 minimum wage. His campaign offers a real opportunity to confront the power structure of New York City with a genuinely progressive program.

The Parrish campaign is moving forward. An independent citizens committee has been formed, with Norman Thomas and A. Philip Randolph as co-chairmen. Among those who have already joined the committee are: Charles Cogen; Frank Crosswaith; Nat Hentoff; Irving Howe; Murray Kempton; Benjamin McLaurin of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Bayard Rustin, deputy director of the March on Washington; Emmanuel Scherer; Clarence Senior, New York Board of Education; Meyer Schapiro; Harvey Swados; and William Worthy.

The Socialist party does not have the resources, financial or otherwise, of the big party machines. If the Parrish campaign is to fulfill the potential it has to make a political breakthrough for civil rights, it must have the wholehearted support of every socialist, unaffiliated radical and committed liberal in New York and throughout the country.

INDEPENDENT CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE ELECTION OF RICHARD PARRISH

A. Philip Randolph, Norman Thomas—*Co-Chairmen*

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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A Modest Proposal:

KING AND REUTHER FOR '64!

Bernard Rosenberg and Michael Walzer

For a long time, we of the anti-Communist Left have been politically dispossessed. There is no home for us in either of the big national parties. There never was. Every few years, a few of our breed will allow themselves to be carried away by momentary enthusiasm for a liberal Democratic candidate—who betrays their best hopes soon after his inauguration. Thus, our habitual withdrawal from electoral activity. It seemed to us through all these bleak years that no political act could be less significant than voting in an election whose outcome would too largely depend upon which ad agency might manage to establish marginal differentiation, or the illusion of difference, between two ideologically indistinguishable candidates.

In these circumstances, while cherishing the right not to vote, there was still much a man of socialist and humanist views could do. Fortunately, politics is not circumscribed by the ballot box. Intellectuals, concerned with the well being of society, always have an obligation to think, talk, write, criticize, stir the populace up. For many of the most articulate, this magazine became a forum in which they undertook, often painfully, to recast, clarify and express their political ideas. From the columns of DISSENT, one also lent support to those bravely engaged in direct action for securing rights long overdue, which no government agency would grant. And we could extend a comradely arm to heroes abroad who sought to throw off the yoke of tyranny or to establish their independence of colonial domination.

This activity, though cramped and limited, was peculiarly satisfying. Up to a point, given the intellectual exhaustion and ideological disenchantment that prevailed, it literally sustained many of our contributors and readers. It strikes us now, for the first time in ten years, that the moment may be ripe for a re-entry into conventional politics. This is why the undersigned feel that it would be desirable to initiate and support a third party ticket in 1964—call it socialist, liberal, independent—with, say, Martin Luther King for President and Walter Reuther for Vice-President.

The time is now

Why now? Why men like King and Reuther? *Now,* first of all, because of the tremendous upsurge of the Negro people, who demand more rapid and profound social change than either of

(continued on page 390)

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JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER

THE NEGRO REVOLUTION *(continued)*

Will the strategy of non-violent resistance prove as successful for the Negro liberation movement in the future as it has in the past, or should it be replaced by new methods? If so, which methods?

Should the liberation movement try to play a more directly political role?

Should it press for Negro quotas in employment? Is such a demand a way of proposing a kind of Jim Crow in reverse, or is it the only way of getting a rough justice for Negroes in employment?

Should the Negro leadership insist upon transporting white children to predominantly Negro schools, even if this creates resentment among white parents?

Given the fact that in many cities the problem of discrimination soon reveals itself to be a problem in economic power and privilege, is the stress upon legal rights sufficient? How can the protest movement cope with the economic bases of discrimination?

Do street demonstrations retain the value they have had these past months, or will they reach a point of diminishing returns?

In short, where do we go from here?

These are some of the questions that the leaders and active participants of the Negro liberation movement are now discussing. Some of them would phrase these questions differently; but no matter, the problems remain.

Mostly they are problems of initial success. Not for decades has any social movement in the U.S. been able to mobilize the kind of energy and enthusiasm that were shown at the March on Washington. Did it "change a single vote"? A foolish question—for the liberation of the Negroes is not going to occur in the legislative halls, it is going to be the work of the Negroes themselves. What the March did was to give the country a sharper awareness that we face a fundamental test, beyond evasion. And to the Negroes it gave a new sense of their

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power. As Murray Kempton has remarked: "The children from Wilmington, North Carolina climbed back on their buses with the shining memory of a moment when they marched with all America—a memory to sustain them when they return to march alone."

Now the Negro movement faces a time of stock-taking, in which the lessons of the past will be measured and strategies for the future discussed. There are divisions of opinion, as there must be in any democratic movement. Faced with candor and good spirit, these could be valuable, for the Negro movement is not the property of any organization or ideology, it responds to a multitude of problems, and many paths can lead to the common goal of freedom.

There are certain dangers. Summer-patriots can be found in all movements: here they are the genteel Toms who want to make out for themselves, edging their way into middle-class respectability or political office, and leaving the masses of poor Negroes in the lurch. At the opposite extreme are those who would transform the Negro movement into an agency dramatizing their extreme alienation from American life and the progressive forces in our society. How pusillanimous the liberals can be, how inadequate the trade unions, how irrelevant the radical sectarians—all this we know. Yet the Negro movement would be making a mistake if, out of the understandable bitterness of some younger people, it were to be tempted to go it alone. We do not think it will make this mistake. The leaders are too experienced and hard-headed, the participants too numerous and deeply rooted in American life.

Some talk is heard these days about abandoning "non-violence." When this comes from Marxistic ideologues and sects, it is profoundly irresponsible: they are hoping to impose a frayed blueprint on a living movement. When such talk comes from young Negro activists who have been tried beyond endurance, it is authentic: they have a right to speak their anguish. And when it comes, as it recently has since the Birmingham murders, from responsible Negro leaders, it should be taken with the utmost seriousness as a sign that even men who are in principle committed to non-violence can be pushed too far.

Which of us, seeing the dynamited body of his little girl on the street, would not find it hard to reaffirm non-violence? Yet cruel as it must seem to say so, the grief of a father, the anger of a community, is not finally at stake here. At stake is the course of a great social movement which has already scored major successes, both practical and moral, through the strategy of non-violence. It is a strategy that will surely lead to future victories as well. And what, in any case, could serve to replace it? To ask this question is to answer it: the Negro movement has worked out a course that in its essentials is both strong and good, powerful and right. Only a vir-

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THE HIGHER PHILOSOPHY:

Right Wing Dept.

The demonstration in Washington is for ONTOLOGICAL reasons unruly. That is to say, the demonstration has no definite purpose. It was dreamed up before the civil rights bill; and although it is widely thought that its sole purpose is to build pressure for passage of that bill, in fact the March would take place even if the bill were passed tomorrow.—Emphasis added.—*The National Review,* August 27, 1963.

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tual break-down of American social life could warrant any other course.

• For those of us who have been raised in the ambience of the labor movement, who in recent years have defended the unions even when we knew something was radically wrong with them, and who retain strong ties of solidarity and gratitude for the improvements they brought in the lives of our parents and ourselves over the last few decades—for us it was a black day when the AFL-CIO Executive Board refused to endorse the March.

The other week I attended a conference of labor people and was struck at how uneasy and defensive they are on this matter. I was repeatedly told that many unions played an important part in financing the March, that large individual contingents came from a number of major unions, that serious work is being done in many places by the unions to eradicate discrimination. The people who told me these things are serious people, and I believe them. Yet in their absorption with the daily life of the unions, they fail to recognize how deeply tarnished the idea of unionism has become even in liberal circles; they fail to recognize how utterly damaging was the decision, or lack of decision, taken by the AFL-CIO Executive Board. Imagine the response of a young Negro in Chicago or Birmingham upon hearing that George Meany could not find it in his heart to endorse the March! There are times in political life when it is precisely the gesture that speaks most clearly; and here the gesture of refusal has done enormous hurt to the labor movement. Whatever idealism is to be found these days among young people is directed toward two central issues: Negro rights and peace. When the veteran union leaders bemoan their inability to recruit devoted young organizers, they might try to imagine themselves as young Americans in the sixties, without ideology or program, dubious about political systems, but believing passionately in fair play and decency for all human beings. Is George Meany and all he represents a figure likely to evoke their loyalties?

• Concerning the role of the Kennedy Administration, most of what we said in our last issue seems still to be true. It would be interesting if some political analyst who is close to Washington affairs would try to explain why it is that this Administration seems utterly unable to fight in domestic politics: is it that it really lacks serious convictions? Or that it believes above all else in avoiding public confrontations?

The fact remains that it has done very little publicly in behalf of the Civil Rights bill. The barnstorming tours that should have been held to rouse the country, the speeches, North and South, that the President and his Cabinet members should have been making in support of the bill—these have not occurred. Such efforts have an importance far beyond the imme-

---

BEYOND THE QUOTA

There is much talk these days about a "quota" of jobs, etc., for Negroes. Pres. Kennedy has even denounced the idea of such "quotas" as unAmerican. But there is one "quota" which is oversubscribed. Negroes form only ten per cent of the population, but according to Dr. Howard Rosen of the Manpower Office of the Department of Labor, "22 per cent of the unemployed workers in the U.S. are nonwhites."

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diate legislative vote: they are necessary for stirring the country, for educating people, for keeping the issue alive.

Let us simply ask our liberal friends: Is it genuinely your conviction that the Kennedy Administration has done what it could and should in response to the Negro revolution? Is it genuinely your conviction that the Administration has responded to the cry for help coming from the Birmingham Negroes, responded in a way that satisfies the moral urgencies of this moment? IRVING HOWE

P.S.—I wrote these lines before the news came of the murder of six Negro children in Birmingham. All the government of the U.S. could so far do, by way of response, was to send two white gentlemen as mediators to Birmingham, where they were met at the airport by other white gentlemen. Mediate between whom? The murderers and the murdered? The oppressive white power structure and the terrorized Negroes?

So I ask the question again, of the ADA and the Harvard liberals and UAW leadership and the liberal weeklies and all the other semi-demi-Kennedy supporters: *Is it seriously your contention that the Administration has responded to the Birmingham terror in a way that satisfies your conscience?*

What a country!

OVERKILL AND UNDERSTATEMENT

Within five years, the United States will have hardened into a vast thermonuclear missile base. While an under-informed citizenry goes about its usual business, the military establishment has developed, and plans to continue developing, a strategic atomic force, the dimensions of which are beyond the arithmetical reckoning of the daily market place. This will be accomplished by using only a fraction of our armament production capacity; nor is the end in sight. Should the present trend continue, we shall, before the decade passes, have turned ourselves into a social dinosaur—grotesque, useless and stupid in our defensive posture.

This arsenal has been conceived without the consent, and without the knowledge, of the American people; even the one-tenth of one percent of the public that is considered well informed has only recently become aware of the Pentagon's outrageous frame of reference. This information gap has been created by the overclassification and inaccessibility of information in a government which is spending half its domestic, and three-quarters of its international, energies on military or military-related undertakings. The information gap, exemplified in military matters but ramifying through all aspects of our polity, reflects the increasing bureaucratization of knowledge, and the further consolidation of a power elite. It raises the hackles to recall that long before the origin of formal political sociolo-

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gy, Plato wrote that democracy habitually degenerated into dictatorship because of the failure of individual responsibility, and a correlated contempt for the public by elected officeholders. One does not wish to indulge in such abstract inevitabilities, since they slight history, but it would be easy to view our problems today in Plato's perspective, to which, by the way, his beneficently totalitarian Republic was conceived as the cure.

The gap between the public at large and the nuclear technicians is not one of the civilian intelligence, of the capacity to comprehend, but of military intelligence, of the technical withholding, slanting, or obscuring of facts, either directly or indirectly, and I shall say more about this below.

But first, what are the facts? By 1968, we shall have at our disposal 950 Minuteman missiles, dispersed in hardened sites throughout the country, each with a thermonuclear warhead of one megaton (equivalent to one million tons of TNT). By that time, 656 Polaris missiles, of equal destructive capacity, will have become operational. A single megaton nuclear bomb is fifty times more powerful than the weapon which destroyed Hiroshima, killing an estimated 100,000 people. Thus, our Polaris and Minuteman ICBMs alone would have the power to destroy, 800 times over, the 140 Soviet cities that have a population of 100,000 or more. These two weapons systems contain 1606 megatons of destruction, exceeding 7 tons of TNT, for each Russian man, woman and child. When we add our intercontinental Atlas and Titan missiles to this projected force, and discounting our strategic bombers, our theoretically deliverable, strategic nuclear capacity reaches more than 25,000 megatons, probably 10 times that of Russia's. As we compound our nuclear equation, and trap ourselves in the paranoid rationality of strategic debate, the Soviet Union seems to have stripped itself, for economic, and who knows what other reasons, to a minimal deterrent designed, theoretically, to destroy America once, by focusing a small number of multi-megaton weapons on our major population centers.

This Soviet trend has been apparent for several years. In 1958–1960, while we were building 1600 intercontinental bombers, the Russians built less than 200, and apparently plan, now, to stop. While we are in the business of producing 2,000 strategic missiles, the Soviets seem ready to rest content with 75 to 200 invulnerables* (in silos and submarines), and it is unlikely that these will be augmented, although we may be sure they will be replaced as the need arises.

The dimensions of our build-up can be readily understood if we realize that our Polaris and Minuteman systems *today* are roughly 8 times that needed to destroy the 25 largest cities of the Soviet Union, with a population of 28 million people, without *any* help from the Air Force, or the Atlas and Titan systems. In other words, were we to make a step toward the recovery of our sanity, and, by a parity agreement, cut back our present strategic force to the point where, let us say, *only* the major 25 Soviet cities

* Not including the intermediate range missiles and other Soviet nuclear weapons, which are capable of reaching and being used in Europe. Here we are concerned with comparative Soviet-U.S. *strategic* strength, otherwise, we would have to weigh NATO, etc., in the balance. The point is that the capacity to destroy the homeland of the other is considered the real basis for deterrence.

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could be obliterated, the reduction would be more than 90%. A proportionate cut back in the deliverable megatonnage would be about 99%. But military and political leaders view such a reduction as an impossibly radical disarmament proposal; and it would, indeed, at one fell swoop, encompass the first, second, and most of the third phase of the Administration's disarmament program. Yet, to most ordinary people, the capacity to destroy 28 million people in 25 cities in 25 minutes, must be an incomparable enormity.

What accounts for these incommensurate frames of reference between the official scientists, law makers, and other representatives of the people on the one hand, and the anxiety-bound, apathetic citizen, on the other? There are, I think, several factors. First, the Washington-Rand Corporation-Pentagon atmosphere inflates the abstractions of international murder in the absence of proven alternatives. Obviously, it seems safer to too many official minds to play the falsely secure nuclear game than to take the social, economic and political risks involved in encouraging revolutionary change throughout the world, even when the need is understood. Secondly, the magnetic circuit of the nuclear debate in Washington sooner or later draws all sides into its radius. In the absence of a national dialogue, the official strategists increasingly lose touch with reality. The Lapps, the Szilards, the handful of people in the Disarmament Agency, or on the staffs of a few well-intentioned congressmen, at the Peace Research Institute, or at SANE, find themselves talking to their more official opposite numbers within a frame of reference that has been freezing for at least a decade. And they talk to them because there is no one else to talk to. And the result is that even the most well meaning and intelligent Washington-centered peace experts are growing skeptical about the possibility of educating the public in the near future. They carry a burden of knowledge which keeps them constantly on edge, and makes them both contemptuous and fearful of the people at large. Thus, the clash between the peace-minded and the guardians of our ar-

THE OVERKILL ARSENAL

"The junior Senator from South Dakota (Senator George McGovern, a 41-year-old former bomber pilot) said in a Senate speech that the time has come to question the assumptions 'that we are adding to defense and security by adding more and more to the nuclear stockpile.'

McGovern's argument goes this way: '. . . present level of military spending and military foreign aid are distorting our economy, wasting our human resources and restricting our leadership in the world.'

"The reason for the massive defense budget is that the United States has built up, and is still building, a 'vast overkill capacity' in nuclear weapons."

"At present," McGovern said, 'while we have a capability of a thousand ICBMs and are building many more, the Russians have built only a minor fraction of that number. Indications are that they will improve and replace rather than greatly increase the number of their missiles.' "

The Washington Post, August 3, 1963.

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senal becomes merely verbal, manipulative; in the end it is even friendly. Herman Kahn is "Herman."

More specifically, it has become evident to the peace-inclined in Washington that apart from the special economic interests, and they include labor, corporate and local governmental authorities, pressing Congress for the appropriation of funds in support of defense contracts, there has been a systematic distortion about our military potential. The "overkill" capacity has been known to the experts outside of classified government sources for about three years. But the capacity itself has existed for at least a decade.

Nor was there ever any missile gap. The missile gap myth was rooted in the Republican sponsored Coolidge report, issued in 1959, on the basis of information solicited from "responsible" sources in Washington. Of course, the managed fear of a missile gap had probably been generated by the initial Soviet success in launching satellites. But it will be recalled that Eisenhower denied the existence of a missile gap almost from the beginning, and, also reiterated on many occasions the more than adequate armament at the disposal of the United States. Presumably, as President, Eisenhower knew what Kennedy was to learn, and this helps explain, further, the somber warning given the nation by Eisenhower in his farewell address, which outranks in importance anything that any high official of the Government has stated since. Pertinently, after Kennedy took office, the missile gap issue disappeared; it had been a useful bit of political ammunition but, putting it charitably, it proved upon closer inspection to be a dud and was discarded.

The question remains: who found it useful to permit the American people to be misled? Or, what is almost the same, withheld essential information from them? And the most reasonable answer is—the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were the only body consistently aware of the most strictly classified data on both Russian and American nuclear arsenals. The highest civilian officials, even if briefed fully, found themselves functioning publicly within the narrow limits of security clearance. It will be recalled that in Eisenhower's statements, and in his farewell address, he still restricted himself from quoting facts and figures.

In recent months there has been some indication that a critical battle between the military and the civilian sectors of the government is being waged. McNamara has been seriously reconsidering our strategic commitments and has indicated, in congressional hearings early this year, the impracticality of the usual Rand Corporation assumptions. The sudden firing of the Chief of the Navy, and the, in all probability, terminal one-year appointment of the Air Force fire-eater Curtis LeMay, seem to support the view that even this "hard-nosed" administration is appalled by the insatiable martial appetite of the military chiefs. It also strengthens the belief that the Joint Chiefs have been responsible for misinformation and misinterpretation for many years.

The sinister ramifications of our nuclear build-up are clear—first, the national energies are being dissipated. While Russia apparently decides on a minimal deterrent, we waste our time and brains in war gaming and associated vested interests. More dangerously, as our nuclear armaments escalate, the probability of using them grows exponentially.

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The typical military argument—the more weapons the less chance of war—is, historically viewed, sheer nonsense, even though, in another sense, no substantial precedent for our present situation exists.

An individual analogy may be useful here. A man stocks his home with hand grenades, rifles, pistols, perhaps a sub-machine gun, etc., in the name of protecting his family from enemies in the neighborhood. His energy-absorbing defensive build-up becomes merely the other side of an increasingly touchy and aggressive mood. Clearly, he is well on the way to creating a paranoid world for himself, taut with the probability of provocation, and he is almost certainly going to kill someone, someday. We are in the position of this man, creating step by cumulative step, economically, socially, and politically, our own need and possibility of homicide. We are doing this against our flabby good intentions as a nation and in gruesome contrast to the middle class surfaces of our lives. And it should also be clear, that in this era of collective bureaucracies, when the power of decision rests in a few hands, the individual analogy is more a description than a metaphor.

Certainly, the human race must learn to live with nuclear energy. All human, including psychic, energy has always been ambivalent; it can be used for good or evil. That is why the mere physical banning of the bomb cannot destroy the possibility of misusing the energies which created it in the first place. Modern political man must learn to confront and live with personal ambivalence and social ambiguity. The most primitive cultures have been able to create the forms that discharged this central human task in the past, and we must hope that it can be done again. That is our ultimate, haunting problem. But the first order on the agenda is to inform the American people about the reality of overkill, and the dangers of understatement and misstatement in the highest quarters of our country today. We must rid ourselves of the abstract war gamers and the official servants of the people who have become their masters, and who threaten us with destruction. Americans have always distrusted the military professional, and this must now be extended to his mirror image—the civilian militarist. On such healthy suspicion our future now depends.

The President still has a chance at achieving the substance of greatness, rather than merely chasing its shadow, if he can break out of his narcissistic preoccupation with profiles and images and goes to the people, by-passing special interests, and asks for their support in the internal struggle for peace. The presidency was designed to belong to the people, and this issue is likely to be the final test of the viability of that idea. Peace will demand the self-transformation of our society; that is a revolutionary issue for all Americans.

STANLEY DIAMOND

HEY, K. and K.!

The Russians are pouring an estimated $1 million a day in aid to Castro. The United States pays Diem more than $1 million as his daily retainer.

Why don't both sides stop throwing good money down the drain and jointly invest it in something worthwhile? $2 millions a day, three-quarters of a billion per year, might go a long way in building up Indian steel production. L. C.

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KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: PRINCIPLES OR POWER?

Khrushchev is no less a Russian Communist today than yesterday, nor is Mao Tse-tung more of a Chinese Stalinist than he was the day before. The thaw did not, so to speak, produce the recent violence of conflict between the USSR and China. It is accordingly neither a patriotic mission to urge Khrushchev to give the Chinese what for, nor a socialist duty to join the "apostles of revolution" in raising the Chinese banner.

The seeds of dissension have been there from the day Chiang was chased off the Chinese mainland, and it can be fairly argued that they were there before that. Stalin leashed and unleashed the Chinese Communist party, as it suited his (Russia's, the Comintern's) international policy. It was never his intention to permit a strong, economically viable, independent nation in China, whether under Kuomintang or Communist rule. Nor is it Khrushchev's intention to permit that now. The difference lies in the times. Stalin could not arrest the break with Tito in another context (I was tempted to say, in "another geography"), nor could he, any more than Khrushchev, have arrested the conflict with Mao. Once aroused, the aspirations of the national Communist states, with their own bureaucracies and their own ambitions, are not easily stifled. (Even a lickspittle like Hoxha in Albania can get into the act, defying Khrushchev. And while Rumania had to pull in its horns this summer, it is clearly not satisfied with the economic role it has been assigned in the satellite empire.)

The Russians, according to the available evidence, have never been generous in trade, economic assistance, or credit. Whether they were in a position to be is another matter. If, because of ideological ties and the absence of an alternative, it seemed to be dependent on Russia for a time, Communist (very well, Stalinist) China no longer is or wants to be. Its trade with Japan (a natural business relationship) has grown, as has its trade with Canada and other nations. For all the appearance of an uncompromisingly rigid antagonism toward the West and its Eastern outposts (presumably unlike Khrushchev's genial accommodation), China appears to regard trade as being satisfactory, except with the United States, and evidently expects to do better—which may account in part for the timing of its self-assertion. The other consideration would be the desperate needs engendered by its past policies.

Thus, in a particularly interesting article that appeared in the August 17 *New Republic,* Cyrus H. Peake writes:

> The Chinese want an alternative to Soviet aid and hegemony. Since the failure of the Great Leap Forward they have turned, despite their militant ideology, to the "imperialists." The non-Communist nations have given China short-term credits for over $100 million since 1959, while the USSR has apparently given none in the same period. They now account for 55 per cent of China's imports, compared to 30 per cent in 1959. Trade between the USSR and China dropped 67 per cent in the same period, and trade with the other Communist countries has fallen sharply.

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Obviously, there is more to it than that. China is an immense country, with an immense population, immense needs, terrifyingly immense hunger, and doubtless immense pride. These are, after all, a people with an ancient and intricate culture who scorned the barbarians around them. (And the barbarians, in the Czar's day as well, had their eyes on this land—as did more remote upstarts like Great Britain, France, and the United States.) It is also a brutal dictatorship, but its brutality is not at issue in its dispute with Russia. Despite appearances to the contrary, it is also a cautious dictatorship—hesitating to involve itself in adventures that do not guarantee a political or economic profit, but engaging in aggressive moves where the pay-off is clearly worth the risk.

Its differences with Russia are not ideological in a principled sense, but within the complex of international Communist relations they are no less serious for that. Party control of the state, and state control of industry—here there is basic agreement. Both are bureaucratic collectivist—or state capitalist if you prefer. There are no differences on totalitarianism versus democracy. (Khrushchev has not, at least not in anything I have read, demanded of Mao that he relax his repressive measures. Mao, in fact, did take a fling at planting a "hundred flowers," though he quickly dug up the seeds before they took root.) Their differences originate in a vital controversy over who shall ultimately dictate the internal and foreign policies of the Communist states and what these policies shall be at a particular moment; who shall hand down the line. (If Gomulka leaps to Khrushchev's side it is not so much because Poland does not have ideas of its own, as because propinquity, the choice of alternatives, and events since 1956 have buttered that side of the bread.)

Within the limits of propriety, these differences are best encouraged. It is certainly indecent to expect of the Chinese that they remain docile members of the Russian Communist empire. It is also damned foolish. It is equally indecent to rush into the breach for the new "socialist fatherland" as the—well, the indecent—Sweezy-Hubermanites *(Monthly Review)* have done. At this point it is well to remember that Khrushchev is not being challenged by workers and peasants ready to fight tanks with bare hands (Hungary!), but by tyrants who would themselves flay a resisting population.

The U.S.-Russian detente is surely a factor, though the conflict between Russia and China antecedes it by many years. Khrushchev wants no international applecarts overturned; he well appreciates the risks—though he takes them when it seems to Russia's advantage to do so. The same can be said for Kennedy. And, so far as we can see, for Mao. Khrushchev attempted a provocation in Cuba, and pulled back when the risk boiled over. Kennedy gambled on a game of chicken over Cuba, and pulled it off. Mao struck at India, and stopped short of an irrevocable commitment to total war. In the spirit of the detente Khrushchev prefers a more cordial tone to the belligerent noise from China. As for the U.S., we can spread sweetness and light without succumbing to idiocy or callousness. If memory serves, Truman helped Yugoslavia survive its break with Stalin by supplying food at a tense moment in 1948 to a hungry population. That Tito has persecuted

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Djilas and harassed others does not alter the fact that the break itself was a good thing. Thus, compassion and ordinary, unqualified human decency require that we do something for China's hungry millions, something concrete—like sending food! Political decency suggests that disaffection cannot be encouraged by self-defeating extremes of rigidity. It is certainly time to discontinue the childish pretense that Red China does not exist as a nation—except when our plenipotentiaries meet its plenipotentiaries in Poland. And good sense requires that we not grumble about those things that are, on the face of them, unobjectionable — like China's pact with Pakistan.

However feeble the current detente between the USSR and the U.S. may be, no matter how unreconstructed certain elements in both countries are, the slightest easing of tension is in itself welcome. The bombs are still stockpiled, the basic issues are unresolved and will remain so for a long time to come, all of our problems remain. But there will be less contamination of the air, there may be more time to work on our problems, and both of these are worth something. Similarly, a disengagement vis-a-vis China will not liberate China's trampled millions, but it may reduce political fallout in Asia. What kind of disengagement? Well, we might, for example, offer to lessen the provocation of military bluster from Formosa. (Rumor has it, anyway, that Chiang's son intends to seek an accommodation with Mao when Chiang goes.) If we are not yet prepared to recognize mainland China, and that hardly seems the most urgent issue at the moment, we can at least recognize that Chiang's Kuomintang no longer governs China, and is not likely to. We can put out feelers in the direction of offering credit for essential needs, encouraging instead of hindering trade with the West. (The September 13 N.Y. *Times* reports Premier Ikeda of Japan as saying that Japan would not develop commercial relations with Communist China "at the risk of injuring trade with the free West." Who threatened the injury?) Yes, and we have a right to expect reciprocation in various ways —perhaps an agreement not to proceed with the development of nuclear missiles, as other nations have restrained themselves; perhaps a commitment to relieve neighboring nations of any threat of military pressure (e.g., India). None of this precludes voicing the democratic world's horror at every sign of internal repression.

Khrushchev is essentially pursuing Russia's traditional (Stalin's too) policy toward China. Kennedy is pursuing the futile policy of his predecessors. Both policies are "acceptable" only under the intolerable condition of a world divided into gigantic (and stultified) spheres of influence: Russian and American. It won't work, and if it did we would have to rise up against it, for it would be a world in which half was doomed to repression and the other half pushed toward it. We oppose tyranny best if we ourselves act as a people with a conscience first. Without yielding an inch to Khrushchev or Mao, it is possible to encourage the dignity of China's millions, and with it their will to freedom, by recognizing the advantages latent in the Russia-China split. I offer that view as a democratic socialist, but it does not seem to me too far out or radical as an element in a rational U.S. policy. EMANUEL GELTMAN

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VIETNAM: THE FRUITS OF BLINDNESS

Pursue a disastrous policy long enough, and the outcome is inevitable. Politics is a ruthless discipline; error and stupidity exact a cruel price. Supporting the authoritarian Diem in the name of anti-Communism, the U.S. helped spawn the odious Nhus, which in turn makes more likely the eventual victory of the Communist Ho Chi Minh.

Priests, university students, high-school girls are packed into jail. Their jailors are an elite special force subsidized from CIA funds. The U.S. government protests the jailings; the CIA continues to pay the jailors. That is what is known in political science as separation of powers.

Years too late the U.S. formally acknowledges that the Diem clique, brutal and authoritarian, is unable to rally the people against Communist guerrillas. The regime is unsavory, detested, without social perspective. Yesterday hailed by the State Department as an indispensable ally, today Ngo Dinh Nhu mumbles audibly about a deal with Ho Chi Minh.

Is all this surprising? Only to the political dimwits and reactionaries who have set U.S. policy these last eight years. And how shall we designate this policy? As a collaboration between Republican and Democrat, Eisenhower and Kennedy, Old Troglodyte and New Frontier.

To the point of boredom, the State Department was told over and over again that the Diem regime was a disaster; that it ruled by sheer force, without the assent of the people; that a policy of giving total support to this narrow-spirited clique and excluding all other Vietnamese anti-Communists would lead to defeat. Was it merely radicals who said this, or starry-eyed liberals? Not at all. Apolitical specialists, scholars, even some U.S. military men in South Vietnam said it too. But to no avail.

The American people may not know, but surely the State Department does, that some 20,000 political prisoners rot in Diem's camps—some of them anti-Communist nationalists in the penal colony of Paule Condore, where they were first imprisoned by the French, then the Japanese, then the French again, and finally by Diem, the creature of Eisenhower-Kennedy. The American people may not know, but surely the State Department does, that in the last—rigged—South Vietnam election, 35% of the Saigon voters repudiated the regime.

The brilliant *N.Y. Times* correspondent, David Halberstam, writes from Saigon (August 8, 1963):

> Year after year [the Nhus and the Government], under the helpless watch of their American partners, had systematically cut down the elements of the nation that might prove rivals to them — removing men of independence and daring, leaving an opposition latent but without rallying points.
>
> If there were elements still forceful and willing to take risks against the Government—and there are—they were unsure of American intentions, after the years of lavish American praise for the reigning Government.
>
> . . . the Americans had been partners to the constant growth of the police aspects of this regime. Americans suggested the possibility of

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> an elite Special Forces unit of the best and toughest troops . . . to be used for special warfare at border crossings and for commando raids. The Government listened, approved and then used the unit for its own purposes as a loyal political arm of the military to control the regular army and the people.

What more need be said? Only this: that if, as Halberstam correctly says, the Americans were partners to "the police aspect of the regime," it is manifestly incorrect to say they were confined to "a helpless watch" of its increasing authoritarianism. On the contrary. The Diem-Nhu regime is essentially an American creation, the joint and proud achievement of Eisenhower and Kennedy.

After the round-up of the Buddhist priests, the U.S. tried to upset the Diem-Nhu regime. The brilliant minds in Washington who preach to us day-in and day-out on the need for political realism, now thought to manage a coup—by a public statement from the President. It was a piece of chauvinist folly, however, to assume that Diem would fail just because the U.S. issued a hostile paragraph. Mr. Kennedy and his predecessor had made certain over the years that the Diem regime would amass such a concentration of public power, it could resist even the disapproval of its creators. And surely the State Department should have had enough intelligence to realize that after years of discouraging and disregarding the opposition in South Vietnam, it could not suddenly present it with power through a press release.

Meanwhile, the choices in Vietnam are grim. The genuine options available seven or eight years ago have shrunk. A policy of combining military opposition to Communist guerrillas with popular social reforms might well have rallied the population in 1955; by now, given the weariness and disillusion of the Vietnamese, who have suffered 22 years of unceasing civil strife, it may all be too late.

The U.S. can reluctantly and with embarrassment stick by the Diem-Nhu clique. That would mean pouring millions down the drain, wasting American lives, causing further misery to the Vietnamese, incurring still more unpopularity in Asia — and moving straight to defeat, an American Dien Bien Phu.

A second possibility is to try more carefully to arrange the overthrow or serious modification of the regime in the coming months and to replace it with a popular "national rally." Whether this can in fact still be done, is an open question. Will the Vietnamese, so long harassed and betrayed, respond to *any* politics, except that of immediate peace?

The third possibility is indicated in a dispatch from Hong Kong printed in the *London Observer* (August 1, 1963):

> North Vietnamese leaders have suggested discreetly that France might play a role in the eventual reunification of Vietnam. Reliable sources here are reported to have explained to French diplomats in Hanoi that a unified Vietnam, able to meet her food requirements from the rice-growing south, could then reduce her economic and political dependence on China.
>
> . . . the North Vietnamese did not indicate they would be willing to abandon Communism for the sake of unity.

Such a proposal, which is being toyed with in France, Vietnam and the United States, is almost certain to signify a factitious "neutralism,' leading to the absorption of the whole of

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Vietnam by the Northern Communists. It should be recognized for what it is: a device for surrender. And it remains that whether put forward by De Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh, Ngo Dinh Nhu, or American liberals.

Probably, U.S. policy will veer between the first two possibilities, but in such a way as to render both of them ineffectual and then be left with no choice but the third. You cannot go along year after year ignoring elementary truths without ending in a fiasco. And that is precisely where the Eisenhower-Kennedy policy has ended.

I. H.

THE TEACHERS' VICTORY:

New Blood for the Labor Movement?

New York's public school teachers, by a show of militancy, unity and determination, scored a striking victory in early September. More, their victory pushed open new doors through which the declining labor movement could easily march if its leadership would have the imagination to grasp this opportunity.

The scope of the teachers' victory ought not to be underestimated. More important even than the substantial money package of over $25 million in salaries is the fact that henceforth the 43,000 teachers, represented by their United Federation of Teachers, are a power to be reckoned with. An elaborate grievance setup, if properly policed by union stewards, ought to put an end once and for all to the system of petty tyranny often exercised by principals, administrators and school superintendents. That a school principal must now sit down once a month with the union representative will have a healthy effect in curbing injustices. The bitter, up-to-the-end resistance of the school administration was largely due to the fact that it felt its authority challenged. Well, it lost the battle and it must henceforth share power with those who count most in education, the teachers themselves.

For both the community and the million children who attend the schools, this new relation of forces can only be to the good. Now that such issues as classroom size, curriculum content and the running of the school have become at least semi-negotiable, the children and their parents will know that standing for *their* interests (smaller classrooms, better equipped schools, modernized curriculae, better prepared teachers, etc.), is a vital organization of teachers. This victory may also turn out to be a beginning in the revitalization of New York education; a task thus far beyond the ability of either the educational or the city administration. If any group can make a constructive contribution to the sad mess found in the city schools,

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it is the teachers' union. Such a contribution would have to tackle directly the multitude of problems involved in raising the educational level of the schools: recruitment of teachers and their training; classroom size and the attention given to students; issues of integration and segregation; what to do about the vocational high schools, the "garbage heap" of the city system; the special problems represented by the neglected groups of Negroes and Puerto Rican children; the issue of discipline and control.

For the American labor movement there's an important lesson in the victory of the New York teachers. Fresh blood? New and militant union people? People who, whatever their limitations, have an awareness of the modern world and its issues? There are many of them in the public and private school systems. Only a comparative handful — 80,000 — are organized into a proper union, the American Federation of Teachers to which the UFT in New York is affiliated. The overwhelming bulk of them are thoroughly tired of the traditional relationship with boards of education; many are completely cynical about their so-called "professional" organization, the NEA.

Using the New York success as a springboard, the labor movement has a marvelous organizing opportunity before it. Will it have the imagination and leadership to throw a few million dollars and a few hundred organizers into a nationwide drive to organize, say 150,000 more teachers by the end of the year? Walter Reuther has given support to the New York UFT, not overwhelmingly but at least a start. Now it's up to the national AFL-CIO leadership to take the necessary steps. What a fillip it would be to the stagnant labor movement in America if large numbers of classroom teachers would find a welcome place in its ranks. It would bring new blood, new energy, new skills, new ideas and new independence to a movement that desperately needs them.

STANLEY PLASTRIK

SEMINARS TO COVER MURDER AND COOKING

"Murder in America, decorative arts, cooking, colonial history and the uses of wood will be among the new courses that are being given this summer by the New York State Historical Association at Cooperstown, N.Y.

"The twelve courses will be held from today to Saturday and from July 7 to 13 at the Farmers Museum and the Fenimore House in Cooperstown. The seminars are designed for amateurs as well as for professionals."—N.Y. *Times,* June 30, 1963.

THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY

[PICTURE OF GORILLA]

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An ideal playmate for the kids

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Thousands of beautiful items from around the world . . . come in and browse.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF STORE

—From an ad. *San Jose Mercury-News,* Sunday, August 18, 1963

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Tom Kahn

THE POWER OF THE MARCH—AND AFTER

"The revolution is a serious one. Mr. Kennedy is trying to take the revolution out of the streets and put it in the courts. Listen, Mr. Kennedy! Listen, Mr. Congressman! Listen, fellow citizens! The black masses are on the march for jobs and freedom, and we must say to the politicians that there won't be a 'cooling-off period.'"—John Lewis at the Lincoln Memorial, August 28, 1963.

The success of the March on Washington is now a part of American history. But its ramifying effects on the civil rights revolution will be long in unfolding.

Certainly the moral impact of the March was incalculable. As one of its organizers put it, "Every Negro feels two feet taller now." Of the quarter of a million marchers, 200,000 were black. That means one out of every 100 American Negroes was in Washington on August 28.

Looking out over the vast throng that took undisputed possession of the Lincoln Memorial, one saw more than the fruit of a heroic six-week organizing job. One saw—and felt almost as a physical presence—the fulfillment of a promise made over twenty years ago. For it was in 1940 that A. Philip Randolph called for 100,000 Negroes to descend on the capital to demand a federal FEPC. Unable to break Randolph's iron insistence. President Roosevelt finally and reluctantly issued Executive Order 8802, and Randolph canceled the March.

But the march idea hung in the air, periodically revived in an oratorical extravagance, always growing heavier with the weight of new grievances, outrages, frustrations. Then came the Prayer Pilgrimage of 1957, followed by the Youth Marches for Integrated Schools of 1958 and 1959. None approached the 100,000 mark.

Not that the number 100,000 became an obsession. But at least some Harlem old-timers wondered from time to time whether, if Roosevelt had stood firm, Randolph could have delivered the threatened blow. Maybe Negro leaders were all bark and no bite. How much white complacency has accumulated on the confidence that Negroes could never unite and...

In Harlem, on the eve of the March, there was a feeling that this might be it. Community organizing was at a high pitch as thousands

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of bus and train seats were being sold. Activity was only intensified when bus companies announced exhaustion of their facilities. Everyone was too busy to fulfill prophecies that the summer would bring race riots like those of 1919. To senseless violence there was an alternative —to heave a massive powerful force against the power structure in Washington. For black Americans, lacking decisive economic and political power, that force could only be their own numbers. And numbers are important to a minority.

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Some observers in Washington were disappointed that less than 20% of the Marchers were white. They missed the real point of the day—which was not mainly an occasion for whites to display their solidarity with the struggle. The meaning of the day—and the source of its joy—was that Negroes had assembled themselves in such numbers that alone they presented the federal government and its agencies with unprecedented logistical problems. Downtown Washington virtually closed down.

The March put a greater strain on Washington police than any event in the city's history. The telephone company complained that its facilities were overtaxed. Never before had so many television, radio, and newspaper reporters converged on Washington, not even for a presidential inauguration. Local merchants—those who stayed open—reported enormous loss in sales. And during the twenty-four hours when the Marchers dominated the capital, police in this predominantly Negro city reported a record low crime rate—only two arrests.

For weeks prior to the March the press was obsessed with the possibility of violence; reporters harassed the March office for details of internal marshaling, while often indifferent to the political programming. The fear of mayhem expressed in editorials (including one in the *New York Times*) was reflected in the pre-March scurrying of Washington's bureaucracy and merchantry.

Beneath these obsessive fears there was a profound sense of guilt, akin to what underlay Southern nightmares of slave uprisings before the Civil War and generated a paranoia that could not tolerate Negroes gathering in groups except for carefully supervised religious services. Then as now the paranoia was not completely unfounded. The error of the latest paranoids is that they underestimated the ability of the Negro to follow his *own* discipline; and the tragedy of our time is that respectable America still fears gatherings of angry black people more than it hates the cause of their gathering.

In any case, no demonstration so large has ever been conducted with greater dignity and unity of spirit. Those who stood on the Washington Monument platform and could see thousands of people spontaneously forming tight-knit, slow-moving wedges that funneled into the lines of march on Constitution and Independence Avenues, were as moved by the eloquence of mass orderliness and instinctive self-discipline as by the Lincoln Memorial speeches.

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Here was an old lesson learned anew at a time when it had been well-nigh forgotten: a mass is not necessarily a mob, and masses in motion are capable of enormous self-direction and purposive coordinated action—that is, when inspired by a great cause and when conscious of the challenge before them.

That is precisely why the segregationists' threats to launch their own nonviolent mass movement are hollow. At bottom, their impulses are too corroded by a desperate selfishness, by a distorted vision of the world and themselves, by a hostility to the democracy of mass action.

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The Luce publications were particularly impressed by the "picnic" atmosphere of the March, the meaning of which to them was that, say what you will, Negroes in this country are a pretty happy lot. Ironically, the purveyors of the pleasure principle have high standards of austerity for movements dedicated to more serious principles.

Sure, there was picnicking on the grass and innumerable black and white feet soaked happily in the Reflecting Pools of the Lincoln Memorial. The incomparable Mahalia Jackson evoked a chest-swelling, hand-clapping elation, and the presence of Hollywood stars was scarcely conducive to funereal depression.

But joyful confidence is not to be confused with frivolity. The spirit that possessed the audience when Mahalia Jackson let loose was also the spirit that brought us to our feet at the conclusion of Dr. King's "Dream Speech." It was the spirit that made us stand, when the Senators and Congressmen arrived on the scene, and shout *"Pass the bill!"* in a roar that echoed for a mile. It was the spirit that answered Bayard Rustin's reading of the demands with thunderous assent.

It was not the spirit of frivolity. Nor was it the spirit of conciliation or of awed reticence in the presence of government dignitaries in the seat of political power.

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Malcolm X (who appeared at the March headquarters in the Statler Hotel on the eve of the March) charges that the really militant forces in the Negro community stayed away from Washington when it became clear that white liberals had subverted the original radical program of the March. The Negroes who participated, he says, wanted to hobnob with white folks. What a curious statement for a self-styled spokesman of the black masses to make about 200,000 of his own people, including the 300 who bussed all the way from Mississippi. Not curious, insulting.

Just what the original radical program of the March was has, inevitably, become the subject of widespread gossip in many circles. Undoubtedly those who formulated the earliest conceptions of the March thought in terms of direct action that would bring Congressional business to a halt for the day. Bayard Rustin, the prime organizational gen-

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ius behind the March, has called for such action from many platforms over the years.

Many of us are convinced that action along those lines may be ultimately necessary to force the federal government into the kind of reconstruction of Southern states that can eliminate racist power in the nation. Yet it became clear that no such program of radical action on August 28 could enlist the support of all the civil rights groups, not to speak of other forces whose participation was deemed essential.

The importance of welding these various forces into a coalition has not been fully appreciated by some, who apparently located the chief significance of the March in stories about how Archbishop O'Boyle censored the militant speech of John Lewis, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—stories too embellished by the press to form the basis of serious discussion. The issue involved in Lewis' speech was not censorship—it is not true that the Archbishop threatened to withdraw from the March, nor would the civil rights leaders have tolerated such a threat. The real issue was whether the March and its chairmen should express support, though with reservations, for the Kennedy civil rights bills. The decision to do so, the March chairmen felt, had been one of the original agreements underlying the coalition. The first draft of John Lewis' speech expressly withholding support of the bills was, in the view of the others, susceptible to divisive and misleading interpretations. True, there were objections to some of the rhetoric of Lewis' first draft (which I personally preferred to the revisions), but these were peripheral to the political question.

How we assess this question depends on how we assess the coalition and its program. Had the coalition been formed merely to stimulate popular clamor for the Kennedy bills, strong criticisms would have been in order. As it was, the demands which the Marchers carried to Washington not only constitute a critique of the Administration's policies but represented a broad program for social reform.

On the political level, the Marchers called for reduction of Dixiecrat representation in Congress through enforcement of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a sign of the times that this demand, constitutionally sound as it is politically revolutionary, is being revived after years of lying dormant. In addition, the Marchers went beyond the Administration in calling for:

1) authority for the Attorney General to institute injunctive suits when *any* constitutional right is violated;

2) withholding of federal funds from all programs in which discrimination is practiced;

3) desegregation of all school districts in 1963.

But it is on another level that the radical character of the March emerges: the combination of demands for civil and political freedom with a far-reaching economic program. A glance at this program—

1) a massive federal program to train and place *all* unem-

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ployed workers—Negro and white—on meaningful and dignified jobs at decent wages;

2) a national minimum wage of $2.00 an hour;

3) a federal Fair Employment Practices Act;

4) a broadened Fair Labor Standards Act to include *all* areas of employment;

—is sufficient to know that it means nothing less, and probably more, than a recrudescence of the New Deal and all the possibilities that would open up for social planning and imagination. Certainly a political upheaval of some magnitude is implicit in these demands, for it is chimerical to assume that they could be realized without, at the very least, destroying the national power of the coalition of Dixiecrats and reactionary Republicans.

It was A. Philip Randolph, veteran socialist and director of the March, who gave sharpest expression to the implications of the March. As the first of the chairmen to speak, he called for an all-out crusade against "the unholy coalition that strangles Congress" and asserted that Negro freedom could not be won without fundamental changes in the nation's "political and economic philosophies and institutions."

Whatever the long-range implications of the March program, the ten demands are militant and the unification of so many diverse forces around them must be considered a major advance. Whether those forces remain together and committed to the demands will not be up to the leaders alone.

At the Lincoln Memorial, a quarter of a million people pledged to continue the struggle at home—in the streets as well as in the courts. This pledge may well turn out to be more important than the eloquent speeches or the specific demands. The streets were the incubators of the March on Washington, and it was pressures from the streets that fused jobs and freedom into a single slogan. Action in the streets in cities and towns across the country, in keeping with the pledge, will keep the March on Washington Movement alive and militant.

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Harvey Swados

THE UAW—OVER THE TOP OR OVER THE HILL?*

A: *The union and the nation*

In the midst of the great organizing drive of the CIO, which was to culminate in the solid establishment of industrial unionism in the United States, John L. Lewis came to Detroit to address a mass meeting. Some ten thousand people crowded into Olympia Stadium to hear him promise them that they were not alone in their battle to build the United Auto Workers against the thugs and spies of the auto corporations.

A quarter of a century has passed since I sat among that throng of workers and their wives and watched them weeping unashamedly as Lewis exhorted them to stand fast against the corporations and to stand together for a better life. When I returned to Detroit recently with the aim of finding out what has happened to the powerful union built by those workers in the thirties and forties, I found first of all that it is impossible in the sixties to make the kind of generalization that used to come so easily. Even the memories of the participants can be faulty: An officer of the UAW described to me how the elderly come up to him at public functions honoring those who (in increasing thousands) are retiring from working life. "They try to remind me," he said, "of the good old days when we fought together to build the union. The fact is that most of those guys who are retiring now, and were middle-aged then, never lifted a finger to help us when we were young and reckless and had nothing to lose. Our union was built by young men. The middle-aged climbed aboard when it looked safe, but now that they're getting old they like to think that they participated in the early growth of the union."

As a rule, people are eager to associate themselves in memory with institutions which have grown to be not only acceptable but respectable. And respectable the UAW surely is. When Vice President Leonard Woodcock, Walter Reuther's putative successor, recently ran for re-election to the Michigan State Board of Regents, he was endorsed by the Detroit *Free Press* as a responsible executive (he is an appointee, after all, to the Executive Board of Telstar) who puts duty to the community above more particular interests (indeed, several academics observed to

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me privately that, much as they respected Woodcock's abilities and preferred him to his opponents, his refusal of aggressiveness was precisely what had disappointed them about him).

Any organization which strikes roots and acquires possessions will inevitably become as respectable in the community as any growing middle-class family. More to the point is that this organization, which was built by an alliance of radicals and disaffected workers, was characterized in 1947 by Walter Reuther himself as "the vanguard in America," as "the architects of the future." Is the characterization still valid? Such was the question that I posed to myself a few months ago.

Attempting to answer it is not too unlike attempting to find out what has happened to the American dream in the years since 1947. For if ever a union was typically American, that union is the UAW. Nurtured in the heartland of the United States, it has had to move with the decentralization of the auto industry, so that now well under a half million, or only about one-third of its members, are still in Michigan (and in consequence the seven great locals concentrated in the Detroit area no longer dominate the organization). Negroes make up perhaps 15 per cent (no figures are kept) of its membership, as they do of the population at large. But while, thanks in part to an administration which is admirably free from racism, Negroes have been making excellent progress—Jack Stieber, in his *Governing the UAW,* quotes a forthcoming study on racial practices in unions to the effect that the UAW "probably has more Negroes in staff positions than all other major unions combined"—they are sorely dissatisfied, and have only recently succeeded in getting a Negro onto the Executive Board *as a Negro.*

In other ways too, the composition of this union, whose members now earn an average of perhaps $6500 a year, parallels that of the United States. Not only is it a mixture of native stock (originally lured from southern and border states by promise of high wages) with immigrants and their children from central, southern, and eastern Europe; not only is it a mixture of urbanites and their country cousins, the latter displaced from the land by spreading suburbia or in search of an occupation more central than farming; but it is also made up increasingly of the very old and the very young. The retirees, who retain certain voting rights, are becoming so numerous that they now hold the balance of power in many local unions and in consequence are going to have to be relieved of those voting rights by the working members. Even back in 1959, as Stieber points out, "ten years after the UAW negotiated its first pension plan, 84,000 of the 102,600 UAW members who had retired were still living." In the years since then, these retirees have increased, and in many of the new plants the production work is being taken over by young men. In the two locals at Willow Run, the average age is about 24, and at Toledo, where there is something like a fifty-fifty balance between old and young, all the younger men are under thirty (and all too many of them, as UAW Treasurer Emil Mazey put it to me, "don't know the difference between unionism and rheumatism").

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What also makes the auto workers seem so typical is that they manufacture the product which more than any other—with the possible exception of the cowboy movie—has represented America to the rest of the world in the 20th century; which, except for a house, is the most expensive object that they themselves ever buy; and which is still enormously important to the American economy as a whole.

Shifts in auto output, as *U.S. News & World Report* observed on 11 March, 1963, "have a strong effect on total production." Reporting on a new study of the gross national product by the Commerce Department, the magazine noted that:

> In the 1957–58 recession, for example, the auto share of gross product dropped 6.3 billions. The total drop was 18 billions. In the 1960–61 recession, the auto decline was 5.1 billions; the total, 8.4 billions. Rising auto output likewise contributes strongly to total output, auto output for this year thus promises to prop up local activity. Auto's share of the gross product was 21.7 billions in 1955. It fell to 13.9 billions in 1958, swelled to 20.8 billions in 1960, dipped to 17.5 billions in 1961 and rose to 21.5 billions in 1962. Those swings have a powerful effect on the general course of business activity.

Which brings us to our final parallel, and one which should lead into the problems of these men and their union. Just because they are involved in the mass production of a product which is universally regarded almost with veneration, it does not follow that they derive unalloyed satisfaction from their involvement, or that they do not feel alienated from their tasks. And the fact that the auto industry is currently enjoying one of its best years, and that sales records are being broken month after month, does not mean that the vast majority of its workers are enjoying a real sense of security; they have learned from the bitter experience of recent years that seniority, far from guaranteeing employment, has come to serve as a roster for layoffs.

It is these twin specters—dissatisfaction with the job ranging from boredom in some cases to downright hatred in others, and the fear that one may be severed from the job and so severed from any possibility for gainful self-respecting employment—that remain characteristic of the auto worker as they do of millions of other Americans. What has their union done to vanquish these specters? What has it not done that it might have? And what is the relationship of the leaders to the led?

One thing must be made clear at the outset. The auto worker has made tremendous progress, thanks to the UAW and Walter Reuther. He earns a living that is well above the margin of poverty; he is not terrorized by ruthless bosses; he usually lives in a decent home in a decent neighborhood; his children can and often do go to college and leave the working class behind; and he can look forward to retirement not with trepidation but with honest expectation. For his pension is only one of the constantly-expanding fringe benefits which cushion him against the shocks of illness, hospitalization, and old age. What is more,

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his union has won him these benefits (many younger workers, probably thousands of them, really believe that the benefits have been "given" by the companies rather than wrested from them) without having to be corrupt, crooked, or collusive with the corporation with which it negotiates. Those who incline to excuse the behavior of other union leaders with the comfortable reflection, "at least they deliver," might try to remember that Walter Reuther and the UAW have been delivering, too, without having to deliver themselves or their dues-payers into the hands of goons or mobsters.

But when we say such things about the United Auto Workers and Walter Reuther we have only said letter A. There remains not just an alphabet, but an entire encyclopedia. If, however, we examine only B and C—job dissatisfaction and insecurity—a combination almost as peculiarly American and as unpredictable in its effects on the system as apple pie a la mode, we may learn more about the situation of these particular Americans than by psychoanalyzing their leader or pressing bouquets on the UAW for being what any union ought to be to start with: honest.

B: *Job dissatisfaction*

This is a problem which began with the industrial revolution and did not end with the Russian revolution—as we have been reminded by East Berlin, Poznan, and Budapest. It used to be known as the class struggle, and it provided part of the motor force for the original growth of the UAW. Now, under a different nomenclature—whether as work standards, speedup, production standards, or whatever lingo is used to indicate a difference of opinion between boss and worker as to how hard or how fast the latter ought to do what the former is paying him for—it continues to plague the UAW as a nagging endless irritation, a sore that will neither heal nor even respond to such medication as participation in profits.

It was the union which used to resist profit-sharing schemes when proposed by management, out of fear that they would dilute working-class militancy and, by giving workers the feeling they were little capitalists with a stake in labor efficiency, would convert them into individualistic eager beavers. Now that the union itself has taken the initiative in proposing and securing a profit-sharing agreement with the American Motors Corporation, both it and the corporation discover that the worker feels no greater sense of identification with management than he did before he was granted a modest share of the profits, probably because his tasks have become so rationalized that he sees little connection between them and the finished Rambler, or the year-end profit statement. In consequence, the corporation is charging the 11,000 workers at its Milwaukee plant with a slowdown. The workers, mostly young men, are complaining in turn about being made to work too hard, profit-sharing or no profit-sharing.

For a while, the sociologists, the labor-management people, and

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even some labor leaders were assuring us that technological change would raise the workers' levels of skill, responsibility, and initiative. But as the rate of change increases, these assurances have become somewhat muted. "Automation does not appear to have significantly altered these characteristics of production-line work," says Professor William A. Faunce of the Labor and Industrial Relations Center of Michigan State University, in "Automation and Leisure" (Chapter 25 of *Automation and Society,* Ed. by H. B. Jacobson and J. S. Roucek):

> Machine operators in the automated plant, while having somewhat more responsibility in that there is a larger machinery investment per worker, do not need appreciably greater skill and many feel that they have an even less important part in the total work process than had been the case in plants using conventional machine techniques. . . . In short, automation has not altered the fact that most production-line jobs do not produce the kind of occupational involvement or identification necessary to make work a satisfying experience.

What has happened over the years has been a codification of two basic articles in the endless struggle over the conditions of the job: 1) The inalienable right of the company to establish production standards. 2) The inalienable right of the workers to strike over those production standards (and over health and safety matters also), if the grievance procedures have been exhausted. The UAW-Ford Agreement states: "The right of the Company to establish and enforce production standards is recognized." The UAW-General Motors Agreement puts it this way: "Production standards shall be established on the basis of fairness and equity consistent with the quality of workmanship, efficiency of operations, and the reasonable working capacities of normal operators. The Local Management of each plant has full authority to settle such matters."

Seen from the outside, nothing could be more reasonable. In our economic system, production must supersede everything else. (From the Ford Agreement: "Management shall have the right to deny vacation, upon payment of vacation pay as provided in Section 26 of this Article, if in its judgment the exigencies of production so require.") Certainly even the most sophisticated observers concede this as a precondition for the efficient management of what A. A. Berle calls "the American economic republic." "This is the most successful economic system the world has ever seen," Mr. Berle told the *Herald Tribune* Book and Author Luncheon on 29 April, 1963. "We are some eons away from perfection, but—without being Pollyannish—we have an American system which we can call truly great." And indeed the grievance procedure, backed up ultimately by the right to strike, for which the union fought so hard, supposedly humanizes the work situation, and nicely countervails management's pressures for increased productivity, or for profits based on the exploitation of labor.

So it seems from the outside. Seen from the inside, the matter is

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somewhat different. Since the workers are no more privy to the production standards that will be set by engineers, time and motion study men, and plant supervisors, than they are to such other management prerogatives as product design or pricing, they are continually off balance. The difficulties posed by the fact that the union has no machinery to deal with production standards are simply insuperable. "You can strike one week over standards," a leader of the union said to me, "and next week they'll introduce new standards."

Put another way, the worker is ultimately powerless to protect himself, even when supposedly he has the union behind him, against a management which is determined to tighten the screws on him and his fellows, first in one operation, then in another, first in one department, then—as he reacts by going out on strike unselfishly, not for himself but to protest against even a handful of men being abused—in another. What good does it do to win a battle for yourself or for your fellow-workers if you discover after victory not only that the war goes on but that the rules of war have been changed all over again, unilaterally, by your opponent?

But why on earth should the management representatives of the economic republic, who Mr. Berle and others assure us have developed social consciences unique in history, resort to such primitive methods of exploitation as stepping up the work pace, cutting back on lunch hour, cutting down on wash-up time?

The answer lies in the structure of the auto industry. For one thing, the parts supplier companies, which are still important to the UAW (they continue to provide a substantial fraction of its membership), are always being economically squeezed, and in order to stay in business must minimize their labor costs, with or without the cooperation of the union. By and large that cooperation has been forthcoming: the UAW is not an anti-capitalist organization and is committed to holding as many jobs as it can for its members. It is in this process of cooperating that a series of fascinating developments takes place.

I know of no more elegant explanation of the process than that of Harold M. Levinson, in his article, "Pattern Bargaining by the UAW," in the September 1958 *Labor Law Journal*. Speaking of accommodations offered by the UAW to companies outside the Big Three (Ford, Chrysler, General Motors) in an effort to keep them competitive, Mr. Levinson says that "the union was more willing to provide relief to individual firms through adjustments in productivity rather than hourly compensation since the former technique could not be as easily known to outsiders and, hence, involved less possibility of adverse secondary effects."

> The productivity approach, however, [he goes on] is concededly a long and difficult one, and from the union's point of view is a very delicate one to handle. While the top officers of the union may attempt to convince the membership that prevailing standards are relatively low, they

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> must overcome work habits which have been established and accepted over a long period of years. Neither can the union leadership ignore a long history of union organization and strike action against the so-called "speed-up."

How can the union leaders get away with this? Or how come, in Mr. Levinson's somewhat more elevated language, the "relative lack of emphasis on political considerations"? (By "political considerations" he refers to "pressures on the union leadership to obtain at least as much in negotiations as have other union leaders in order to retain the political allegiance of the membership.") This relative freedom from the reprisals of an aroused membership, Mr. Levinson explains, with admirable candor,

> stems largely from the organizational structure of the UAW, under which the union official having the major responsibility for conducting the negotiations and making final recommendations to the membership was not directly responsible to that membership or dependent upon them for his political position within the union . . . the possible adverse political repercussions on the international representative because of a below-pattern settlement in any one unit, or even in several units, is small as compared to the total number of units within the entire union . . . this type of organizational arrangement does result in a diffused and indirect relationship between the political security of the union official and his success or failure in obtaining a pattern settlement in the specific units within his jurisdiction.

If we are to understand fully the role of leaders and staffers in convincing the ranks of the necessity for sacrifice in order to keep their employers competitive, we must tear ourselves away from the cut-throat world of the parts suppliers, in which such euphonious public-relations labels as "Project Progress" are pasted onto sacrifices by the workers—who have no way of knowing the true position of their employers, or even whether their sacrifices will really prevent them from being driven out of business or simply closing down. For there is one other basic fact about the structure of the auto industry which cannot be overlooked, and that is the absolute dominance of General Motors.

If, in 1962, the total profits of the Big Three, after taxes, came to a little over two billion dollars, nearly one and a half billion of those dollars were earned by General Motors. The UAW newspaper, *Solidarity,* has expressed it with direct simplicity: "General Motors made more money in 1962 than any other corporation in the history of the world."

This corporation is in fact not only more efficient and more powerful than just about any other corporation; it is also more efficient and more powerful than most states. Again according to *Solidarity,* which seems somewhat uncertain as to whether its readers should be horrified or awed, "the money General Motors took in from sales in 1962 was equivalent to the total expenditures of these major states put together:

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California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Massachusetts, New York and Ohio."

It is not only that General Motors is so rich that, if all of its plants all over the United States were to be simultaneously destroyed by some national disaster, it could in a year rebuild them all with its own resources and not even have to borrow money. It is not even that Ford and Chrysler continue to stay in business by sufferance of GM, which is presumably dissuaded from driving them out of business only by that corporate conscience which has become the ethical governor of our economic machine. (John Quirt, writing in the New York *Herald Tribune* of 13 May, 1963 on the decline of new car inventories, noted that "some industry observers persist in the suggestion that fear of increasing GM's market penetration has helped hold back the company's production.")

Most important from the worker's point of view, GM has utilized its gigantic capital accumulation to install in its plants machinery and equipment far more efficient than those of Ford and more particularly of Chrysler. As a result these weaker firms must—if they are serious about staying in the race—increase output per worker to keep their prices competitive, and to accumulate the capital with which to buy more efficient equipment.

For an outsider, the immediate question arises: Why doesn't the UAW attempt to challenge GM's production standards, not just for the benefit of the GM workers, but to take the heat off the Chrysler and Ford workers? The fact is that—whatever the reasons—it has not. The consequences of this refusal to take on GM are what we must now consider.

The UAW leadership functions with what might be called a social-democratic outlook. It conceives the job of the union to be to improve the lot of its members under the going social order, and when the occasion demands, to shore up the more unstable elements of that order. As the years pass, it finds itself serving not only its members, but the weaker firms in the auto industry as well. Since it is precisely in these firms that the workers are apt to be most squeezed and therefore most restless, it becomes the self-imposed responsibility of the union to persuade those workers that their very livelihoods depend on the yielding of concessions to make their employer competitive.

This task is, as Mr. Levinson puts it so well, "a long and difficult one," and since, as he also observes, it is "a very delicate one to handle," we find the union resorting to sophisticated techniques of salesmanship. What is curious, given leaders who once saw themselves as "the vanguard" in America, is that the salesmanship is directed not so much at the corporations as at the membership; and that the servicing is done not simply for the dues-payers but for the corporations as well.

In terms of servicing: The union has found it expedient to cooperate with management to work out supposedly more reasonable production standards, particularly with the Chrysler Corporation, and more recently with parts suppliers. Thereupon it must program into its trans-

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mission line, its Regional Directors and International Representatives, an understanding of the need to hold in line those most directly responsive to the ranks—the stewards and the activists—in order that production may continue uninterrupted.

In terms of salesmanship: The Regional Director and the International Rep move in on the workers, after having themselves been presold at Solidarity House, whose front lawn is appropriately graced by a larger-than-life auto worker sculpted in a style which might be described as Stalinist Modern. Armed with all the paraphernalia of entrenched bureaucracy—researchers, clerks, writers, mimeographs, in addition to superior education, oratorical persuasiveness and access to indirect means of suasion—they take over local meetings ordinarily devoted to ordinary business, and hammer away at the need for aiding the employer to become competitive. The enemy, they explain, is not the employer—himself a victim, like those in attendance, of circumstances. The enemy is GM.

Obviously if the employer is determined to maintain those pressures which originally aggravated the workers, the situation is not going to be resolved by the use of Madison Avenue techniques. And indeed what often happens is that the workers, goaded beyond endurance, turn to their final resource, a strike vote. The strike, however, must be sanctioned by the International. It would be most instructive if some labor historian could one day compile a history of the instances in which locals have taken such strike votes, only to be worn down by the International into not putting the threat into practice. If it is easier to obtain authorization from the International for a strike outside the Detroit area, you may find, as one International Rep pointed out to me, that "if you hit one plant for better conditions, the company will simply shift the work from the struck plant to its other factories." The simple truth is there has never been an over-all study of job conditions throughout the auto industry, much less an attempt to establish industry-wide standards. And, as we have observed, a strike can even be "won" with no result other than a displacement of pressure from the affected department to another within days after the supposed victory.

In such circumstances, one can hardly wonder at the prevalence of cynicism and apathy among UAW members, or at the fact that job dissatisfaction continues to be a running sore in the automotive industry. There have been abortive attempts to attack the ailment on an industry-wide basis—Emil Mazey submitted a 10-point program on production standards to the 1961 UAW convention, which received it quite coolly—but it seems clear that unless and until there's a determination to take on GM, in each of whose 135 separate bargaining units disputes on working conditions are settled separately, auto workers will continue to thrash about blindly, often sacrificing job conditions they had earlier won in years of militant struggle.

Now when we think of the distance between leaders and led, the conclusion seems inescapable that the use of manipulative techniques

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has been widening the gulf that separates the two. If we talk to the workers about the leaders, we find the latter referred to as "they." If we talk to the leaders, and to the staffers at Solidarity House and in the various regions, we find the workers referred to as "they." People who are being manipulated, even by those whom they admire (and there is no question but that speaking generally the UAW membership *does* admire Reuther and his lieutenants even more than the electorate at large, say, admires Kennedy and the New Frontiersmen)—such people can hardly be expected to identify, in the old-fashioned fraternal sense, with their manipulators.

As for the latter, it was inevitable that feelings which were originally prideful and perhaps even boastful should have been gradually replaced by attitudes which can often be characterized as at best patronizing and at worst contemptuous. The Regional Directors and the International Reps, if not the staff technicians of the UAW or the executives at the management end, come from the ranks (in fact their very jobs are often looked upon as "retirement" from "work," and have more than once been conferred upon secondary leaders and defeated local officers as a reward for faithful service to the International among the recalcitrant ranks). Their attitude, I think it not unfair to say, can upon occasion be compared to that of second-generation Americans who are troubled and embarrassed by their immigrant parents and devote considerable energy to pondering about how best to "handle" them, how to "make" them pursue or desist from a certain line of conduct, in short how to "sell" them, since they are not educated enough to realize it themselves, on what is best for them.

The workers, like the immigrant parents, tend to evade such confrontations by using their only defenses, lethargy and negativism, and to regard their offspring as remote if conscientious, and hostile if well-intentioned.

I was struck by the near-unanimity with which the staffers insisted, wherever I encountered them, in Solidarity House, throughout Detroit, and in other areas as well, that the leadership was "ahead of the workers." A man would have to be a fool, or what amounts to the same thing, imbued with a mystic faith in the purity as well as the progressive historical mission of the proletariat, to deny that auto workers, like other workers and like most other Americans in fact, are shot through with racism, jingoism, a pervasive narrow-mindedness, and a conservative resistance to new ideas; or to deny that their officers and technical advisers are more sophisticated, more free from bigotry and flag-waving, more hospitable to adventurous thinking. But to say this is hardly to exhaust the subject.

Surely it is precisely those who have led workers to victory in struggles that are now a part of history who should be the first to understand how the struggles themselves function as educational forces for the participants—and the leaders. One personal experience of a Negro standing at your side in a strike instead of scabbing on you is worth a thousand

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Hollywood movies on the charm of Negro children and the rectitude of "tolerance." It is when struggles are postponed or aborted that the fabric of democracy must deteriorate. It is when people are in motion, and are led toward an ethical goal, that they are most receptive to challenges to received wisdom; more than that, they themselves become innovators, and discover that they are capable of an inventiveness and an intellectual audacity of which they themselves could scarcely conceive in less adventurous times. (See, for example, *Diary of a Strike* by Bernard Karsh.)

When I think that it was one of the most impressive intellectual lights of the UAW, an ironist of exceptionally subtle insight but a liberal still devoted to Reuther and the UAW, who was most emphatic in insisting to me that "the leadership is ahead of the rank and file," I can only refer once again to my analogy of the second-generation son and his greenhorn father. This particular official is not a manipulator; he is not eager to bend the rank and file to his design; he has a patient, almost a disinterested, understanding of the way in which the whole bureaucratic mechanism operates. But like the intelligent and analytical son who still cannot bridge the gap between the generations, in short cannot surmount his own role, he fails to quite see how the UAW's years of accommodation to the realities of capitalism (or, if it sounds better, to the realities of "the economic republic") have worked to deaden the ordinary member's enthusiasm, to drive him away from an organization which he comes less and less to regard as part of his life, and in consequence to conservatize him.

If the UAW member (particularly the Chrysler employee) is growing older, the UAW staff is growing older still—according to Professor Stieber, in 1961 16 per cent of the staff was over 55 years old and the average age was 49. And the distance between staff and membership keeps growing too, as the leaders increasingly get their information on the mood of the workers not from the workers themselves, but from the International Reps and the Local Presidents, themselves less and less in contact with union members who do not even bother coming to meetings.

It is the unofficial contention of the UAW officialdom that their very success in negotiations over the last ten or fifteen years has in a sense foreclosed the possibility of their being "the vanguard in America." That is, the substantial slice of the economic pie that they have gotten for the dues-payer, and the trimmings too, the health insurance, pensions, and the rest, have made him into a pretty satisfied fellow, a member (whether black or white) of an elite, the aristocracy of labor, more concerned with paying off on his home and getting a boat to go fishing than with "taking on GM" or otherwise rocking the boat. Not only is this a fact that can hardly be called into question, it is one that should always be kept in mind in any evaluation of the present situation and the future prospect of these typical Americans. But as I have already tried to indicate, it is very, very far from being a com-

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plete explanation for the malaise afflicting an organization which was in the very recent past so magnificently combative and so uncompromisingly democratic. If both of these aspects of the auto worker's position —his increasing well-being *and* his endless frustration and bitterness on the job—are taken into account, perhaps we shall approach somewhat more closely an understanding of what has become of his union.

C: *Insecurity*

But if job dissatisfaction remains as a practically insoluble grievance, one which goes back to the installation of the conveyor belt system and will apparently continue into the incalculable, or workless, fully automated future, job insecurity is a much more recent and terrifying phenomenon. This may seem like purposeful misstatement, in view of the facts: that employment in the auto industry has always been seasonal because of model changes and the need for retooling, that long hard-driving periods of overtime have inevitably been followed by long uncertain months of unemployment, and that the auto industry has always been quick to feel the backlash of recession and depression. Furthermore, one of Walter Reuther's finest negotiating achievements, SUB (supplemental unemployment benefits), which has been in effect since 1956, has made employers "think twice about mass hirings and layoffs" (the words are *Business Week's,* 2 March 1963), and the union's ongoing push toward the GAW (guaranteed annual wage) and an eventual white-collar status for its membership has succeeded so far in penalizing employers for short work weeks and is forcing them to stabilize employment and improve scheduling. When one learns of these substantial steps toward civilized working conditions made by an aggressive and sophisticated union leadership, one is entitled to wonder how the worker can be more insecure now than when he was nothing but a warm body, bought up by the day and dumped often before the day, to say nothing of the season, was over.

The answer is devastatingly simple. In former times, when a worker was laid off he took his gun and went hunting, or he drove back down home to the old folks' farm until word came that they were hiring again. If it got really tough, he went on relief and sweated it out until things picked up and he was called back. Now, a layoff may mean that he will *never* work again.

It is only within the past six or seven years that the impact of the second industrial revolution has begun to be felt in the auto industry (as it had somewhat earlier in the coal mining industry, and as it has yet to be, we are given to understand, in the vast white-collar, clerical, and technical areas of the economic republic). A few figures will indicate what technological innovation and automation are just *beginning* to do to the automotive industry: "In 1953," according to *Newsweek,* 1 April 1963, "917,000 auto workers turned out 7.3 million cars, trucks, and buses; in 1963, 723,000 workers produced 8.3 million vehicles." Briefly: One million *more* vehicles produced by 184,000 *fewer* workers.

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Suppose we narrow this down somewhat. The Flint, Michigan, Buick plant is, because of its age and other factors, not an average or typical plant. Nevertheless, it is part of the industry. In February 1956, the all-time peak month of auto production, Buick Local 599 of the UAW had 27,635 dues-paying members. In December 1962, the best month since 1956, this local had 13,022 members. Briefly: The Buick plant in Flint, Michigan, is now turning out about the same number of cars that it did six years ago, with about half the number of workers.

Otis Bishop, President of Local 599, claims to be the best crankshaft lathe operator in Buick. He is also old enough to have felt the full force of the depression at first hand; during the worst of it he lived in a freight car for a year. Yet he feels that the prospect of the laid-off, or more accurately the displaced worker, is more frightening now than it was then, and he told me several stories to illustrate his feeling.

One of his fellow-workers, a Southerner, had lived all his life in South Carolina, where he owned his own home, a small place but all paid up, until a GM hotel-room recruiter urged him to sell out, pack up, and come to Michigan, where a high wage job was waiting for him. (This was not during the 19th century, nor was the worker a European recruited to lay railroad ties across the American wilderness; this was during the 1950's—it is said that the highwater mark of migration to Michigan from the South was not in the days of the Model T but in 1955.) When this Southerner was laid off, his savings, including the money he had realized on the sale of his house, melted away. And when he turned up at the Local hall, he said to Bishop, "They tell me I got to go on relief, but nobody in my family ever went on relief. Before I do that I'll shoot GM."

Another, also laid off, turned up in the Local president's office even more distraught, crying and sobbing. He looked, said Bishop, like those men you read about who go off their rockers and shoot up their entire family, then commit suicide. The immediate cause of his hysteria was his son's birthday: The boy had wanted a bike, like the kid next door had gotten for his birthday. But the kid next door's father was working, and since the boy's father wasn't, he had wound up with only a cake. So the man said, sobbing, Why should I go on living when I can't even face my son?

Bishop did not know what had become of these two men. Nor does the UAW know, except in a general way, what has become of the thousands who have been laid off—and for the most part will never work again. The machinery is coming in too swiftly to be absorbed by the shrinkages resulting from withdrawals, retirements, and deaths (this attrition is called "nutrition" by some workers, but though they may mispronounce the word, they do not misunderstand its implications).

One of the ironies of the economic republic is the way in which improvisatory solutions to pressing social problems succeed only in transferring the problems to other areas, or in raising newer problems. The UAW's ingenious efforts to convert its members from wage slaves into

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salaried human beings, can be seen in the light of this irony, which has been well-expressed by Robert Theobald in his highly suggestive essay, "Abundance, Threat or Promise?" in *The Nation* of 11 May, 1963:

> Labor unions must try to raise wages and therefore purchasing power: when men are competing with machines for jobs, this will cause growing unemployment. The government must encourage further investment: as the new equipment installed will usually be more cybernated than the old, this will also mean growing unemployment. In effect, therefore, the separately "rational" actions of the various parts of society are the *same* actions which, combined, are shaking our total socio-economic system apart.

Thus, the introduction of supplemental unemployment benefits (financed by company payments of a nickel an hour worked)—eligibility for which depended on the auto worker being laid off for a week—caused the auto makers to schedule four-day weeks, often for months on end. The UAW responded by introducing the short week clause, under which a worker gets partial payment for hours not worked. "But for UAW," observes *Business Week* (2 March 1963), "the success of the short week brings problems, too. The clause has

> created a stable work force but at the same time it has become a factor —along with automation and the cost of other fringe benefits—that forces companies to produce more with fewer people.
>
> And just as the short week principle plugged a gap in the social security structure, so has it opened another. Employers now find it less costly to work overtime than to schedule in new workers. Reuther wants to try to close this gap in 1964 bargaining by raising the overtime penalty to double-time pay.

Clearly, it is both reasonable and ethical that the UAW work for the abolition of overtime, which is certainly unconscionable during a period when despite new records in auto production some 90,000 auto workers are jobless. But one is entitled to wonder whether this expedient too will result not in putting some of those 90,000 jobless onto the payrolls of the Big Three, but rather, in the long run, in accelerating the process of replacing workers with machines.

Last year the Chrysler Corporation demonstrated its ability to rejoin the profit makers of the industry, aided by a union desperately anxious to keep the company solvent and its workers employed. Thanks in part to this cooperation, Chrysler's share of the approximately two billion dollars' profit of the auto industry came to about sixty million dollars. The renewed efficiency of the corporation was no doubt a source of considerable satisfaction to its stockholders. Whether the 30,000 workers laid off in 1962 as a consequence of this efficient management took similar satisfaction is to be doubted. Some might even have preferred the bad old days when their employer was losing six and seven million dollars a year—but was at least paying them wages.

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In short, the available evidence indicates that what is known in the auto industry as the "improvement factor" works to improve the lot of those fortunate enough to hang on to their jobs, but, far from creating new job opportunities, serves to insure that those whom it disemploys will never again be needed in the industry.

The UAW is far from being a jobholders' protective association, like certain of the craft unions. But—despite a splendid program of activities ranging from summer encampments and UN Workshops to a brand new Labor Studies Center which, under the direction of Brendan Sexton, will doubtless be a model of its kind—the UAW remains, like the Longshoremen's Union, the Steelworkers' Union, or the Mine Workers', an organization of the employed, committed to its dues-payers and not to those who are steadily disappearing from the industry. One searches in vain through the roster of staff members involved in research, planning, public relations, etc., etc., for a single man whose primary responsibility is for the unemployed. Nor can one find, in a union brimming over with schemes for getting people to register, moving in on this or that primary, supporting school bond issues, etc., etc., an unemployment program. This lack is, as one staffer frankly conceded to me, "a most shameful abdication of the radical conscience."

It may also explain why in 1956, when there were 200,000 men out of work in the Detroit area, the UAW could draw only (as a UAW leader told me) 2,000 people to a meeting on the West Side, and only 1,300 people to a meeting on the East Side.

It is one thing to complain that workers are more interested in fighting crabgrass than in fighting for a better world. It is another to marvel at the quiescence of the jobless and at their reluctance to turn away from the narcosis of their TV and to turn out for your rallies (I was told that TV viewing time in Detroit has achieved the status of a full-time occupation, with sets tuned in an average of 35½ hours a week), when in fact you have given no indication that you have any new perspective to offer them. Not long ago, when 60 vacancies were announced in the Detroit Post Office, 10,000 people lined up to apply. This was not during the 1958 recession, but in the midst of the 1963 boom, when you might also drive past the corner of Gratiot and Eight Mile Road any day of the week and observe the informal shape-up of Negroes offering themselves for employment by the day to cruising housewives who want their windows washed or their gardens spaded, or to non-union building contractors in search of below-scale laborers. These people, these invisible TV viewers, these suddenly visible civil service job-seekers and day laborers, have been through the UAW in the thousands as dues-payers for shorter or longer periods; but they are not looking to the UAW to solve their problems or even to offer them a new way of thinking about those problems.

During the last boom auto production year, 1955, the jobless rate declined. Not so now. With car production and sales once again booming, "Unemployment in Michigan jumped by 21,000 during February

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bringing the state's jobless total to 205,000, or 7.1 per cent of the labor force. This is the highest rate in six months." (Michigan *AFL-CIO News,* 14 March 1963.)

Everyone is frightened. And everyone is groping. Even the old-timers, who are over the hump and safely on the secure road to retirement (you need *17 years'* seniority to be reasonably sure of your job at the Ford plant in Detroit), and supposedly both snug and smug, are frightened for their sons and their sons-in-law. This is partly why, in towns like Toledo, Owosso, and Flint, *60 NOW* buttons are flashing on the lapels of aging auto workers. They want the social security age lowered from 65 to 60 not just because they are sick of working, but because they feel that an early retirement program to remove from the labor market the seven million-odd Americans in their 60's now employed ("60 Now" has membership in 33 states, and can be seen as a latter-day variant of the Townsend Plan), would make some room for their sons in the factories which are being automated under their very noses.

This is also partly why the Negroes too are turning from the UAW (from which, as one highly articulate Negro leader put it to me, "the compassion and the commitment are gone") to their own organizations. Not only was the Detroit Negro family's median income in 1959 $3,800 as compared to $6,400 for the white family, partially because the Negro wage earner has been unable to move into the skilled, or high-paying end of the auto industry, but his percentage of unemployment in relation to the total labor force is often double, and in some age brackets, triple that of his white brother. The UAW, as we have noted, has been in the forefront of Negro hiring for its own staff; it has had to buck Southern white prejudice time and again, from the Detroit race riots of June 1943 down through the years; but it has not succeeded in convincing the Negroes that they do not need their own parallel organization to fight for their own ends.

In 1957 a group of 17 Negro trade unionists got together to raise money to spur voter registration in Detroit's Negro precincts. From this small group arose the formidable Trade Union Leadership Council, which has swiftly become a political, social, and economic force in Detroit, with its leadership taken from Negro UAW veterans, and its membership of about 10,000 also drawn substantially from UAW members, their wives and families. In TULC's handsome headquarters, Freedom House, on Grand River Avenue (where a key club is maintained which helps considerably with finances), such leaders as Buddy Battle, Ernest Dillard, and the hard-driving and politically sophisticated Horace Sheffield, direct the most active segment of Detroit's Negro population (whose militancy parallels that of their Southern counterparts) in a multi-pronged assault on white prejudice in management and unions alike and on Negro passivity in politics and racial exclusion.

TULC's most startling achievement so far has been its leading role (acknowledged by everyone) in electing Jerome Cavanagh Mayor of De-

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troit in 1962 over a candidate endorsed by the UAW, which awoke the day after election to discover that its man had been well-whipped by TULC's. In consequence politicians big and small have been making their way to Freedom House to address Saturday evening meetings or simply to socialize and show how concerned they are about the Negro.

More important, however, will be TULC's results in its anti-job discrimination campaign and its youth program—both of which are interlinked. It is taking on such varied interests as the Michigan race tracks and the brewing industry (and its lily-white unions) in an effort —by means of pressures ranging from community appeals to the threat of "selective withholding of patronage"—to gain employment for Negroes and to train younger Negroes as multipliers. The hiring of such young men and women, and their *visibility* in the Negro community, is desperately important if there is to be any substantial progress in motivating young people to stay on in school and to batter at the doors of company and union training programs for upgrading the unskilled. TULC has a pilot program of 40 kids underway, and is setting up a series of self-help programs, among them a twice-weekly typing and steno class for girls, staffed by volunteers.

It is a tribute to TULC, which would seem to be the liveliest and most stimulating new organization in the motor capital, that the Black Muslims are making no particular headway in the Detroit area. It is also a tribute to the UAW that the leadership of TULC came from its ranks, and that this leadership has not been harassed (much less fired from staff jobs in the union) because of its opposition to political candidates officially supported by the UAW. Furthermore, it was the UAW itself which, by virtue of its color-blind struggle for seniority and job security, created a stable home-owning Negro working class, which in turn provided an economic base for the new Negro middle class of merchants, salesmen, and professionals, that must shrink in revulsion from extremist and separatist movements such as the Muslims.

But to say this is hardly to say everything. It is by no means certain that Horace Sheffield could have stayed on the staff of the UAW—for the time being he seems invulnerable—if his mayoralty candidate *had* been defeated. And surely, given the history of the UAW, one would be entitled to expect more from it than a more or less graceful (in certain instances exceedingly ungraceful) acquiescence to the upsurge of its Negro members, to their demand for representation on its Executive Board, to their struggle to cope with a series of economic facts which are all but overwhelming in their implications.

Seventy-eight per cent of Detroit's Negro youth are unemployed. And it is George Edwards, himself an old UAW man and a first-rate Police Commissioner of Detroit, who has observed that one-third of this city's out-of-school teen-agers can be characterized as "uneducated, unattached, and unemployed," and available for leadership by "such racist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens' Councils and the Black Muslim movements."

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The simple truth is that neither the UAW nor any other union, no matter how large its membership, how influential its representatives on Capitol Hill, or how many millions it has invested in gilt-edged securities, has the capacity or the power to resolve problems of this magnitude, even when they affect the lives of its own members. (This is a fact which ought to be borne in mind in all those tiresome discussions on "big labor" and its abuses of the privileges accorded it by a soft-headed public.)

"We live in an epoch," B. J. Widick has written, "in which trade unionism increasingly cannot solve union problems." Given his socialist background and his quick intelligence, no labor leader is more aware of this than Walter Reuther. What one must be wary of is making too simple an equation between what a labor leader says and what he is able to do.

Labor leaders like to, often have to, talk big. "The new army of American unemployed will not use kid gloves and will not be as gentle and easy-going as the unemployed of the 1930's," says Mike Quill, President of the Transport Workers Union, in *TWU Express,* April 1963. And although he goes on to call for nationalization of transit facilities, hospitals, public utilities, all national resources and financial institutions—"TWU's position is clear. Our own government should move into these industries now in orderly fashion, that would be completely legal, and so avoid the near upheaval that we had during the depression of the '30s"—it is doubtful that the capitalist class has been thrown into terrified disarray by this oratory.

Just so, one can read about Reuther's political impatience in *U.S. News & World Report* (11 March 1963), which says darkly that he "is prepared to urge more forceful pressure on the part of President Kennedy to cure the unemployment problem. It's Mr. Reuther's contention that if the President can't get action from Congress on this problem Mr. Kennedy will be defeated for re-election in 1964." Or in Marquis Childs' column (Washington *Post,* 27 March 1963) written from Detroit: "It is not hard to find in this city that gave President Kennedy 70 per cent of its vote in 1960 a deep disenchantment with the Kennedy administration ... The President's promises to 'get things moving again' are recalled with an edge of bitterness ..." But nothing is arising from the impatience, disenchantment, or bitterness of a nature to trouble Mr. Kennedy's sleep. As Murray Kempton has observed, in connection with the 1962 UAW convention's resolution accepting President Kennedy's decision to resume nuclear testing (after Walter Reuther had earlier opposed test renewal), "it is the posture of the American labor movement to disagree with a decision of President Kennedy's only up to the point that it is made."

Mr. Kennedy, who has never been charged by anyone with being a poor politician, knows perfectly well that Walter Reuther has no place to go. And this is why, it seems to me, Kempton's judgment that Reuther has "fallen out of history" may be cruel—but it is not unjust.

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Just as Reuther knows that he cannot resolve basic problems of the work situation without taking on GM (a struggle that many observers honestly feel could not be won against the giant of an industry that is geared to make 20 per cent profit in a 35-week year), so he knows that he cannot resolve basic economic problems without political action, and more political action than Mr. Kennedy is prepared to undertake. But just as no one can go around Reuther's left in the UAW, who wants to try going around Kennedy's left in the nation? In this connection, David Carper's words in DISSENT (Winter 1962) are well worth recalling:

> Among the hyper-actives in the industrial unions, the Kennedy Administration at the moment is a not unpleasant trap. When they make telephone calls their wires go straight through to the top Administration people. The hackneyed but basically meaningless programs adopted at union conventions year after year, with some legislative tinkering and tailoring, are being enacted into law. Actually, the Kennedy Administration very often proposes measures legislatively in advance of anything the unions, which are steeped in 19th-century rhetoric, have conceived. And when dignified pot latches are scheduled there are engraved R.S.V.P. invitations and places for union leaders. If they cannot claim recognition and a role in the government with a voice in the decision-making, at least it is pleasant for them to testify personally that they have received tickets entitling them to places at an elegantly served table.
>
> Especially for labor leaders it is difficult even to think of walking out on a pleasant host who happens to be President of the United States and who calls you by your first name. And even if the president of the IUD-AFL-CIO should choose to walk out, where would he go?

Whatever Reuther's earlier ambitions may have been—to enter national politics, to take over the AFL-CIO, to be appointed U.S. delegate to the United Nations—they do not now seem relevant to me. If he is deeply frustrated, as he gives every evidence of being, from his compulsive journeying to the fringes of the "Free World" to his wearisome speechifying, that is more significant, for it reflects the impasse of a million-membered union without which he would be another Adlai Stevenson or Henry Wallace—or Harold Stassen.

Reuther's most recent extra-curricular activity has been his service on the ten-man committee directing the March on Washington. When he is aroused to his old-time fervor by the onrush of the Negro revolution, he is capable of characterizing (on 13 August 1963) hidebound George Meany's weasling AFL-CIO executive council statement, withholding endorsement from the March, as "so anemic that you'd have to give it a blood transfusion to keep it alive on its way to the mimeograph machine." His own full-blooded participation in the March reflects not only Reuther's reaction to the restiveness of the Negroes in and around his own power base, but his eagerness to play a role in the revolution: if any labor leader has the insight to grasp the implications of a future

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linkage between socially rebellious Negroes and economically rebellious disemployed, it is Walter Reuther.

D: *The union and the future*

The head of an AFL-CIO union sympathetic to the UAW has described Walther Reuther to me as "ambitious without a specific ambition," and as eager to be at the center of a social movement, but no longer having a social movement in which to function. If this is so, it may be at least partly because Reuther has done little to keep a social movement alive *within his own union.* Throughout that union, one is continually being reminded of the great role played by radicals—Wobblies, Socialists, Stalinists, Trotskyists of various persuasions—not only in building the union but in maintaining through the 40's and even the 50's the kind of democratic ferment that raised the persistent notion not merely of trade unionism but of a movement with goals. When one of Reuther's aides commented sadly that the union and its leader sorely missed the spur of the socialist group led by Max Shachtman, I could not but reflect that not only had Reuther done a job on these political people, he had also domesticated some of them to the point where they are now to be found roaming the corridors of Solidarity House, on the payroll.

It is true that the various radical movements have, for the time, all but disappeared. But radical thinking has not, even within the precincts of the UAW, thanks to the presence in it of men educated in the left but not yet ossified. One cannot complain, as one might with almost any other union, of an absence of intellect, or of lack of application of that intellect to the problems of our age. What one can say, I think with justification, is that the UAW leadership no longer takes its own demands seriously.

When Emil Mazey declares to the UAW Workshop of World Affairs at the UN: "The peoples of the world need to exert counter-pressures. They must tell President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev that no nation has the right to use the sky as an open sewer," one must applaud this plea for an end to the Terror Olympics. But one will look in vain for the UAW to exert any pressures on the President of the United States in this regard.

When Walter Reuther himself comes out strong for a big tax cut for the lower-income groups, and for increased federal expenditures for housing and education, one can only applaud. And in such instances we *will* find the UAW applying pressure, or at any rate attempting to convince key people in the Administration: what we will *not* find is the leader of one million two hundred thousand workers attempting to mobilize those workers for a program, much less mobilizing the unemployed. Manipulation has for so long taken the place of mobilization that one may wonder whether the latter is even being considered, or whether it could be made effective with a membership—and a staff—which has time and again seen demands sabotaged by being tied to the

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economic line of the Kennedy Administration.

When Walter Reuther announces, at the beginning of 1963, that Jack Conway has returned to the labor movement, to become his administrative assistant once again, this time to take charge of an organizing drive in the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, one can only applaud. First because Conway is universally respected as a top-notch administrator whose talents were going to waste in the New Frontier. Second because organizing the unorganized, which was exhilarating in the 30's and a snap in the 40's, when unions were accustomed to winning nine out of 10 elections, became a nightmare in the 50's: a National Labor Relations Board report showed AFL-CIO unions won only 53.5 per cent of 5,049 elections in which they participated in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962.

And when Walter Reuther goes on to assert candidly that the job of organizing the unorganized has been characterized by a "lack of will on the part of the leadership of the whole labor movement," one can only applaud such virtually unprecedented frankness, particularly when one finds him adding, "I include myself in that." The problem "has never been the workers. It has always been in the leadership of the labor movement."

Magnificent words. It remains to be seen whether money and skill will suffice to implement them, without the elixir of masses in motion and leaders stirred by the heady fragrance of that movement. When one considers the record of the UAW itself, one can only be doubtful. If it has not organized the white-collar people in its own bailiwick (Stieber, *Governing The UAW:* "Total UAW white-collar membership probably does not exceed fifty thousand out of an estimated potential of 250,000 within the union's jurisdiction"), how will it be able to go out and organize white-collar workers in unrelated fields? For years now, the organizer has been the low man on the UAW totem pole; unlike the International Rep who can lead a fairly leisurely life, he is the one who has to leave town, eat bad food, sleep in fleabags, argue, sweat, ring doorbells, work endless hours, and . . . have the results of his labors tabulated in naked figures, there for everyone to see. Nor is it any secret that for years Walter Reuther never even bothered to confer with his Director of Organization. When the organizer once again becomes the hero of the labor movement, when that movement extends to the unemployed as well and is once again animated by the idealism which marked the 30's, and which is an absolute prerequisite when unemployment coexists with "prosperity" and you do not have the spur of an external menace (as in the 40's) driving masses into factories and unions, then perhaps large-scale organizing drives will succeed.

In the meantime Walter Reuther's impassioned and repetitive appeals for the extension of democracy must seem not only tiresome but hollow, coming as they do from a union which has preserved the democratic form and all but lost its spirit. "The problem in the UAW," says Prof. Stieber, "is not that members . . . do not have an opportunity to

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consider and discuss policies and to make their choices known. It is rather that they do not have a choice between alternate policies equally well thought out and developed by competent leaders with the assistance of technical staff. Only the administration policies reach members in this form. Opposition views are presented to individuals and groups in bits and pieces which occasionally find their way into the administration program, if the leadership senses considerable membership support for them."

The Public Review Board of the UAW, a group of distinguished citizens which hears complaints of those who feel they have been treated unjustly and cannot obtain redress within the union itself, has been hailed as one of Walter Reuther's most honorable accomplishments; and indeed if such a Board were to be established by certain other AFL-CIO affiliates we might see some notable changes in the labor scene. But as it is now constituted in the UAW we can hardly expect it to be much more than an additional resource for professional unionists; certainly it is not going to instruct the average rank and filer, or even the leadership of the UAW in the extension of democracy to such areas as the union's press.

Thus, Case 64, as summarized by the Board in its annual report, concerned the complaint of a member that the editors of his Local newspaper "in refusing to publish his articles relating to the 1960 presidential campaign denied him his guaranteed personal freedoms and violated the AFL-CIO Code of Ethical Practices." The Board found: "His sole complaint is that his articles were rejected by the local union publication for what he considers to have been an invalid reason. What has been denied him, then, is not the right to publish his political opinions, but the alleged right to have them published by his local union. This distinction is fundamental and dispositive of the issues here."

It is not clear how a union officialdom can regret the absence of "pressure from the left," or regret the fact that it is "ahead of the workers," and at the same time refuse to the ranks the right to quarrel in print, no matter how crankily, with the line as it is formulated and codified in Solidarity House. "Controversial articles of any kind," Prof. Stieber says of the union press, "are notable by their absence. As for presenting both sides of an issue . . . this is virtually unheard of in UAW newspapers . . ."

One test, it seemed to me, of the depth of the individual commitment to the union, to the labor movement, to the idea of that movement as a motor force in the impulsion toward a more reasonably ordered and more humane state of things, would be the encouragement by an individual of his own child to go into the factory and participate in the life of the union. And so I asked everyone I met, from officials to staffers to rank and file activists who indicated by their own behavior that the union was still important to them, whether they had indeed done so with their own children, whether they intended to do

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so, and whether they could honestly encourage an idealistic college student to go to work in an auto or aircraft plant (assuming that he could find a job) and work in the ranks of the UAW for the realization of his ideals.

The question was greeted with embarrassment, with amusement, with derision. It was not that young people would be unable to take the assembly line pace, or the long dull perspective of working class life. It was rather that they would be "chopped up" by the bureaucrats, and their energy and idealism dissipated in an endless series of petty struggles. In one instance a UAW official told me wryly how the son of one of his colleagues (not in the Teamsters or the Operating Engineers, be it remembered) had come to him to inquire which of two universities had a better school of business administration. Those children of social-minded unionists who are themselves of an idealistic bent are finding their way to the peace movement and to the Negro revolution; it would seem that they find the careers of their parents boring, old hat, and . . . conservative.

In these circumstances, and with the leftist political groupings dead or moribund, and in any case no longer "colonizing" the factories, it is difficult to see from whence will come the infusion of new blood that would be essential if the UAW were to raise aloft once again, for a new generation, the banner of the vanguard in America. New members, yes; there are workers to be organized in the new industries, and some of them no doubt will develop into natural leaders, as workers have in the past. But new leftists with grounded democratic principles and articulated social ideals? Hardly.

If we are lucky, some of these young men and women will throw themselves into the organization of the new unions among the new workers, the white collar people and the technicians: the teachers' unions, the unions of government employees, and the like, which have a potential as great or greater than that which once energized the Steel Workers Organizing Committee or the UAW itself. These are the unions which will have to go in for a new kind of politics, and will have to make connection, and close connection, with the Negro revolution and the peace movement. They will draw, let us hope, not only on the financial resources of the UAW, which have always been so generously forthcoming, to the eternal credit of Walter Reuther and his union, but also on the intellectual resources of its staff—a group of dedicated technicians who are the envy of industrial managers—and on the collective experience, shrewdness, and savvy of its trained working class politicians, some of whom began their careers by fighting for democratic socialism and by organizing the unemployed as well as the unorganized, and who have not all forgotten what they learned then, who have not all grown old and slothful, who have not all ceased searching hopefully for a young movement to which they can contribute the best that is in them. It is a best which we are all going to need very badly in the years ahead.

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Marie Syrkin

HANNAH ARENDT: THE CLOTHES OF THE EMPRESS

The debate sparked by Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem** is almost as disturbing as the book itself. A good many qualified reviewers in various journals have attacked not only Miss Arendt's views but the scholarship on which her conclusions are presumably based. Numerous vital errors and misstatements of fact have been pointed out by her critics. Her champions, however, have in no instance bothered to take cognizance of such factual objections. The readers outraged by Justice Musmanno's harsh review in The *New York Times Book Review* made no attempt to argue on the basis of the factual material adduced by the Justice; instead, they excoriated his failure to grasp the author's deep insights. The poet Robert Lowell, for example, while admitting that he was not "a suitable authority" to make a "point by point refutation," was impressed by "so much detail, profundity and intuition." (N.Y. *Times*, June 23, 1963.) Dwight Macdonald confined himself to discussing Miss Arendt's theory of totalitarianism. *The New Yorker*, which devoted five issues to Miss Arendt's report of the trial, ignored, with one exception, all communications, many of which expressed not merely disagreement, but cited flagrant and major errors. Nor has Miss Arendt deigned, thus far, to refute particulars. This astonishing indifference to charges of gross inaccuracies and omissions of pertinent data—charges which, if sustained, seriously undermine the author's main theses—is a perplexing feature of the discussion. It can only be explained on the assumption that Miss Arendt is considered exempt from the criteria of reliability usually applied to any work which pretends to be objective scholarship rather than tendentious exposition. If so, it is a dubious kind of honor to accord an intellectual as widely praised as Miss Arendt.

The New Yorker (July 20, 1963) in an unprecedented display of emotion mourned editorially the "breakdown" of communication which made possible the misunderstanding of a "historian, philosopher, and humanist" of Miss Arendt's caliber. In the interests of clarification, *The New Yorker* helpfully offered a resume of Miss Arendt's ideas: "She recorded the behavior of individuals and of nations, and found within her story a moral for Germans, for citizens of other Western countries, and for Jews—in descending

* *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, by Hannah Arendt. The Viking Press, New York. 275 pp., $5.50.

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order of responsibility: It is evil to assent actively or passively to evil, as its instrument, its observer, or as its victim." This capsule formulation has its uses, for in the widespread discussion of the book it is precisely the "evil" of the *victim* that is at issue—whether in descending or ascending order of responsibility. And for many readers even the "order" is beclouded.

Bruno Bettelheim, who agrees with Arendt in the main, granted in a laudatory review (*The New Republic,* June 15, 1963) that "Arendt at times creates an ambiguity in her evaluation of guilt. Thus on cursory reading she seems to plead that Eichmann was a victim and that Jewish leaders were heavy with guilt." But a characteristic of the debate is that it is not "the cursory readers" who have made the most devastating indictments of the author's method. It is the scholars, the specialists in contemporary Jewish history.

In a moving letter to Miss Arendt, who is his old friend, the great Jewish scholar and historian, Gershom Scholem, writes in German from Jerusalem (*Mitteilungs Blatt,* August 16, 1963): "Your book revolves around two centers, the Jews and their behavior during the catastrophe, and Eichmann and his responsibility. I have considered the problem of the Jews for many years and have studied no small measure of the literature on the subject. It is clear to me, as to every thoughtful contemporary of these events, how bitterly serious, complex and not readily reducible this problem is. . . . The question that you have raised is a genuine one. Why then, since we know this, does your book leave one with a feeling of shame and bitterness not in regard to what is reported but in regard to the reporter? . . . The answer, insofar as I have one and which because I value you so highly I must give . . . lies in the heartless, sometimes downright mean-spirited [*hämische*] tone with which you treat a matter at the very center of our lives." After making various specific objections, he writes: "In the camps men were degraded and, as you yourself say, brought to cooperating in their own destruction, the execution of their fellows and the like. Is therefore the boundary between victims and persecutors wiped out? What perversity!" In her presentation of the question he finds no "considered judgment" but often "overstatement degenerating into demagogy."

Miss Arendt's answer (in the same issue of *M. B.*) indicates her view of the controversy. She thinks that Scholem's independence of judgment has been warped by the "American-Jewish" campaign of "misrepresentation." To the man whose standing as original thinker and scholar is certainly no less than her own, she writes: "I cannot believe that had you read the book uninfluenced by so-called public opinion, manipulated in this case, you would have misunderstood the following . . ." and she lists the by-now familiar areas of misunderstanding: her charges applied only to "Jewish functionaries"; she never said Eichmann was a Zionist, and she did not mock Zionism. It was all irony. And she adds, "What confuses you is that my arguments and my way of thinking are unpredictable (*nicht vorgesehen*]. Or in other words that I am independent."

The question of Miss Arendt's bewildering originality I shall here leave aside, but the "irony" missed by Scholem and so many other readers is more to the point since it is the most frequent defense offered against jarring

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citations from her work. Her references to Zionism can serve as an example. Of Eichmann she writes that he read Herzl and was converted "immediately and forever to Zionism." She refers to the Nazi expulsions, which preceded extermination, as the "pro-Zionist" stage of the Nazi movement, and she describes one of Eichmann's concentration schemes for his captives as "(a Jewish homeland, a gathering in of the exiles of the Diaspora)." *If this be irony, at whom is it directed?* One does not have to be a Zionist to be shocked, or to "misunderstand" the author's intent.

Apparently the breakdown of communication lamented by *The New Yorker* extends not only to stolid Philistines who coarsely call an irony a spade, but to such leading members of the intellectual community as Scholem. And how curious it is that the gap in comprehension widens in direct proportion to the reviewer's competence in the area covered. (See, for example, Jacob Robinson, special consultant to Justice Jackson at Nuremberg and to the prosecution at the Eichmann trial, *Facts,* August, 1963.)

Why should there be these difficulties? *Eichmann in Jerusalem* is neither *Finnegan's Wake* nor *The Waste Land.* Miss Arendt is more given to categorical pronouncements than the seven types of ambiguity. What then caused the "breakdown"? One reason lies in the author's macabre humor, so tasteless in context; another in her bland omission and distortion of relevant data; but the chief reason is that her accusation of the Jews, far from being ironic or even subtle, is explicit and unequivocal, and is not at all limited to "Jewish functionaries." She writes: "But the whole truth was that there existed Jewish community organizations and Jewish party and welfare associations on both the local and international level. Wherever Jews lived, there were recognized Jewish leaders, and these leaders, almost without exception, cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the Nazis. The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really been unorganized and leaderless there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between five and six million." This "whole truth" illumines a lot of territory—Europe, America, Palestine (the "local and international level") and every aspect of Jewish life.

II

The author's theme, the "banality of evil," is developed in her account of how Jews behaved and what Eichmann did. Everyman, given the conditions, is capable of unspeakable evil and she tries to demonstrate that Eichmann is everyman. He is "terrifyingly normal," a conscientious little cog in the Nazi murder machine. Every time she is faced by evidence of his murderous initiative she explains that her subject is merely overconscientious. Yet the author's philosophic understanding of the banality of evil, so steadfast in regard to Eichmann, deserts her when she surveys the host of his victims. In arraigning their guilt she becomes hortatory instead of all-comprehending. And it is this difference which brings into question the paradox of her position: To kill millions is banal; anyone of us could do it under the pressures of a totalitarian state. But to be among the sufferers is somehow culpable; any one of us would have faced death more valiantly, else what point is there to the author's accusations?

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To sustain her twin theses—the normality of Eichmann and the moral aberrations of the Jews—Miss Arendt, basing herself largely on Raoul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews,* recapitulates the familiar events of the Nazi holocaust. *En passant,* she snipes industriously at Zionism, Israel, Ben-Gurion's "show trial," the witnesses, the prosecuting attorney, and the justice of the Judges. At the end of the script the only one who comes out better than when he came in is the defendant. The victim comes out worst.

The legerdemain with which Miss Arendt shuffles evidence to sustain her image of Eichmann as an obedient underling, neither a fanatic nor an anti-Semite, is impressive to any one who has examined the sources she uses. Eichmann found himself on trial in Jerusalem not because he was a chance Nazi captured indiscriminately by vengeful Israelis but because he was head of the Department of Jewish Affairs, the man in charge of rounding up all European Jews for their extermination. It was Eichmann who reported to Himmler in August, 1944, on the success of his program and gave the figure as six million killed. Eichmann's celebrated admission, "I will jump into my grave laughing because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews on my conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction" is briskly explained by Miss Arendt as "sheer rodomontade." Everyman is merely boasting here, for as we all know "bragging is a common vice." He boasts too when he "pretended" to have invented the ghetto-system or the plan to ship all Jews to Madagascar. When he threatened angrily "to drop France" from his program because the French were not delivering Jews fast enough to him—a statement which the Jerusalem Court viewed as evidence of his authority—he was again boasting. Miss Arendt is equally skeptical of Rudolf Höss, Commandant of Auschwitz, who testified to Eichmann's ingenuity in introducing Cyclon B, the gas used in the gas chambers, and of the Lutheran Minister Heinrich Grüber who had tried to help the Jews and who characterized Eichmann as "a block of ice."

When German defeat became imminent Eichmann received orders to stop the deportation of Hungarian Jews to the deathcamps. Instead of obeying, he speeded up the transports. Hilberg, Miss Arendt's chief source, writes of this phase, *"Eichmann could not rest until all the Hungarian Jews were in their graves."* Miss Arendt has no difficulty in explaining Eichmann's enthusiasm: "For the uncomfortable truth of the matter is that not Eichmann's fanaticism but his very conscience had prompted him to adopt his uncompromising attitude during the last year of the war." Suddenly everyman, the conscientious cog, appears to have become a zealot; yet Miss Arendt views the uncontested evidence of his enterprise as further proof of his supine loyalty to Hitler—the Führer's words are law and superseded all written instructions by others, be it Horthy or Himmler.

Dr. Robinson has pointed out the astonishing negligence with which Miss Arendt has examined the relevant documents in order to reach this conclusion. In a communication (quoted also by Hilberg) from Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, the Nazi plenipotentiary in Hungary, the German Foreign Minister warns: "The Führer expects that the measures against the Budapest Jews will now be taken without any

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further delay by the Hungarian government, with those exceptions which were allowed to the Hungarian government by the German government. . . ." The exceptions involved permission for about 7000 Jewish families to leave Hungary, apparently via Rumania. (Trial Doc. T1214—par. 5.)

In a telegraphic report that Veesenmayer sent to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin (T1215—par 2), *Eichmann is shown as questioning Hitler's concession and appealing to Himmler to get a new decision from the Führer.* Now, of this damaging report Miss Arendt writes: "When Himmler's order to stop the evacuation of Hungarian Jews arrived in Budapest, Eichmann threatened, according to a telegram that Veesenmayer sent to Himmler, 'to seek a new decision from the Führer.'" But notice that Miss Arendt has here switched the roles of Hitler and Himmler! The document leaves no doubt that it is Hitler, not Himmler, who had given the order to stop the deportation. Consequently, Miss Arendt's elaborate structure (for Eichmann, the little bureaucrat, Hitler's word is sacred) crashes. The evidence shows Eichmann as seeking to contravene Hitler himself.

Nor does Miss Arendt's transformation of this hyperactive agent of the Nazi terror into an automaton jibe with Eichmann's view of himself. In the Sassen Papers (Buenos Aires, 1957), accepted as authentic by both prosecution and defense, he stated: "Had I been just a recipient of orders, then I could have been a simpleton. . . . When I reached the conclusion that it was necessary to do to the Jews what we did, I worked with the fanaticism a man expects from himself as a devoted national-socialist." That he changed his tune in Jerusalem is not surprising. Harder to understand is the omniscient confidence with which Miss Arendt brushes aside the historical record.

III

Miss Arendt's second thesis—that of Jewish collaboration—is expounded in as arbitrary a style as the first, but with one significant difference. In her account the author has achieved the miracle of humanizing Eichmann, the mass-murderer who is not a "monster," and only the informed reader can take issue with her. But the Jews in their extremity are dehumanized, and again it is only the informed reader who is fully in a position to disagree.

Writing of the Jewish Councils Miss Arendt declares: "To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story." (She credits Hilberg with revealing it.) No. For a Jew, and one trusts a non-Jew, the "darkest chapter" is the Nazi murder of six million.

The Jewish Councils, established by Nazi decree in 1939, had to conduct community affairs and transmit Nazi orders. Some kind of organization had to exist among the imprisoned Jewries of the ghettos for the distribution of food, sanitation, and even education. It is clear from all accounts that the ghettos became isolated worlds whose inhabitants clung to the illusion that some would survive until liberation. The Jewish Councils, forced to assume responsibility, had the agonizing task of fulfilling German orders and at the same time of trying to shield the ghetto from Nazi savagery. According to Hilberg, "the Jewish Councils, in the exercise of their historic function, continued until the end to make desperate attempts to alleviate the suf-

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fering and to stop the mass dying in the ghettos"—a statement which might seem to qualify Miss Arendt's somber vision of Jewish functionaries engrossed in writing deportation orders.

To indicate how the Jewish Councils relished their authority, Miss Arendt comments as follows on the first announcement issued by the Budapest Council: "We still can sense how they enjoyed their new power—'The Central Jewish Council is granted the right of absolute disposal over all Jewish spiritual and material wealth and over all Jewish manpower.'" But she does not bother to relate the circumstances (reported on the same page by the same Hilberg) which explain this announcement. Eichmann had arrived in Budapest to form a *Judenrat*. To enlist the unwitting cooperation of the Jews in their eventual destruction he assured them that they had nothing to fear unless they refused and that "after the war the Germans would be *gutmutig* [amiable] again." The Budapest Council members asked for compliance because they honestly believed that obedience would save Jewish lives. When they discovered the truth, the "Jewish leaders" (Hilberg) implored the Allies to bomb the railway junctions. So much for their "enjoyment."

Eichmann's elaborate deception was typical of the Nazi technique. Every first hand account of the ghettos describes the ingenuity with which the Germans kept their victims from discovering their doom. The ghettos not only segregated the Jews but divided them into manageable groups before whom the Nazis held out the promise of "resettlement" in the East. In the Warsaw Ghetto people who reported voluntarily to the transfer center were given bread and marmalade as an indication of Nazi kindliness. Postal cards, supposedly from previous deportees, kept arriving to prove that the writers were alive and working. To combat doubts the Nazis showed motion pictures of the comfortable life in the "work camps." The trickery was maintained till the very entrance into the gas chambers: men and women undressed voluntarily in the belief that they were entering a shower bath.

When, despite Nazi adroitness, the truth began to filter back to the ghettos from the extermination centers, many rejected the information as atrocity propaganda. They could not believe the humanly unbelievable. By the time the realization of the truth was inescapable, the majority of survivors was too reduced by hunger, disease and incarceration for even a gesture of opposition to the Nazi machine.

Emanuel Ringelblum (*Notes From The Warsaw Ghetto*), the archivist of the ghetto, asks in the diary discovered after his death: "A very interesting question is that of the passivity of the Jewish masses who expire with no more than a slight sigh. Why are they all so quiet? Why does the father die, and the mother, and each of the children, without a single protest?" He answers: "the fear of mass reprisals" and the "physical passivity" of those dying of hunger.

In the recently discovered Kaplan Diary, we read (July 30, 1942): "Amid all the tragedy of sudden expulsion, one minor detail is perhaps the most tragic of all: people come to the transfer point voluntarily, saying, Take me from the quagmire of the ghetto. I will die anyhow."

Ringelblum, Kaplan and other firsthand reporters vehemently denounced individual members of the Councils. One of the most abject episodes in the

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Kaplan Diary is his account of a terrified Council member huddling with his wife in his office, afraid that the Germans will seize her the moment she steps from his side. Yet these searing portraits can be accepted not as libels but as authentic descriptions of ghetto life, and the reason is that the diarists present complete not partial pictures. One never forgets that the cowering Council member is as much a victim of the Nazi terror as the fellow victim whose name he inscribes. Those who refused to fulfill German orders were immediately shot (Paul Eppstein, Theresienstadt) or deported. (See Isaiah Trunk's Yiddish account, *Tzukunft,* Vol. 68.) Yet in the face of all the evidence, in her answer to Professor Scholem who reminds her of her statements in regard to the helplessness of the individual before total terror, Miss Arendt writes: "These people were not under the direct pressure of terror but only of indirect." How indirect is shooting?

Two questions are involved in the evaluation of the Councils. The first is moral. Regardless of the effect of their actions, how did they behave? No single answer can be given. Some men were noble, like Adam Czerniakow who killed himself to alarm the world; some were weaklings who tried to save their own families and themselves; most honestly believed that they protected the ghettos from immediate and complete annihilation through the sequence established by the Nazis, and that each deferral promised survival for some.

The second question—would more Jews have survived if there had been no Councils or other forms of organization, as Miss Arendt states—requires only a reference to history. It has already been shown (Hilberg, Robinson, and particularly Lionel Abel in *Partisan Review,* Summer, 1963) that in Russia where no Jewish Councils had been set up, the unorganized Soviet Jews were massacred by the advancing Nazis at an even more rapid rate than in Poland. 900,000 Soviet Jews were murdered by the *Einsatzgruppen* in the first months of the Nazi-Soviet war. Lionel Abel asks pointedly: why does the author ignore such massive evidence which invalidates her thesis? Where the Jewish Councils did function, they were impotent. The most that can be said is that in some instances they determined the place in the death march. They could alter no one's fate, not even their own.

Of the most degraded group, the Jewish commandos in the extermination centers, Miss Arendt writes: "The well-known fact that the actual work of killing in the extermination centers was usually in the hands of Jewish commandos had been fairly and squarely established by witnesses for the prosecution." Not at all. After a review of the entire testimony, Dr. Robinson has pointed out that "not a single witness made such a statement," and that no other evidence to this effect exists. S.S. men did the killing. Jewish commandos were compelled to work on corpses. So much for "fairly and squarely."

In a sense the whole discussion of Jewish Councils is diversionary. No cabal to hush up disclosures as to their failings exists—as Miss Arendt implies. Public trials of individual Council members have taken place repeatedly in Israel. (The trial of Hirsh Barenblat of Bendzin is now in progress in Tel Aviv.) The indignation aroused by Miss Arendt stems from her charge of total Jewish collaboration: leaders,

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parties, organizations, and associations on the "local and international level" constitute the people.

IV

To sustain her charge of total collaboration Miss Arendt manages to transform every positive attempt to save Jews from the Nazis into something suspect. The negotiations of the Jewish Agency with the Nazi government before the war to enable German Jews to transfer goods to Palestine are described by the author as a "mutually highly satisfactory agreement." The Zionist organizers of illegal immigration into Palestine from Germany are shown as concerned only with their partisan political purposes; they are selecting only "would-be pioneers." Jon Kimche *(The Secret Roads: The Illegal Migration of a People)* is quoted to that effect. Miss Arendt fails to quote—from the same page—that after 1938 the Palestinians changed their objective. Kimche writes: "The aim was no longer the need of the Jewish community in Palestine but to save what they could of the Jews in German hands."

Having omitted this essential corrective, Miss Arendt proceeds to moralize about the evil of Jews "selecting" Jews for survival, an error which led to a situation in which "the non-selected majority of Jews found themselves confronted with two enemies—the Nazi authorities and the Jewish authorities." This is clear enough; the would-be rescuer and the destroyer are presented as parallel "enemies." Admittedly, every effort to save, tragically inadequate despite its heroism, implied "selection" since, legally or illegally, only a few could escape. Youth Aliyah, the rescue operation which saved thousands of Jewish children by arrangement with the Nazis, meant "selection." In a sense, every Jew who fled with his family on a quota to the United States "selected" himself in preference to another.

All the desperate abortive ransom negotiations, conducted by such noble figures as Gisi Fleischmann in Slovakia as well as Joel Brand in Hungary, appear in Miss Arendt's text as a chipper, self-seeking collaboration between privileged "Zionists" and the Nazis. Just as the author obscures the distinction between persecutor and victim, she merges killer and savior. All are involved in a symbiosis of guilt. She ignores the constant struggle to organize spiritual and physical resistance long before the Warsaw Ghetto's last stand: the underground classes and lectures to maintain morale; the unceasing attempts of girls and boys posing as Aryans to link the severed ghettos by bringing information and smuggling in a pistol or two; the reverse effort of volunteers outside Europe to breach the ghetto walls and to establish contact with the immured Jewries. An awareness of these attempts is certainly relevant to an understanding of the role of Jewish "leaders" and "parties." This part of the record is not to be found in the Nazi documents on which Hilberg mainly based his study. The extensive Yiddish and Hebrew documentary literature of the period – which Miss Arendt apparently did not consult—does provide the material. There is a problem in scholarship here, and the admirers of Miss Arendt ought to confront it.

Her explanations of the few occasions when Jewries were saved are as wilful as her reasons for their destruction. The 8000 Jews of Denmark escaped because they were in the midst

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of a brave, friendly population located on the coast opposite Sweden; the Danes ferried the Jews across nightly. The courage of the Danes and the accident of geography, not the quality of their "leaders," proved the salvation of the Danish Jews.

To explain the comparative failure of the Nazi extermination program in Italy Miss Arendt makes one of the most sweeping declarations in a book notable for brushing aside obtrusive facts: "The Germans, yielding, as usual, when they met resistance . . ." (page 162). Is this characterization of the Nazi terror to be taken seriously? The Germans were more circumspect in Italy because they were dealing with an ally, not a conquered country.

These are only a few instances of the author's technique. As history, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* is shockingly inaccurate and insofar as her thesis depends on the objective marshalling of evidence it is on shaky ground. Far from being the "quiet, moral, rational" document commended by *The New Yorker,* the book is a tract in which the author manipulates the material with a high-handed assurance.

Nevertheless, those who admire her "insight"— the common nexus of guilt which supposedly binds Nazi and Jew, sinner and sufferer—and those who are deeply offended by it, are both entitled to a *specific refutation* of the bill of particulars which critic after critic has rendered against the work. As a responsible writer, Miss Arendt should offer it. The cry of lèse-majesté is not an adequate rebuttal.

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Irving Howe

BLACK BOYS AND NATIVE SONS

James Baldwin first came to the notice of the American literary public not through his own fiction but as author of an impassioned criticism of the conventional Negro novel. In 1949 he published in *Partisan Review* an essay called "Everybody's Protest Novel," attacking the kind of fiction, from *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to *Native Son,* that had been written about the ordeal of the American Negroes; and two years later he printed in the same magazine "Many Thousands Gone," a tougher and more explicit polemic against Richard Wright and the school of naturalistic "protest" fiction that Wright represented. The protest novel, wrote Baldwin, is undertaken out of sympathy for the Negro, but through its need to present him merely as a social victim or a mythic agent of sexual prowess, it hastens to confine the Negro to the very tones of violence he has known all his life. Compulsively reenacting and magnifying his trauma, the protest novel proves unable to transcend it. So choked with rage has this kind of writing become, it cannot show the Negro as a unique person or locate him as a member of a community with its own traditions and values, its own "unspoken recognition of shared experience which creates a way of life." The failure of the protest novel "lies in its insistence that it is [man's] categorization alone which is real and which cannot be transcended."

Like all attacks launched by young writers against their famous elders, Baldwin's essays were also a kind of announcement of his own intentions. He wrote admiringly about Wright's courage ("his work was an immense liberation and revelation for me"), but now, precisely because Wright had prepared the way for all the Negro writers to come, he, Baldwin, would go further, transcending the sterile categories of "Negro-ness," whether those enforced by the white world or those defensively erected by the Negroes themselves. No longer mere victim or rebel, the Negro would stand free in a self-achieved humanity. As Baldwin put it some years later, he hoped "to prevent myself from becoming *merely* a Negro; or even, merely a Negro writer." The world "tends to trap and immobilize you in the role you play," and for the Negro writer, if he is to be a writer at all, it hardly matters whether the trap is sprung from motives of hatred or condescension.

Baldwin's rebellion against the older Negro novelist who had served him as a model and had helped launch his career, was not of

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course an unprecedented event. The history of literature is full of such painful ruptures, and the issue Baldwin raised is one that keeps recurring, usually as an aftermath to a period of "socially engaged" writing. The novel is an inherently ambiguous genre: it strains toward formal autonomy and can seldom avoid being a public gesture. If it is true, as Baldwin said in "Everybody's Protest Novel," that "literature and sociology are not one and the same," it is equally true that such statements hardly begin to cope with the problem of how a writer's own experience affects his desire to represent human affairs in a work of fiction. Baldwin's formula evades, through rhetorical sweep, the genuinely difficult issue of the relationship between social experience and literature.

Yet in *Notes of a Native Son,* the book in which his remark appears, Baldwin could also say: "One writes out of one thing only—one's own experience." What, then, was the experience of a man with a black skin, what *could* it be in this country? How could a Negro put pen to paper, how could he so much as think or breathe, without some impulsion to protest, be it harsh or mild, political or private, released or buried? The "sociology" of his existence formed a constant pressure on his literary work, and not merely in the way this might be true for any writer, but with a pain and ferocity that nothing could remove.

James Baldwin's early essays are superbly eloquent, displaying virtually in full the gifts that would enable him to become one of the great American rhetoricians. But these essays, like some of the later ones, are marred by rifts in logic, so little noticed when one gets swept away by the brilliance of the language that it takes a special effort to attend their argument.

Later Baldwin would see the problems of the Negro writer with a greater charity and more mature doubt. Reviewing in 1959 a book of poems by Langston Hughes, he wrote: "Hughes is an American Negro poet and has no choice but to be acutely aware of it. He is not the first American Negro to find the war between his social and artistic responsibilities all but irreconcilable." All but irreconcilable: the phrase strikes a note sharply different from Baldwin's attack upon Wright in the early fifties. And it is not hard to surmise the reasons for this change. In the intervening years Baldwin had been living through some of the experiences that had goaded Richard Wright into rage and driven him into exile; he too, like Wright, had been to hell and back, many times over.

II

Gawd, Ah wish all them
white folks was dead.

The day *Native Son* appeared, American culture was changed forever. No matter how much qualifying the book might later need, it made impossible a repetition of the old lies. In all its crudeness, melodrama and claustrophobia of vision, Richard Wright's novel brought

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out into the open, as no one ever had before, the hatred, fear and violence that have crippled and may yet destroy our culture.

A blow at the white man, the novel forced him to recognize himself as an oppressor. A blow at the black man, the novel forced him to recognize the cost of his submission. *Native Son* assaulted the most cherished of American vanities: the hope that the accumulated injustice of the past would bring with it no lasting penalties, the fantasy that in his humiliation the Negro somehow retained a sexual potency—or was it a childlike good-nature?—that made it necessary to envy and still more to suppress him. Speaking from the black wrath of retribution, Wright insisted that history can be a punishment. He told us the one thing even the most liberal whites preferred not to hear: that Negroes were far from patient or forgiving, that they were scarred by fear, that they hated every moment of their suppression even when seeming most acquiescent, and that often enough they hated us, the decent and cultivated white men who from complicity or neglect shared in the responsibility for their plight. If such younger novelists as Baldwin and Ralph Ellison were to move beyond Wright's harsh naturalism and toward more supple modes of fiction, that was possible only because Wright had been there first, courageous enough to release the full weight of his anger.

In *Black Boy,* the autobiographical narrative he published several years later, Wright would tell of an experience he had while working as a bellboy in the South. Many times he had come into a hotel room carrying luggage or food and seen naked white women lounging about, unmoved by shame at his presence, for "blacks were not considered human being anyway.... I was a non-man.... I felt doubly cast out." With the publication of *Native Son,* however, Wright forced his readers to acknowledge his anger, and in that way, if none other, he wrested for himself a sense of dignity as a man. He forced his readers to confront the disease of our culture, and to one of its most terrifying symptoms he gave the name of Bigger Thomas.

Brutal and brutalized, lost forever to his unexpended hatred and his fear of the world, a numbed and illiterate black boy stumbling into a murder and never, not even at the edge of the electric chair, breaking through to an understanding of either his plight or himself, Bigger Thomas was a part of Richard Wright, a part even of the James Baldwin who stared with horror at Wright's Bigger, unable either to absorb him into his consciousness or eject him from it. Enormous courage, a discipline of self-conquest, was required to conceive Bigger Thomas, for this was no eloquent Negro spokesman, no admirable intellectual or formidable proletarian. Bigger was drawn—one would surmise, deliberately—from white fantasy and white contempt. Bigger was the worst of Negro life accepted, then rendered a trifle conscious and thrown back at those who had made him what he was. "No American Negro exists," Baldwin would later write, "who does not have his private Bigger Thomas living in the skull."

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Wright drove his narrative to the very core of American phobia: sexual fright, sexual violation. He understood that the fantasy of rape is a consequence of guilt, what the whites suppose themselves to deserve. He understood that the white man's notion of uncontaminated Negro vitality, little as it had to do with the bitter realities of Negro life, reflected some ill-formed and buried feeling that our culture has run down, lost its blood, become febrile. And he grasped the way in which the sexual issue has been intertwined with social relationships, for even as the white people who hire Bigger as their chauffeur are decent and charitable, even as the girl he accidentally kills is a liberal of sorts, theirs is the power and the privilege. "We black and they white. They got things and we ain't. They do things and we can't."

The novel barely stops to provision a recognizable social world, often contenting itself with cartoon simplicities and yielding almost entirely to the nightmare incomprehension of Bigger Thomas. The mood is apocalyptic, the tone superbly aggressive. Wright was an existentialist long before he heard the name, for he was committed to the literature of extreme situations both through the pressures of his rage and the gasping hope of an ultimate catharsis.

Wright confronts both the violence and the crippling limitations of Bigger Thomas. For Bigger white people are not people at all, but something more, "a sort of great natural force, like a stormy sky looming overhead." And only through violence does he gather a little meaning in life, pitifully little: "he had murdered and created a new life for himself." Beyond that Bigger cannot go.

At first *Native Son* seems still another naturalistic novel: a novel of exposure and accumulation, charting the waste of the undersides of the American city. Behind the book one senses the molding influence of Theodore Dreiser, especially the Dreiser of *An American Tragedy* who knows there are situations so oppressive that only violence can provide their victims with the hope of dignity. Like Dreiser, Wright wished to pummel his readers into awareness; like Dreiser, to overpower them with the sense of society as an enclosing force. Yet the comparison is finally of limited value, and for the disconcerting reason that Dreiser had a white skin and Wright a black one.

The usual naturalistic novel is written with detachment, as if by a scientist surveying a field of operations; it is a novel in which the writer withdraws from a detested world and coldly piles up the evidence for detesting it. *Native Son,* though preserving some of the devices of the naturalistic novel, deviates sharply from its characteristic tone: a tone Wright could not possibly have maintained and which, it may be, no Negro novelist can really hold for long. *Native Son* is a work of assault rather than withdrawal; the author yields himself in part to a vision of nightmare. Bigger's cowering perception of the world becomes the most vivid and authentic component of the book. Naturalism pushed to an extreme turns here into something other than itself, a kind

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of expressionist outburst, no longer a replica of the familiar social world but a self-contained realm of grotesque emblems.

That *Native Son* has grave faults anyone can see. The language is often coarse, flat in rhythm, syntactically overburdened, heavy with journalistic slag. Apart from Bigger, who seems more a brute energy than a particularized figure, the characters have little reality, the Negroes being mere stock accessories and the whites either "agit-prop" villains or heroic Communists whom Wright finds it easier to admire from a distance than establish from within. The long speech by Bigger's radical lawyer Max (again a device apparently borrowed from Dreiser) is ill-related to the book itself: Wright had not achieved Dreiser's capacity for absorbing everything, even the most recalcitrant philosophical passages, into a unified vision of things. Between Wright's feelings as a Negro and his beliefs as a Communist there is hardly a genuine fusion, and it is through this gap that a good part of the novel's unreality pours in.

Yet it should be said that the endlessly repeated criticism that Wright caps his melodrama with a party-line oration tends to oversimplify the novel, for Wright is too honest simply to allow the propagandistic message to constitute the last word. Indeed, the last word is given not to Max but to Bigger. For at the end Bigger remains at the mercy of his hatred and fear, the lawyer retreats helplessly, the projected union between political consciousness and raw revolt has not been achieved—as if Wright were persuaded that, all ideology apart, there is for each Negro an ultimate trial that he can bear only by himself.

Black Boy, which appeared five years after *Native Son,* is a slighter but more skillful piece of writing. Richard Wright came from a broken home, and as he moved from his helpless mother to a grandmother whose religious fanaticism (she was a Seventh-Day Adventist) proved utterly suffocating, he soon picked up a precocious knowledge of vice and a realistic awareness of social power. This autobiographical memoir, a small classic in the literature of self-discovery, is packed with harsh evocations of Negro adolescence in the South. The young Wright learns how wounding it is to wear the mask of a grinning niggerboy in order to keep a job. He examines the life of the Negroes and judges it without charity or idyllic compensations—for he already knows, in his heart and bones, that to be oppressed means to lose out on human possibilities. By the time he is seventeen, preparing to leave for Chicago, where he will work on a WPA project, become a member of the Communist party, and publish his first book of stories called *Uncle Tom's Children,* Wright has managed to achieve the beginnings of consciousness, through a slow and painful growth from the very bottom of deprivation to the threshold of artistic achievement and a glimpsed idea of freedom.

III

Baldwin's attack upon Wright had partly been anticipated by the

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more sophisticated American critics. Alfred Kazin, for example, had found in Wright a troubling obsession with violence:

> If he chose to write the story of Bigger Thomas as a grotesque crime story, it is because his own indignation and the sickness of the age combined to make him dependent on violence and shock, to astonish the reader by torrential scenes of cruelty, hunger, rape, murder and flight, and then enlighten him by crude Stalinist homilies.

The last phrase apart, something quite similar could be said about the author of *Crime and Punishment*; it is disconcerting to reflect that few novelists, even the very greatest, could pass this kind of moral inspection. For the novel as a genre seems to have an inherent bias toward extreme effects, such as violence, cruelty and the like. More important, Kazin's judgment rests on the assumption that a critic can readily distinguish between the genuine need of a writer to cope with ugly realities and the damaging effect these realities may have upon his moral and psychic life. But in regard to contemporary writers one finds it very hard to distinguish between a valid portrayal of violence and an obsessive involvement with it. A certain amount of obsession may be necessary for the valid portrayal—writers devoted to themes of desperation cannot keep themselves morally intact. And when we come to a writer like Richard Wright, who deals with the most degraded and inarticulate sector of the Negro world, the distinction between objective rendering and subjective immersion becomes still more difficult, perhaps even impossible. For a novelist who has lived through the searing experiences that Wright has there cannot be much possibility of approaching his subject with the "mature" poise recommended by high-minded critics. What is more, the very act of writing his novel, the effort to confront what a Bigger Thomas means to him, is for such a writer a way of dredging up and then perhaps shedding the violence that society has pounded into him. Is Bigger an authentic projection of a social reality, or is he a symptom of Wright's "dependence on violence and shock?" Obviously both; and it could not be otherwise.

For the reality pressing upon all of Wright's work was a nightmare of remembrance, everything from which he had pulled himself out, with an effort and at a cost that is almost unimaginable. Without the terror of that nightmare it would have been impossible for Wright to summon the truth of the reality—not the only truth about American Negroes, perhaps not even the deepest one, but a primary and inescapable truth. Both truth and terror rested on a gross fact which Wright alone dared to confront: that violence is central to the life of the American Negro, defining and crippling him with a harshness few other Americans need suffer. "No American Negro exists who does not have his private Bigger Thomas living in the skull."

Now I think it would be well not to judge in the abstract, or with much haste, the violence that gathers in the Negro's heart as a response to the violence he encounters in society. It would be well to see this

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violence as part of an historical experience that is open to moral scrutiny but ought to be shielded from presumptuous moralizing. Bigger Thomas may be enslaved to a hunger for violence, but anyone reading *Native Son* with mere courtesy must observe the way in which Wright, even while yielding emotionally to Bigger's deprivation, also struggles to transcend it. That he did not fully succeed seems obvious; one may doubt that any Negro writer could.

More subtle and human than Baldwin's criticism is a remark made some years ago by Isaac Rosenfeld while reviewing *Black Boy:* "As with all Negroes and all men who are born to suffer social injustice, part of [Wright's] humanity found itself only in acquaintance with violence, and in hatred of the oppressor." Surely Rosenfeld was not here inviting an easy acquiescence in violence; he was trying to suggest the historical context, the psychological dynamics, which condition the attitudes all Negro writers take, or must take, toward violence. To say this is not to propose the condescension of exempting Negro writers from moral judgment, but to suggest the terms of understanding, and still more, the terms of hesitation for making a judgment.

There were times when Baldwin grasped this point better than anyone else. If he could speak of the "unrewarding rage" of *Native Son,* he also spoke of the book as "an immense liberation." Is it impudent to suggest that one reason he felt the book to be a liberation was precisely its rage, precisely the relief and pleasure that he, like so many other Negroes, must have felt upon seeing those long-suppressed emotions finally breaking through?

The kind of criticism Baldwin wrote was very fashionable in America during the post-war years. Mimicking the Freudian corrosion of motives and bristling with dialectical agility, this criticism approached all ideal claims, especially those made by radical and naturalist writers, with a weary skepticism and proceeded to transfer the values such writers were attacking to the perspective from which they attacked. If Dreiser wrote about the power hunger and dream of success corrupting American society, that was because he was really infatuated with them. If Farrell showed the meanness of life in the Chicago slums, that was because he could not really escape it. If Wright portrayed the violence gripping Negro life, that was because he was really obsessed with it. The word "really" or more sophisticated equivalents could do endless service in behalf of a generation of intellectuals soured on the tradition of protest but suspecting they might be pygmies in comparison to the writers who had protested. In reply, there was no way to "prove" that Dreiser, Farrell and Wright were not contaminated by the false values they attacked; probably, since they were mere mortals living in the present society, they were contaminated; and so one had to keep insisting that such writers were nevertheless presenting actualities of modern experience, not merely phantoms of their neuroses.

If Bigger Thomas, as Baldwin said, "accepted a theology that denies him life," if in his Negro self-hatred he "*wants* to die because he glories

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in his hatred," this did not constitute a criticism of Wright unless one were prepared to assume what was simply preposterous: that Wright, for all his emotional involvement with Bigger, could not see beyond the limitations of the character he had created. This was a question Baldwin never seriously confronted in his early essays. He would describe accurately the limitations of Bigger Thomas and then, by one of those rhetorical leaps at which he is so gifted, would assume that these were also the limitations of Wright or his book.

Still another ground for Baldwin's attack was his reluctance to accept the clenched militancy of Wright's posture as both novelist and man. In a remarkable sentence appearing in "Everybody's Protest Novel" Baldwin wrote: "our humanity is our burden, our life; we need not battle for it; we need only to do what is infinitely more difficult —that is, accept it." What Baldwin was saying here was part of the outlook so many American intellectuals took over during the years of a post-war liberalism not very different from conservatism. Ralph Ellison expressed this view in terms still more extreme: "Thus to see America with an awareness of its rich diversity and its almost magical fluidity and freedom, I was forced to conceive of a novel unburdened by the narrow naturalism which has led after so many triumphs to the final and unrelieved despair which marks so much of our current fiction." This note of willed affirmation was to be heard in many other works of the early fifties, most notably in Saul Bellow's *Adventures of Augie March*. Today it is likely to strike one as a note whistled in the dark. In response to Baldwin and Ellison, Wright would have said (I virtually quote the words he used in talking to me during the summer of 1958) that only through struggle could men with black skins, and for that matter, all the oppressed of the world, achieve their humanity. It was a lesson, said Wright with a touch of bitterness yet not without kindness, that the younger writers would have to learn in their own way and their own time. All that has happened since, bears him out.

One criticism made by Baldwin in writing about *Native Son,* perhaps because it is the least ideological, remains important. He complained that in Wright's novel "a necessary dimension has been cut away; this dimension being the relationship that Negroes bear to one another, that depth of involvement and unspoken recognition of shared experience which creates a way of life." The climate of the book, "common to most Negro protest novels . . . has led us all to believe that in Negro life there exists no tradition, no field of manners, no possibility of ritual or intercourse, such as may, for example, sustain the Jew even after he has left his father's house." It could be urged, perhaps, that in composing a novel verging on expressionism Wright need not be expected to present the Negro world with fullness, balance or nuance; but there can be little doubt that in this respect Baldwin did score a major point: the posture of militancy, no matter how great the need for it, exacts a heavy price from the writer, as indeed from everyone else. For "Even the hatred of squalor/Makes the brow grow stern/Even

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anger against injustice/Makes the voice grow harsh. . . ." All one can ask, by way of reply, is whether the refusal to struggle may not exact a still greater price. It is a question that would soon be tormenting James Baldwin, and almost against his will.

IV

In his own novels Baldwin hoped to show the Negro world in its diversity and richness, not as a mere specter of protest; he wished to show it as a living culture of men and women who, even when deprived, share in the emotions and desires of common humanity. And he meant also to evoke something of the distinctiveness of Negro life in America, as evidence of its worth, moral tenacity and right to self-acceptance. How can one not sympathize with such a program? And how, precisely as one does sympathize, can one avoid the conclusion that in this effort Baldwin has thus far failed to register a major success?

His first novel, *Go Tell It on the Mountain,* is an enticing but minor work: it traces the growing-up of a Negro boy in the atmosphere of a repressive Calvinism, a Christianity stripped of grace and brutal with fantasies of submission and vengeance. No other work of American fiction reveals so graphically the way in which an oppressed minority aggravates its own oppression through the torments of religious fanaticism. The novel is also striking as a modest *Bildungsroman,* the education of an imaginative Negro boy caught in the heart-struggle between his need to revolt, which would probably lead to his destruction in the jungles of New York, and the miserly consolations of black Calvinism, which would signify that he accepts the denial of his personal needs. But it would be a mistake to claim too much for this first novel, in which a rhetorical flair and a conspicuous sincerity often eat away at the integrity of event and the substance of character. The novel is intense, and the intensity is due to Baldwin's absorption in that religion of denial which leads the boy to become a preacher in his father's church, to scream out God's word from "a merciless resolve to kill my father rather than allow my father to kill me." Religion has of course played a central role in Negro life, yet one may doubt that the special kind of religious experience dominating *Go Tell It on the Mountain* is any more representative of that life, any more advantageous a theme for gathering in the qualities of Negro culture, than the violence and outrage of *Native Son.* Like Wright before him, Baldwin wrote from the intolerable pressures of his own experience; there was no alternative; each had to release his own agony before he could regard Negro life with the beginnings of objectivity.

Baldwin's second novel, *Giovanni's Room,* seems to me a flat failure. It abandons Negro life entirely (not in itself a cause for judgment) and focuses upon the distraught personal relations of several young Americans adrift in Paris. The problem of homosexuality, which is to recur in Baldwin's fiction, is confronted with a notable candor, but also with a disconcerting kind of sentimentalism, a quavering and sophisticated

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submission to the ideology of love. It is one thing to call for the treatment of character as integral and unique; but quite another for a writer with Baldwin's background and passions to bring together successfully his sensibility as a Negro and his sense of personal trouble.

Baldwin has not yet succeeded—the irony is a stringent one—in composing the kind of novel he counterposed to the work of Richard Wright. He has written three essays, ranging in tone from disturbed affection to disturbing malice, in which he tries to break from his rebellious dependency upon Wright, but he remains tied to the memory of the older man. The Negro writer who has come closest to satisfying Baldwin's program is not Baldwin himself but Ralph Ellison, whose novel *Invisible Man* is a brilliant though flawed achievement, standing with *Native Son* as the major fiction thus far composed by American Negroes.

What astonishes one most about *Invisible Man* is the apparent freedom it displays from the ideological and emotional penalties suffered by Negroes in this country—I say "apparent" because the freedom is not quite so complete as the book's admirers like to suppose. Still, for long stretches *Invisible Man* does escape the formulas of protest, local color, genre quaintness and jazz chatter. No white man could have written it, since no white man could know with such intimacy the life of the Negroes from the inside; yet Ellison writes with an ease and humor which are now and again simply miraculous.

Invisible Man is a record of a Negro's journey through contemporary America, from South to North, province to city, naive faith to disenchantment and perhaps beyond. There are clear allegorical intentions (Ellison is "literary" to a fault) but with a book so rich in talk and drama it would be a shame to neglect the fascinating surface for the mere depths. The beginning is both nightmare and farce. A timid Negro boy comes to a white smoker in a Southern town: he is to be awarded a scholarship. Together with several other Negro boys he is rushed to the front of the ballroom, where a sumptuous blonde tantalizes and frightens them by dancing in the nude. Blindfolded, the Negro boys stage a "battle royal," a free-for-all in which they pummel each other to the drunken shouts of the whites. Practical jokes, humiliations, terror—and then the boy delivers a prepared speech of gratitude to his white benefactors. At the end of this section, the boy dreams that he has opened the briefcase given him together with his scholarship to a Negro college and that he finds an inscription reading: "To Whom It May Concern: Keep This Nigger-Boy Running."

He keeps running. He goes to his college and is expelled for having innocently taken a white donor through a Negro gin-mill which also happens to be a brothel. His whole experience is to follow this pattern. Strip down a pretense, whether by choice or accident, and you will suffer penalties, since the rickety structure of Negro respectability rests upon pretense and those who profit from it cannot bear to have the reality exposed (in this case, that the college is dependent upon the Northern white millionaire). The boy then leaves for New York, where

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he works in a white-paint factory, becomes a soapboxer for the Harlem Communists, the darling of the fellow-travelling Bohemia, and a big wheel in the Negro world. At the end, after witnessing a frenzied race riot in Harlem, he "finds himself" in some not entirely specified way, and his odyssey from submission to autonomy is complete.

Ellison has an abundance of that primary talent without which neither craft nor intelligence can save a novelist: he is richly, wildly inventive; his scenes rise and dip with tension, his people bleed, his language sings. No other writer has captured so much of the hidden gloom and surface gaiety of Negro life.

There is a great deal of superbly rendered speech: a West Indian woman inciting men to resist an eviction, a Southern sharecropper calmly describing how he seduced his daughter, a Harlem street-vendor spinning jive. The rhythm of Ellison's prose is harsh and nervous, like a beat of harried alertness. The observation is expert: he knows exactly how zootsuiters walk, making stylization their principle of life, and exactly how the antagonism between American and West Indian Negroes works itself out in speech and humor. He can accept his people as they are, in their blindness and hope:—here, finally, the Negro world does exist, seemingly apart from plight or protest. And in the final scene Ellison has created an unforgettable image: "Ras the Destroyer," a Negro nationalist, appears on a horse dressed in the costume of an Abyssinian chieftain, carrying spear and shield, and charging wildly into the police—a black Quixote, mad, absurd, pathetic.

But even Ellison cannot help being caught up with *the idea* of the Negro. To write simply about "Negro experience" with the esthetic distance urged by the critics of the fifties, is a moral and psychological impossibility, for plight and protest are inseparable from that experience, and even if less political than Wright and less prophetic than Baldwin, Ellison knows this quite as well as they do.

If *Native Son* is marred by the ideological delusion of the thirties, *Invisible Man* is marred, less grossly, by those of the fifties. The middle section of Ellison's novel, dealing with the Harlem Communists, does not ring quite true, in the way a good portion of the writings on this theme during the post-war years does not ring quite true. Ellison makes his Stalinist figures so vicious and stupid that one cannot understand how they could ever have attracted him or any other Negro. That the party leadership manipulated members with deliberate cynicism is beyond doubt, but this cynicism was surely more complex and guarded than Ellison shows it to be. No party leader would ever tell a prominent Negro Communist, as one of them does in *Invisible Man:* "You were not hired [as a functionary] to think"—even if that were what he felt. Such passages are almost as damaging as the propagandist outbursts in *Native Son.*

Still more troublesome, both as it breaks the coherence of the novel and reveals Ellison's dependence on the post-war *Zeitgeist,* is the sudden, unprepared and implausible assertion of unconditioned freedom with

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which the novel ends. As the hero abandons the Communist Party he wonders ,"Could politics ever be an expression of love?" This question, more portentous than profound, cannot easily be reconciled to a character who has been presented mainly as a passive victim of his experience. Nor is one easily persuaded by the hero's discovery that "my world has become one of infinite possibilities," his refusal to be the "invisible man" whose body is manipulated by various social groups. Though the unqualified assertion of self-liberation was a favorite strategy among American literary people in the fifties, it is also vapid and insubstantial. It violates the reality of social life, the interplay between external conditions and personal will, quite as much as the determinism of the thirties. The unfortunate fact remains that to define one's individuality is to stumble upon social barriers which stand in the way, all too much in the way, of "infinite possibilities." Freedom can be fought for, but it cannot always be willed or asserted into existence. And it seems hardly an accident that even as Ellison's hero asserts the "infinite possibilities," he makes no attempt to specify them.

Throughout the fifties Richard Wright was struggling to find his place in a world he knew to be changing but could not grasp with the assurance he had felt in his earlier years. He had resigned with some bitterness from the Communist Party, though he tried to preserve an independent radical outlook, tinged occasionally with black nationalism. He became absorbed in the politics and literature of the rising African nations, but when visiting them he felt hurt at how great was the distance between an American Negro and an African. He found life in America intolerable, and he spent his last fourteen years in Paris, somewhat friendly with the intellectual group around Jean-Paul Sartre but finally a loner, a man who stood by the pride of his rootlessness. And he kept writing, steadily experimenting, partly, it may be, in response to the younger men who had taken his place in the limelight and partly because he was a dedicated writer.

These last years were difficult for Wright, since he neither made a true home in Paris nor kept in imaginative touch with the changing life of the United States. In the early fifties he published a very poor novel *The Outsider,* full of existentialist jargon applied but not really absorbed to the Negro theme. He was a writer in limbo, and his better fiction, such as the novelette "The Man Who Lived Underground," is a projection of that state.

In the late fifties Wright published another novel, *The Long Dream,* which is set in Mississippi and displays a considerable recovery of his powers. This book has been attacked for presenting Negro life in the South through "old-fashioned" images of violence, but one ought to hesitate before denying the relevance of such images or joining in the criticism of their use. For Wright was perhaps justified in not paying attention to the changes that have occurred in the South these past few decades. When Negro liberals write that despite the prevalence of bias

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there has been an improvement in the life of their people, such statements are reasonable and necessary. But what have these to do with the way Negroes feel, with the power of the memories they must surely retain? About this we know very little and would be well advised not to nourish preconceptions, for their feelings may well be closer to Wright's rasping outbursts than to the more modulated tones of the younger Negro novelists. *Wright remembered,* and what he remembered other Negroes must also have remembered. And in that way he kept faith with the experience of the boy who had fought his way out of the depths, to speak for those who remained there.

His most interesting fiction after *Native Son* is to be found in a posthumous collection of stories, *Eight Men,* written during the last 25 years of his life. Though they fail to yield any clear line of chronological development, these stories give evidence of Wright's literary restlessness, his often clumsy efforts to break out of the naturalism which was his first and, I think, necessary mode of expression. The unevenness of his writing is highly disturbing: one finds it hard to understand how the same man, from paragraph to paragraph, can be so brilliant and inept. Time after time the narrative texture is broken by a passage of sociological or psychological jargon; perhaps the later Wright tried too hard, read too much, failed to remain sufficiently loyal to the limits of his talent.

Some of the stories, such as "Big Black Good Man," are enlivened by Wright's sardonic humor, the humor of a man who has known and released the full measure of his despair but finds that neither knowledge nor release matters in a world of despair. In "The Man Who Lived Underground" Wright shows a sense of narrative rhythm, which is superior to anything in his full-length novels and evidence of the seriousness with which he kept working.

The main literary problem that troubled Wright in recent years was that of rendering his naturalism a more terse and supple instrument. I think he went astray whenever he abandoned naturalism entirely: there are a few embarrassingly bad experiments with stories employing self-consciously Freudian symbolism. Wright needed the accumulated material of circumstance which naturalistic detail provided his fiction; it was as essential to his ultimate effect of shock and bruise as dialogue to Hemingway's ultimate effect of irony and loss. But Wright was correct in thinking that the problem of detail is the most vexing technical problem the naturalist writer must face, since the accumulation that makes for depth and solidity can also become very tiresome. In "The Man Who Lived Underground" Wright came close to solving this problem, for here the naturalistic detail is put at the service of a radical projective image—a Negro trapped in a sewer; and despite some flaws, the story is satisfying both for its tense surface and elasticity of suggestion.

Richard Wright died at 52, full of hopes and projects. Like many of us, he had somewhat lost his intellectual way, but he kept struggling

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toward the perfection of his craft and toward a comprehension of the strange world that in his last years was coming into birth. In the most fundamental sense, however, he had done his work: he had told his contemporaries a truth so bitter, they paid him the tribute of trying to forget it.

V

Looking back to the early essays and fiction of James Baldwin, one wishes to see a little further than they at first invite:—to see past their brilliance of gesture, by which older writers could be dismissed, and past their aura of gravity, by which a generation of intellectuals could be enticed. After this hard and dismal decade, what strikes one most of all is the sheer pathos of these early writings, the way they reveal the desire of a greatly talented young man to escape the scars—and why should he not have wished to escape them?—he had found upon the faces of his elders and knew to be gratuitous and unlovely.

Chekhov once said that what the aristocratic Russian writers assumed as their birthright, the writers who came from the lower orders had to pay for with their youth. James Baldwin did not want to pay with his youth, as Richard Wright had paid so dearly. He wanted to move, as Wright had not been able to, beyond the burden or bravado of his stigma; he wanted to enter the world of freedom, grace, and self-creation. One would need a heart of stone, or be a brutal moralist, to feel anything but sympathy for this desire. But we do not make our circumstances; we can, at best, try to remake them. And all the recent writing of Baldwin indicates that the wishes of his youth could not be realized, not in *this* country. The sentiments of humanity which had made him rebel against Richard Wright have now driven him back to a position close to Wright's rebellion.

Baldwin's most recent novel *Another Country* is a "protest novel" quite as much as *Native Son,* and anyone vindictive enough to make the effort, could score against it the points Baldwin scored against Wright. No longer is Baldwin's prose so elegant or suave as it once was; in this book it is harsh, clumsy, heavy-breathing with the pant of suppressed bitterness. In about half of *Another Country*—the best half, I would judge—the material is handled in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Wright's naturalism: a piling on of the details of victimization, as the jazz musician Rufus Scott, a sophisticated distant cousin of Bigger Thomas, goes steadily down the path of self-destruction, worn out in the effort to survive in the white man's jungle and consumed by a rage too extreme to articulate yet too amorphous to act upon. The narrative voice is a voice of anger, rasping and thrusting, not at all "literary" in the somewhat lacquered way the earlier Baldwin was able to achieve. And what that voice says, no longer held back by the proprieties of literature, is that the nightmare of the history we have made allows us no immediate escape. Even if all the visible tokens of injustice were erased, the Negroes would retain their hatred and the whites their fear and

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guilt. Forgiveness cannot be speedily willed, if willed at all, and before it can even be imagined there will have to be a fuller discharge of those violent feelings that have so long been suppressed. It is not a pretty thought, but neither is it a mere "unrewarding rage"; and it has the sad advantage of being true, first as Baldwin embodies it in the disintegration of Rufus, which he portrays with a ferocity quite new in his fiction, and then as he embodies it in the hard-driving ambition of Rufus' sister Ida, who means to climb up to success even if she has to bloody a good many people, whites preferably, in order to do it.

Another Country has within it another novel: a nagging portrayal of that entanglement of personal relationships—sterile, involuted, grindingly rehearsed, pursued with quasi-religious fervor, and cut off from any dense context of social life—which has come to be a standard element in contemporary fiction. The author of *this* novel is caught up with the problem of communication, the emptiness that seeps through the lives of many cultivated persons and in response to which he can only reiterate the saving value of true and lonely love. These portions of *Another Country* tend to be abstract, without the veined milieu, the filled-out world, a novel needs: as if Baldwin, once he moves away from the Negro theme, finds it quite as hard to lay hold of contemporary experience as do most other novelists. The two pulls upon his attention are difficult to reconcile, and Baldwin's future as a novelist is decidedly uncertain.

During the last few years Baldwin has emerged as a national figure, a leading intellectual spokesman for the Negroes, whose recent essays, as in *The Fire Next Time,* reach heights of passionate exhortation unmatched in modern American writing. Whatever his ultimate success or failure as a novelist, Baldwin has already secured his place as one of the two or three greatest essayists this country has ever produced. He has brought a new luster to the essay as an art form, a form with possibilities for discursive reflection and concrete drama which makes it a serious competitor to the novel, until recently almost unchallenged as the dominant literary genre in our time. Apparently drawing upon Baldwin's youthful experience as the son of a Negro preacher, the style of these essays is a remarkable instance of the way in which a grave and sustained eloquence—the rhythm of oratory, but that rhythm held firm and hard—can be employed in an age deeply suspicious of rhetorical prowess. And in pieces like the reports on Harlem and the account of his first visit South, Baldwin realizes far better than in his novels the goal he had set himself of presenting Negro life through an "unspoken recognition of shared experience." Yet it should also be recognized that these essays gain at least some of their resonance from the tone of unrelenting protest in which they are written, from the very anger, even the violence Baldwin had begun by rejecting.

Like Richard Wright before him, Baldwin has discovered that to assert his humanity he must release his rage. But if rage makes for power it does not always encourage clarity, and the truth is that Baldwin's most

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recent essays are shot through with intellectual confusion, torn by the conflict between his assumption that the Negro must find an honorable place in the life of American society and his apocalyptic sense, mostly fear but just a little hope, that this society is beyond salvation, doomed with the sickness of the West. And again like Wright, he gives way on occasion to the lure of black nationalism. Its formal creed does not interest him, for he knows it to be shoddy, but he is impressed by its capacity to evoke norms of discipline among its followers at a time when the Negro community is threatened by a serious inner demoralization.

In his role as spokesman, Baldwin must pronounce with certainty and struggle with militancy; he has at the moment no other choice; yet whatever may have been the objective inadequacy of his polemic against Wright a decade ago, there can be no question that his refusal to accept the role of protest reflected faithfully some of his deepest needs and desires. But we do not make our circumstances; we can, at best, try to remake them; and the arena of choice and action always proves to be a little narrower than we had supposed. One generation passes its dilemmas to the next, black boys on to native sons.

"It is in revolt that man goes beyond himself to discover other people, and from this point of view, human solidarity is a philosophical certainty." The words come from Camus; they might easily have been echoed by Richard Wright; and today one can imagine them being repeated, with a kind of rueful passion, by James Baldwin. No more important words could be spoken in our century, but it would be foolish, and impudent, not to recognize that for the men who must live by them the cost is heavy.

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NOTEBOOK

Edward T. Chase

Further Autopsies on the Market System

The siege against the market system, or more accurately, against its sustaining folklore, grows stronger, "end of ideology" or not. With the appearance of David Bazelon's *The Paper Economy* (Random House; $6.95), it undergoes an assault a notch more devastating than J. K. Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* of six years ago. One might marvel nowadays at the system's durability in the face of its near-unanimous rejection by our best economic theorists, were it not for life's daily reminders that the system's operators still have practically all the marbles. Which, of course, is one reason they feel they can afford to publish Bazelon and celebrate him in their journals. Among the market's serious critics, only Adolf Berle, with his notion of a beneficent concomitant of the market that he calls "the transcendental margin"—a theory of business altruism that rings false—continues explicitly to uphold the system.

What Bazelon gives us with an astonishing verve and downrightness, is a sophisticated gloss of our economic condition as it really is. A shock of recognition attends the reading of nearly every page. So does a kind of rueful laughter; this book is a rare literary form, an essay in ridicule. But the compelling fact about Bazelon's argument is that he establishes that the fundamental force undermining the market system at an accelerating rate is not some successful polemic or even a worsening of economic conditions but rather the relentless, impersonal workings of technological change. Bazelon is an effective ideologue precisely because he appears to eschew that role. His tactic is simply to reveal, with a maximum of wit, the operating realities of our economic life. He is least effective when he tries to apply extra leverage to his argument by dragging in the cold war, as if beating out Communism were necessary to the overwhelming case he makes.

The essence of his case is that the accretions of the market system—property rights, money, credit, debit, tax, accounting procedures—have by now made ours a "paper economy" with a vengeance, for the system triumphs not as it fosters production but solely as it creates favorable balance sheets. This absorption with bookkeeping is a true perversion of economic activity since to achieve its end result—private corporation profit—it as often as not throttles technology. The reason so heinous a system has long prevailed, suggests Bazelon, is that, historically,

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in a more rudimentary social order of predominant scarcity it worked well enough. But now its very success, signified by abundance, invalidates all the premises on which it has been constructed. Under the modern market scheme of things, surplus "inventory" is the least tolerable condition of all, so help us, and it is this basic absurdity, this effrontery, that impels Bazelon to develop his ruthless analysis.

Weight of Evidence

Bazelon is not the first nor will he be the last to demonstrate that market economics continues to pretend that *the* problem is to allocate *scarce* resources among a number of different industries each producing commodities exchangeable for the products of other industries, when in fact technology has now all but wrecked the game by replacing scarcity with abundance, at least potentially. However, if Bazelon is in the tradition of Veblen, Gardiner Means, Berle, C. E. Ayres, Thurman Arnold and, latterly, Donald Michael, Gerard Piel and Robert Theobald in elaborating upon the inhibitory and inequitable effects of the price-market mechanism, he makes by far the biggest contribution to it within recent memory. He does so by the overwhelming weight of the evidence he marshals. The evidence is partly statistical and factual—Bazelon disavows being an expert, so as a generalist he has read everything—and partly intuitive.

He writes:

> I think there is no question that man's sense of himself and the traditional psychological notions about human nature, all have been substantially conditioned by the previously existing scarcities. So the final result of the technological revolution will be a new conception of man. This need disturb no one, since economics has always been based upon a psychological image of man—on some model of motivation. In this sense, what we are faced with is a revolution in motivation, and the conservatives don't want it, because they see it as an attack on their personalities. Indeed, it is frightening, as well as exhilarating. What in God's name will we do with ourselves if making a dollar loses its allure? If things of all kinds are not very hard to get? If "hewing to the line" no longer really matters? If traditional sacrifice of the present becomes fatuous? (The reason President Kennedy keeps asking for "sacrifice" from the nation is not that any real ones are needed, but because he shrewdly understands that the nation yearns for the mood.) How, then, will we ever face up to the prospect of a decent life? In the previous history of the human race, only very small aristocratic groups were ever confronted with those delicate questions. And unfortunately they didn't solve them—either at all, or usefully for a democratic mass.

He goes on to develop his thesis "that the current image of the system and the obvious facts of the matter are incommensurable." We mindlessly honor "the immutable rules" of the paper economy, essentially the popular business ideology of the "self-coordinating, self-regulating free market," when they are palpably phony. The reality is that all significant prices are administered today; all key markets are rigged to produce profit irrespective of sales volume, let alone production; the "private governments," as Bazelon calls them, of the corporate sector of the economy are underwritten by the central government they ritualistically denounce; balance sheet profits serve us miserably as the allocator of resources, with social needs remaining supremely ir-

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relevant and the perpetuation of managerial elites being the dominating consideration.

What's the Answer?

So perceptive, and frequently funny, is Bazelon's exposition of these familiar matters, and also of his less familiar insight into the changing character of property, debt, credit and law, that one is tempted to share one's delight by quoting favorite passages. But this won't do and anyhow finally the big question must be faced: what's Bazelon's answer to all this? It seems to be little more than vastly greater government involvement in the economy and a faith that the increasingly intellectual character of the new managerial elite running our big corporations will inculcate a genuine concern for the public's well being. Again and again he says that the absurd and dangerous antithesis between government and business must end, there must be an "amalgam" of the two so that we can rationalize the technological revolution. He hardly even tries to spell out how that trick can be effected. He puts his money on the new managers on faith, trusting they will somehow be transmuted into a new kind of conscientious business intelligentsia.

A bit of gossip may help put this answer in perspective. At a recent luncheon, Robert Heilbroner applauded a Bazelon witticism that Daniel Bell's *End of Ideology* should have been entitled "End of *That* Ideology," (i.e., Marxian socialist ideology). At the same table Emile Benoit nodded agreement. The common ground in their generally quite dissimilar new books is their suggested changes in the mix of our mixed economy, all for the sake of greater social justice. Frankly, the recommended changes they all agree upon strike me as inconceivable apart from "*that* ideology." For quite plainly the veritable revolution in housing, education, medical services, urban transportation, etc., via vastly greater government action that Heilbroner, for instance, deems essential (*The Great Ascent*, Harper & Row) "unless we are prepared to bear the consequences of inaction" (a Communist-dominated world)—that revolution is most unlikely simply as a by-product of private cupidity working through a slightly modified market mechanism. And I would say the same goes for the post-disarmament feast (in *Disarmament and the Economy*, Harper & Row) that Benoit covets, the standard liberal litany of superior housing, medicine, etc., as he posits the windfall of resources that would be released with the demise of the defense industries. Ditto Bazelon pleading for decisive structural changes in the U.S. economic system.

But Bazelon is clever in his dismissal of classical socialism as being almost as dated and irrelevant as capitalism since, in his view, it has only existed as a response to capitalism. "The idea that something called socialism just had to replace something called capitalism" was based on a confusion, writes Bazelon. Actually "the new technology—the power of the human mind to fashion reality" is the commanding reality of modern times and "capitalism just happened to be there when this terrible new freedom occurred—and it has restrained at least as much as it has expressed this fundamental historical force." Bazelon's whole book is a testament to the fact that "capitalism has been decisively altered from the inside." "It is question-begging to continue to call it capitalism," he writes. He goes on to say,

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"Socialist ideology was always mostly an inverse image of capitalism, and consequently it either changes with changes in the capitalist order, or it shares the irrelevance of traditional capitalist ideology. Unfortunately, it has participated in the faults of its antagonist."

Its prime failure then, like capitalism's, has been its addiction to the obsolete economics of scarcity and its consequent failure to appreciate that the pertinent challenge is adjustment to abundance and the wise nourishment of the technology creating it. In passing Bazelon observes that "the evangelical heart of socialism was pierced by the betrayal of the German Social Democrats in 1914, and by the nature of the Soviet power created after the Bolsheviks took over in 1917 . . . the Russian experience indicates that classlessness cannot be achieved by an act of human will, that to destroy one ruling class merely prepares the way for the creation of another and not necessarily better one."

Urgency of Reform

Bazelon's is a widely prevailing—I was about to write fashionable—view, or perhaps mood is the better word. One finds it (against an English background) in C. A. R. Crosland's *The Conservative Enemy* (Schocken) and it has been quite vividly capsulized by Irving Kristol in his recent piece in *Harper's,* "Is The Welfare State Obsolete?" Taking two widely discussed areas for illustration, Kristol allows as to how willing he would be to have a General Motors run New York's rapid transit system, and also to leave at least a large share of health care for the elderly up to private insurance—the public will have to pay the cost no matter who runs what, according to this argument. The trouble with this attractive common-sensical notion, however, is that it really evades the point that the system is structured to prevent or sabotage it. To wit, we *have* a "General Motors" of sorts responsible by its charter for New York City's transportation, namely the Port of New York Authority. What the P.A. has done is to ignore the onerous, unpopular task of responsibly seeing to the well-being of mass transit —doomed to being a deficit operation thanks to the weight of private promotion for automobiles and to the political obstacle of the sacrosanct 15 cents fare—and, in big business fashion, to concentrate on the profitable business of bridges, tunnels and highways. Its management has thus preserved itself as a prestigeful, powerful member of the business elite. Similarly, in health insurance, the private sector shuns the low income, high cost, "senior citizens' " market as inevitably a loss operation. And any government subsidy of the private health insurance industry—either direct or indirect through tax incentives so as to encourage the handling of the elderly—won't suffice, because the health insurance industry's leadership is ideologically one with the AMA's, and hence would resist the structural reforms in the American health care system that are essential if we are to take care of our elderly. Such reforms (group practice, regionalization of services) pose a distinct threat to the prevailing medical hierarchy. And so it goes, in area after area of our economy where "public squalor" stands out starkly against the backdrop of private opulence.

Bazelon's relative optimism about the newly intellectual corporate elite's assumption of public responsibilities

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is thus the least convincing aspect of this book. It is when one ponders Heilbroner's *The Great Ascent* and Benoit's *The Economic Impact of Disarmament* that one gets a suggestion of how we may yet be rescued from the problem of public apathy and vested interest. Heilbroner's book is a marvel of succinct, stylish exposition focused upon the agony of the underdeveloped world's socio-economic development. Despite its briskness it is a somber book (as was his more ambitious earlier work, *The Future as History*) contending that it is touch and go as to whether the world's overall political structure will settle into a preponderantly democratic rather than totalitarian character. A continuing mindless addiction to the conventional wisdom of the market system, "the paper economy," is bound to finish us. And Heilbroner is emphatic in his clarification of why forbiddingly authoritarian socialist regimes alone will be capable of accomplishing "the great ascent" of Asia, Africa and Latin America to tolerable levels of economic development.

The impact of this book, perhaps unintentional, is to convince us that radical reform and grinding effort also will soon be required of us at home to cope with the widening discrepancy between our privileged and our disadvantaged classes, with our mounting structural unemployment, and with the progressive deterioration of our urban environment. One infers from Heilbroner that the spectacle of "the great ascent" led by socialist governments in the underdeveloped continents will inevitably quicken the public's recognition of the imminent need for decisive reforms in the U.S. socio-economic structure and will provide lessons on how this can be done.

Disarmament

But there is another probable world development that even more directly would be the catalyst for the changes Bazelon wants, and that is disarmament. Emile Benoit's symposium on the economic implications of such a development is a most valuable contribution. Some of the 15 academicians who have written chapters disappoint with tedious and poorly written papers. Not so Benoit, the book's co-editor (the other is Kenneth E. Boulding). He makes crucial matters simple and clear with an enviably supple style. For one thing he is convincing in demonstrating that step-by-step disarmament phased over a dozen years would not be especially complicated to plan and carry out (the overriding political obstacle of Russia does not come within the book's scope) nor need it have a cataclysmic effect on the economy. The main thrust of this book is that disarmament (over 12 years), in the words of contributor D. B. Suits, "would create an adjustment problem of a lower order of magnitude than that posed year in and year out by the growth of the labor force and increasing productivity. In fact, the impact of disarmament represents a slight, almost unnoticeable, intensification of the problem of adjustment to economic growth in general. . . . The health of the economy depends on how well we manage these persistent problems; the adjustment to disarmament is little more than a detail of the larger adjustment."

What he has in mind primarily is the already staggering problem of structural unemployment and resource allocation. Of course the book's general optimism, if it can be called that, rests on a very big "if." For Benoit, in the book's three key chapters, makes

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plain that an assumption of active Federal intervention in the economy on a vast scale is implicit in the argument. We will emerge from complete and general disarmament (and from our present relative economic stagnation) smelling like a rose *if* we accept substantial deficit financing and other budgetary and monetary reforms; make major selective tax cuts by means of income tax holidays for one or more pay periods keyed to swiftly changing conditions; shift our expenditures from armaments to overpopulation research; to education; to public health (including research into tropical diseases that undermine the vitality of backward continents); to new municipal services including transit and commuter rail transportation; to desalinization of water; to the development of new protein foods from fish meals and algae; to new components for on-site assembly of houses, hospitals, schools, etc., etc.

In short, a sober scrutiny of the economic impact of disarmament under the guise of an academic research project has permitted Benoit *et. al.* to disclose in a most matter-of-fact way just how much is at stake in coping successfully with structural, as opposed to cyclical, economic change. For the reasons suggested, the book is a surprisingly effective complement to Bazelon's and to Heilbroner's.

An unstated but commanding faith permeates these books. Despite all the painful lessons the twentieth century has given us about man's perverse irrationalism, these men, clearly among our best economic writers, express a fresh and undoctrinaire assurance in the capacity of modern economics to guide man's material destiny by planning in ways that are compatible with democracy. It would be nice if the details, the political details, the details about restructuring the power system, were more fully spelled out. Someone must, soon. Bazelon could do it. One senses and hopes that his *Paper Economy,* major accomplishment though it is, is only a warm-up.

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N. Gordon Levin, Jr.

OUR MEN IN HONDURAS

On September 7, 1962, Thomas E. Sunderland, the President of the United Fruit Co., wrote an anxious letter to Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State. Sunderland was upset about a piece of radical land reform legislation then pending in the Honduran Legislature. He said in part:

> . . . Events today indicate the situation in Honduras is getting more serious with the passage of time. Despite assurances by the President in the presence of the American Ambassador that copy of the proposed law would be shown us today, Government officials have now declined to show us the proposed law . . . We urgently need action by the State Department through American Ambassador to get copy of this proposed law before it is too late to take action to protect American interests. Responsible officials of ours now in Honduras continue to have the impression that Honduran officials believe this so-called agrarian reform law either has the tacit approval of the United States or that in any event the United States does not object strenuously to its passage. Imperative that you correct this misimpression on the part of the officials of Honduras, otherwise American property apparently will be subject to expropriation without normal judicial and constitutional protection and without any prompt, adequate and effective compensation. We have attempted to point out the provisions of the Hickenlooper amendment but our representatives in Honduras have been unable to find that the Honduran Government has been advised as to the seriousness of this portion of our law. Appreciate the difficulties under which you are working and know of your desire to protect American investment abroad . . . [1]

The Hickenlooper amendment referred to by Sunderland is actually Section 620 (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. This section instructs the President to cut off all foreign aid to any country which either nationalizes or places excessive tax burdens upon corporations operating on its territory over 50 per cent of whose stock is owned by Americans, unless either "equitable and speedy" compensation is given or rescinding of the taxes takes place within six months. The State Department had opposed this Section in hearings and apparently United Fruit wanted to be sure that the Honduran Government was "reminded"

1 Congressional Record, 87th Congress, Second Session: page 20458.

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of its existence. By the middle of September the situation had worsened from Sunderland's point of view and on September 18, 1962 he telegraphed to Martin:

> Supplementing my telegram of yesterday and today, our representatives have been informed by the Embassy in Honduras that the U.S. Embassy there has not even called to the attention of the Government of Honduras the existence of the Hickenlooper amendment to the 1962 Aid Act and the fact that the proposed agrarian law would be inconsistent with said amendment. Our representatives also were told that the U.S. Embassy had received instructions not to make representations to the Government of Honduras based upon the Hickenlooper amendment, because it would be premature. As you know, matter is most urgent as bill may become law unless the misimpression that the U.S. Government approves the proposed law is corrected.[2]

Apparently, in late September the State Department did in fact let it be known to the Honduran Government that the Alliance for Progress we were running was not of the revolutionary variety. According to United Fruit officials (see below) the State Department reached an agreement with the President of Honduras that certain changes would be necessary in the law to make it accord with the Alliance for Progress (with 620 (e)). The President was to make this clear before signing the law. When the day of signing came, however, emotions ran high. According to Senator Hickenlooper:

> On last Sunday, day before yesterday, with a great deal of ceremony in Honduras, the bill was signed . . . by the President, and there was a great deal of speechmaking to the effect that they are going to take this property now and it will belong to the Hondurans. Apparently one of the major speechmakers at that time had just recently returned from Castro's Cuba and he spoke of the great day on which the land of Honduras is being returned to the Hondurans.[3]

Somehow in the excitement of the moment, or perhaps because of a sudden urge of nationalism, the Honduran President forgot his deal with the U.S. Embassy and mentioned nothing about "necessary" changes in the law. He apparently went so far as to claim that it was in the spirit of the Alianza. On October 1, 1962, Victor C. Folsom, United Fruit Vice President, sent an irate note to Senator Hickenlooper:

> Yesterday the President of Honduras signed so called agrarian reform law but did not repeat or issue statement regarding modifications of law but on the contrary made speech praising the law. We had understood from the State Department that the President was to issue statement pointing out that it would be necessary to amend the law to make it consistent with Alliance for Progress program and international law. Now

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2 Ibid: page 20459.
3 Ibid: page 20457.

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> that law adopted and held up as being praiseworthy and in accordance with the Alliance for Progress program it will be very difficult to secure its modification. Therefore State Department solutions appears highly improbable.[4]

With even greater annoyance Folsom wrote on the same day to Assistant Secretary Martin:

> . . . Cannot understand your statement that no defensible analogy can be made between this program and Communist agrarian reform particularly since you state that you have not read the "exposción de motivos" or statement of purposes attached to the law. The President of Honduras signed the law yesterday without making any statement whatsoever regarding its future amendment to eliminate the conflict of its provision with the Constitution of Honduras and international law. We had understood that the President would make such a statement at the time the law was signed.[5]

On October 2, the Honduras issue reached the floor of the U.S. Senate. Intense anger was generated there in regard to the affrontery of Honduras and the supposed supineness of the State Department. If Assistant Secretary Martin was a little slow in relating events in Honduras to the global machinations of international Communism, Senator Lausche of Ohio was not. In a statement fusing American nationalism and corporation ideology Lausche reminded his colleagues that:

> In the Committee on Foreign Relations the subject of Cuba came up for discussion. It was then pointed out that the confiscation which was tolerated in Cuba in all probability would lead to confiscation of property in Brazil. It was further pointed out . . . that the sufferance of what happened in Cuba brought on what happened in Brazil and, following what happened in Brazil, what happened in Ceylon. Bolivia was then discussing confiscation. Now Honduras is doing so . . . We have been pushed around in Laos and in Vietnam, and by the building of the wall in Berlin. We have been pushed around in the Congo . . . Our sovereignty and our honor are being insulted by this confiscation of property throughout the world . . .[6]

All Senators who spoke seemed to share the viewpoint of the United Fruit executives Sunderland and Folsom that the State Department was not being persistent enough in its pressure on Honduras and Brazil under Section 620 (e). According to Hickenlooper:

> . . . Sometime ago I learned that a bill before the Honduras Legislature provided for the establishment of an agency or commission which would have the right to seize and take over foreign property in Honduras, but with no specified method of payment, except as the commission might determine, and that there would be no appeal to the courts from the

4 Ibid: page 20459.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.

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> action taken by the commission, or no appeal from the commission's decision. In short, the commission could do as it pleased, and could fix such payment, or even a specious payment, as it might wish to fix; and it has openly announced that its purpose is to seize American property in Honduras. The officials have stated that sometime it will get around to issuing some sort of bonds, payable at some distant time in the future, but that in the meantime Americans or American companies will lose their property.[7]

Wayne Morse of Oregon began by angrily referring to the State Department's treating of Section 620 (e) with too great indifference:

> . . . The State Department knew that that was a part of the law. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, I am keenly disappointed that the State Department has not taken a more adamant and persistent attitude in regard to what they knew was the plan of Honduras to enact the kind of law that was referred to by both the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Massachusetts. The law enacted by the Honduras Parliament and signed by the President in recent days becomes meaningless so far as concerns giving any assurance to American property owners that they will receive just compensation for property seized . . . The Senator from Iowa pointed out that it is contemplated that some script or bond or paper may be offered in payment for this property. Mr. President there is only one compensation that means anything, and that is hard, cold American dollars.[8]

One might have hoped that at least a liberal of Morse's caliber would understand that to require immediate compensation in the form of "hard, cold American dollars," was probably the quickest way to stall and perhaps cripple a program of social change and land reform. Obviously a government which nationalizes the land in the context of a long range program of crop diversification and rural redevelopment through cooperatives, cannot pay cash immediately. This is theoretically where a revolutionary Alliance could step in with a reserve fund to compensate United Fruit while in return the country in question would issue bonds to the fund predicated on future development. Morse clearly does not conceive of the Alianza in any such terms:

> . . . We must make clear to American investors that if there is a seizure of their property they will get fair compensation. If they do not get fair compensation, we do not propose to take American tax dollars and pour them into any country by way of foreign aid, so that they will in effect get a double take—the property of American investors and the taxpayer's money. What kind of prestige and respect does that build up for the United States in Latin American countries or anywhere else in the world? . . . [9]

7 Ibid: page 20457.
8 Ibid: page 20460.
9 Ibid.

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No cooperative phasing out of U.S. investment as part of economic and social transformation in Latin America is envisioned here. Nor is it envisioned by other sectors of the American Government dealing with hemisphere matters.

Time (February 15, 1963) reports that J. Peter Grace, "international-minded president of W. R. Grace & Co." is upset over the unfavorable investment climate developing in Latin America. Grace urges the United States to encourage the Latin American countries with grants and loans to enact laws more hospitable to private investment. Grace fears that "we are in great danger of suffering a major defeat to our strategic interests in this hemisphere."

Grace, it turns out, is chairman of a twenty-six man Commerce Committee for the Alliance for Progress (COMAP) appointed by Commerce Secretary Hodges, to make a "business-like" assessment of the Alliance. *Time* also tells us that Grace's views are seconded by David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, who along with two other COMAP members filed their own report. The United States, according to the Rockefeller group:

> should concentrate its economic aid program in countries that show the greatest inclination to adopt measures to improve the investment climate, and withhold aid from others until satisfactory performance has been demonstrated . . . encouragement of private enterprise, local and foreign, must become the main thrust of the Alliance.[10]

Time states that in addition to large amounts of U.S. aid the Alliance planners also counted on at least $300 million a year in direct U.S. private investment.

II

Liberals like to regard the Alliance for Progress as a bold, even revolutionary conception. In practice, as in Honduras, it has become something very different, so different that we may speak of two Alliances for Progress.

The first envisions the United States leading the hemisphere in a program of deep social change. We will work out programs for basic structural reforms and for the cooperative phasing out of private U.S. investment in Latin America. In practice, however, the Alliance is a second or realistic Alliance. Under this program the United States is to prod existing elites into an awareness that a modicum of reform is necessary to stave off revolution. The hallmark of the "realistic Alliance" is order—maintained by American-supported military force if necessary. Beyond order the second Alliance involves a program to expand the already large U.S. private economic stake in Latin America and to make these investments secure against revolutionary change in Honduras and elsewhere.

It is often said that the Alliance is a program developed so

10 "Alliance in Danger," *Time Magazine,* February 15, 1963.

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that we will not repeat the errors that "lost" Cuba. But what in fact were those errors? To believers in a "revolutionary" Alliance the errors consisted in our failure to extend sympathetic aid to Castro in the spring of 1959, which might have steered the revolution toward democratic and pluralistic socialism. For advocates of the "realistic Alliance," however, Cuba was already "lost" in the spring of 1959. As Cuban exile Javier Pazos suggests, America's response to Castro was not the hand of fellowship extended but a cool willingness to "negotiate" in the interests of the vast U.S. economic investments in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Pazos adds that "as a matter of fact, the Cuban people still don't know the type of social revolution, if any, with which Washington would be willing to negotiate."[11]

This conflict between the needs for structural change in Latin America and the needs of American business as a system of power may be irreconcilable. If American investment in Latin America is supposed to increase as an element of the "realistic Alliance"—rather than being cooperatively phased out as under a "revolutionary Alliance"—the conflict will be intensified. Since corporation ideology is intrenched in the very heart of the Alliance for Progress by Section 620 (e) the chances are that these business values will exert a final veto on the social change this country will be willing to underwrite in Latin America.

11 Javier Pazos, "Cuba—Was a Deal Possible in '59?," *New Republic*, January 12, 1963.

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COMMUNICATIONS

William McCord

Democracy and Dictatorship in Modern Africa

The people of the emerging nations, as Stanley Diamond has rightly said ("Modern Africa: the Pains of Independence," DISSENT, Spring 1963), need our "humane insight, fraternal sympathy, and concrete historical perceptions." They also have a right to constructive criticism. To suspend our critical faculties simply because these nations are "young" would be insufferably condescending. In his defense of the inevitability—and indeed, desirability—of dictatorship in West Africa, Diamond comes dangerously close to such a position.

No one can deny the truth of some of Diamond's generalizations: Colonialism has, in many respects, left an unfortunate heritage. Developing nations do need to diversify their economies. West Africa could make judicious use of protective traiffs. Foreign-owned companies often put their own immediate profit ahead of the best interests of Nigeria or Ghana. And, of course, it would be economically desirable, if it were politically possible, for Africa to unite in larger, more viable federations.

Yet Diamond goes further. He appears to assert the economic and political *necessity* of authoritarianism in Africa.

Diamond's brief for centralized, suppressive governments in the developing nations rests on several misconceptions. He apparently believes that some vague "popular democracy" can adequately substitute for the concrete protections afforded to the individual in a liberal society.

In taking the stance that Nkrumah, Touré, or Nasser can create a new communal polity, Diamond dismisses all too lightly the specific freedoms which are the substance of democracy. The African context does not change the essential nature of these freedoms nor, for that matter, does the newness of independence. Correctly, Jefferson attacked the oppressive Alien and Sedition Laws even though the American people were, in Diamond's analogy, going through "growing pains" similar to those of contemporary Africans.

Whether in Washington in 1800 or Accra today, the victim feels the same when he fears an informer, or knows that a judge is a political stooge, or is kept in ignorance by a controlled press, or languishes in jail for political crimes. To trust, as Diamond does, that a one-party bureaucracy can somehow be "cleansed by the vigilance of the people and their executive representatives" puts a faith in despotism which history hardly justifies. He forgets Demosthenes' advice that "there is one safeguard known generally to the wise, which is an

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advantage and security to all, but especially to democrats as against despots. What is it? Distrust!"

Freedom's defense, in West Africa as in Greece, requires distrust—a vigilance expressed in a network of solid institutions reinforced by the rule of law, a set of restraints upon the tyrant's power. No discourse about "new" forms of freedom can convince a political prisoner in Ghana that he really has his liberty.

Diamond overlooks another lesson of history: that a benevolent despot often becomes a cruel tyrant. Once the first steps are taken on the path of authoritarianism, it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse the direction. Nkrumah began by affirming his trust in liberal democracy, then instituted the so-called "preventive detention" law, some years later felt compelled to abolish a free trade union movement, and now, contrary to the prediction of his adherents, has turned to execution as an instrument to protect his power.

Yet many liberals and social democrats have, however regretfully, concluded that a "Western" type of democracy will not work in underdeveloped countries. Intellectuals of this persuasion sometimes give the argument an anthropological twist. They contend, as Diamond does about Ghana, that colonialism has destroyed the indigenous culture (thus leaving a political void) and that the opposition is hopelessly parochial and reactionary. They conclude that "the revolution . . . can hardly tolerate an opposition . . ."

Such an argument radically oversimplifies the West African situation. Admittedly, in Ghana the opposition party did partially draw its sustenance from tribal groups opposed to change. At the same time, one cannot label a party led by such progressive men as Dr. J. B. Danquah, Professor Busia, or Joe Appiah as merely a reactionary clique. They, too, sought economic advance, but within a framework of decentralized political power.

Further, Diamond's argument casts a pall of inevitability over events which were well within the scope of human choice. In Ghana's last free election, Nkrumah received 91% of the vote. Exactly what implacable forces *compelled* this charismatic figure to impose despotism? Surely, with such overwhelming support, he could have governed the nation without resort to mass coercion. (Adherents of Nkrumah sometimes argue that he uses extraordinary measures because of the danger of assassination. In fact, the normal criminal law of Ghana was fully adequate and the president's safety did not require the passage of such acts as the preventive detention law.)

Most unfortunately, the anthropological contention that democracy and economic development cannot be reconciled, seriously underestimates the capacity for freedom of "native" cultures. In Ghana, the Ashanti tradition provided mechanisms for limiting chiefly power, for deposing despots, for discussing issues before an open tribunal. Nkrumah has not just poured new wine into old bottles; he has betrayed some of the ancient political traditions of his land. As a Ghanian correspondent recently wrote me:

> Abettors of Nkrumah's regime implicitly tell us that we are incapable of appreciating values based on belief in the sanctity of human life and personal freedom. They do not realize what an insult this is to some of us, who have not only had the benefit of western education, but who have had personal experience of the values which informed our most primitive governmental

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> arrangements, before the white man set foot in Ghana, values which went into the evolution of central government from the beginning of this century, values which fostered the move for independence in the late forties and early fifties, values caricatured and betrayed by Nkrumah's regime. In short, values derived from the belief that above everything else, men matter.

Whether this urge to freedom can prevail against the lure of authoritarianism is today in doubt. In an age of rising expectations, authoritarianism exerts a basic economic lure. A strongly centralized dictatorial government can pursue its plan development with a ruthlessness eschewed by democratic states. It promises to avoid the compromises, inefficiencies, and hesitations supposedly inherent in liberal democracy.

Diamond has apparently succumbed to this appeal, for his article abounds with economic justifications for centralized, one-party states. I agree with many of the economic suggestions he makes, but most of the recommended policies can be undertaken (if they can be undertaken at all) with equal facility by a free or a tyrannical government.

On one economic issue we basically disagree. He argues that decentralization is inappropriate for underdeveloped nations, although perhaps desirable for industrialized countries. Actually, the reverse is true. It seems most unlikely that General Motors, say, could be broken up into small, self-governing units. The nature of our economy prohibits any extensive decentralization. In West Africa, however, a pluralistic program makes sense.

In societies like Ghana where the critical needs are to utilize unemployed labor, invigorate agriculture, conserve capital, and improve the peasants' lot, a sensible government would strive to stimulate small-scale, village-based endeavors. What is *most* needed are not the highly "capital-intensive" projects like the Volta dam, but rather programs which release the talents of formerly idle men and save scarce capital. In addition to its economic value, a policy of decentralization corresponds well to social reality in the developing nations. In countries divided by ethnic, regional, religious and tribal conflicts, economic planners must seek to persuade and satisfy highly diverse interest groups—either that, or forcefully impose their arbitrary decisions on a restive people.

Diamond, then, seems to have accepted the unfortunate identification, first popularized by the Stalinists though not confined to them, of industrialization with *heavy* industry: Volta dams or massive aluminum factories. Industrialization in West Africa could (and should) mean the creation of small fisheries, village industries, "cottage" forms of production, and the advancement of agricultural techniques.

Diamond has also taken another element from the Marxist lexicon: its total rejection of so-called neo-colonialism. One can readily agree with many of Diamond's assertions about colonialism but, as he points out, the past is dead. The task which confronts emerging nations today is to create growing economies, not to pick over ancient wounds. Too often, broadside disparagement of the colonial heritage raises specters of imagined "neo-colonialism" and serves only to hinder economic development.

In Nigeria, to cite one illustration, a blind anti-colonialism on the part of some demagogues threatens the nation's economic progress. In 1961 the

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Action Group—until then, ironically, the country's most conservative party—demanded nationalization of the economy. The proposal's main appeal lay in its claim to end the economic subservience of Nigeria to foreign "neo-colonial" groups. The motion met with parliamentary defeat, but at least among many in the NCNC party, their vote against this motion sprang more from temporary tactics than fundamental disagreement. Confiscation of foreign enterprises would, in all probability, have crippled Nigeria's economy. Its meager reserve of capital would have been gobbled up in repaying current owners; its hopes for an extension of industry blocked by investment in existing projects. The fund of foreign capital, technicians and equipment, urgently required for the development of new resources would have dried up. Ambitious programs, such as the Shell Co. oil explorations, would have come to a halt, for Nigeria by itself could not provide the men, money or machines necessary for success. Sir Abubakar Balewa's present policy—a program which pragmatically balances public and private sectors, welcomes foreign capital, requests a share of profits from certain new industries, and persuades foreign companies to train a Nigerian staff—this approach promises steady, equitable, if unspectacular growth. Unfortunately, it can hardly be defended with the politically heady but economically sentimental slogans attacking neo-colonialism.

While Nigeria has been more staunch than Ghana in defending basic freedoms (and simultaneously adhering to reasonable economic policies), I am not holding Nigeria up as an exemplar to Ghana, for at the moment, even Nigeria's constitutional framework threatens to collapse. Opposition leaders are standing trial and the government has refused permission for "foreign" lawyers to defend them.

The trend of events now, as in the Europe of the 1930s, makes one fear that dictatorship is the "wave of the future" in the developing nations. I have faith that this new pessimism will prove as fallacious as the old. While democrats in West Africa admittedly face formidable obstacles, there are no *inevitable* forces either in their nations' colonial background, social traditions, or economic situation which dictate an authoritarian solution. In the absence of an informed public opinion, intellectuals in these areas (and in the West) have immense influence and consequent responsibility. We can hope that they will not fall prey to the current self-fulfilling prophecy that tyranny in Africa is inevitable. We can hope, too, that they will remember Albert Camus' observation that "without freedom, heavy industry can be perfected, but not justice or truth."

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The Moral Colonialists

A Reply by Stanley Diamond

McCord's communication is of no importance as an interpretation of the ex-colonial nations in general, nor of emerging Africa in particular. But as a species of moral colonialism, which I define in the article he attacks as

> A curious piece of psycho-political business which gives us the chance to evade our own history by adopting fantastic expectations of carefully chosen others and we then become justified in their failure . . . ,

it needs attention.

McCord's central theme is that I defend, indeed espouse, "dictatorship" in Africa, and have composed a brief for "centralized, suppressive governments." He uses "authoritarian" as a synonym for "dictatorial." He considers me contaminated, although perhaps innocently, with Stalinism which he seems to use interchangeably with "Marxism." He also throws "anthropology" and "intellectuals of a certain persuasion" into the hopper so that everything becomes expediently confused. It would be possible to restate the inner logic of his arguments somewhat as follows: Anthropologists, believing in inevitable forces in history, have no respect for the capacity of native peoples to solve their contemporary problems except in Stalinist, Marxist, centralized, authoritarian, suppressive, and dictatorial ways.

Anthropologists need no defense here. But McCord must know that when Gunnar Myrdal, whose conceptions I follow in my article, talks about the desirability of centralization in underdeveloped areas, he is not referring to streamlined, totalitarian dictatorships, or repressive governments. Quite the contrary, Myrdal's brief for centralization is that it will lead to greater flexibility throughout the whole social structure, and break the regional rigidities associated with underdevelopment.

McCord's use of the term "dictatorship" in modern Africa is simply ethnocentric. With few exceptions, the new African nations are one-party states, and those that are not are striving consciously to become so. Nigeria, which McCord mentions with approval, is dominated in each of its major regions by a single party and the Northern Region, consisting of three-fourths of the country, with more than half the population, is in the grip of the most powerful and reactionary political organization in sub-Saharan Africa, the Northern People's Congress, which also dominates the shotgun coalition in the Center. That coalition is under the premiership of Balewa, who is second in his Party and his Region to the Sardauna of Sokoto, the neo-feudal Northern premier. What is sinister about the NPC is its centuries-old feudal base in the archaic civilization of the Sudanic provinces of Northern Nigeria, not its modern "totalitarianism." The point is that totalitarianism and dictatorship in McCord's irresponsible usage are simply not existent in sub-Saharan black Africa; even a really monolithic party such as the NPC is neo-feudal, not fascist, corporative, militarist or communist in structure. But this is not the place to elaborate on Nigerian politics, except to point out that McCord's

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characterization of the Action Group as "[until] 1961 . . . the country's most conservative party" is ridiculous. The Action Group is a liberal democratic party, far to the left of the NPC, and somewhat to the right of the NCNC, the dominant party of the Eastern Region. Since 1961 the Group—which was crippled in the Federal emergency and consequent treason trials that until recently immobilized the Western Region—has adopted a social democratic program, and is, if anything, more congenial to the West than the Moslem dominated NPC or the more explicitly Marxist elements in the NCNC.

Thomas Hodgkin, a distinguished Africanist, has made the following point in his *African Political Parties:* "We have to seek to understand [African political parties] as they are, avoiding any rigid application of categories and a schemata derived from a study of Western political history and institutions." Emanuel Wallerstein has stated in *Africa, the Politics of Independence,* that "multi-party democracy does not solve the first problem of every African government [which is] how to hold the country together. The alternatives are one-party states and either anarchy or military regimes or various combinations of the two." Wallerstein argues further that national integration makes possible economic development, which in turn acts to diversify interests.

Wallerstein and Hodgkin deny a drift toward totalitarianism. Hodgkin documents "the dispersion of power that prevails in varying degree in African states" as expressed through regional and ethnic groups, traders, cooperatives, civil servants, professionals, trade unions, and so on. Wallerstein adds to these the broader trans-national movements and makes a point similar to mine and Myrdal's which the new, particularly Western educated African leaders themselves emphasize, namely, that "totalitarianism can be forestalled by centralization, as when the opposition party enters the dominant party and acts to maintain an openness of discussion and some pressure to account to all interests before reaching decisions." As Harvey Glickman, a political scientist-Africanist, sums up the matter, "All this undermines the utility of the terms traditionally descriptive of politics elsewhere in the past—left, right; authoritarian, democratic; liberal, socialist, or communist—which are too vague and usually misleading to characterize African politics today. . . ." Although "African nationalism and . . . nation-building resembles the process in its early stages elsewhere, African politics must be related to uniquely African social institutions and to African history." Or, in Hodgkin's words, the African transformation "has its own special kind of contribution to make to humanity."

I would put it this way: the party is the nation in process of formation, drawing upon the past and moving through a variety of social forms on a broad front into the future. But it is not and will not be authoritarian, dictatorial or totalitarian in the Western sense. Rather, it strives to be traditional in spirit, i.e., a unified symbol of the diverse movement of the people into the modern world, the vision of a polity which precedes reality. For a fuller analysis of this situation, I refer McCord to the (thus far) definitive study—*African One-Party States: Tunisia, Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Tanganyika,* edited by Gwendolen M. Carter.

Now to a few particulars.

1. McCord states that "I believe that Nkrumah, Toure or *Nasser* can create

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a new communal polity." Nasser is not mentioned in my article, although some years ago in DISSENT I characterized him as a para-military dictator. Nkrumah, Toure, or for that matter, Nyerere or Kenyatta may help create new communal—*not collective* but *communal* polities—*if* Africa as a whole is:
(a) able to "rapidly unite," as the renowned French Africanist and agronomist Rene Dumont writes in *L'Afrique Noire Est Mal Partie,* "[and thus] to resist the grip of this powerful European bloc: otherwise neo-colonialism may rename itself Eur-Africa."
(b) to transform the fundamentally cooperative and democratic (but not merely mechanically oppositional) local usages into modern political institutions. That Western nations find it hard to understand this effort, being, in the first instance, so deeply separated from primitive democratic historical experience, does not mean that Africans must fail.

2. Since McCord has seen fit to elaborate my reference to the revolution in Ghana as combining *elements* of, not being fully identified with, the American revolution and Civil War, it is necessary to point out, with Richard C. Haskett *(American Historical Review,* April 1954) that Tories "suffered loss of civil rights, confiscation of property, imprisonment, exile, and, in a few instances, hanging. It is estimated that 100,000 Loyalists (4 per cent of the white population) fled the colonies between 1775 and 1783." In Ghana, however, the maximum number of people detained under the Preventive Detention Act probably never exceeded 1,000. At present it is doubtful that as many as 100 are still in prison; moreover, it is agreed by responsible African observers, including those in Washington, that there have been no political executions in Ghana, contrary to McCord's contention. Of course, moral colonialists prefer other people's revolutions to be perfect.

3. McCord states that the Preventive Detention Act in Ghana was unnecessary. But the weekly British journal, *West Africa,* the authority in its field, disagrees, stating "There is no doubt that, in Ghana, the state's security was threatened before and after independence by the impossibility of securing convictions in court largely because of intimidation of witnesses, not only of those guilty of political violence, but also of criminal gangs. . . . The case for the [Detention] Act was strong."

4. The Trade Union Movement in Ghana did clash seriously with the government but a major reason was the compulsory savings plan adopted by a regime which was under tremendous pressure to build a viable economic base on a national scale. It is here that the intent and extent of international aid to the new nations can directly affect internal policy. The Nkrumah government is not opposed to "a free trade union movement" by politics or principle; there was a specific economic conflict of a type which will develop throughout the underdeveloped world unless unprejudiced aid from the richer nations is forthcoming. In this context, it should be noted that American aid to Ghana via the Volta project is primarily to an American company (Kaiser-Reynolds) and is, in any case, a short term loan with a quite high rate of interest,* although bankers do not think so.

* The actual terms and categories for American aid to Ghana are as follows: From A.I.D. to the Volta River Authority, a government corporation paralleling the TVA,

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5. I do not contend, as McCord states, that colonialism has destroyed much of the indigenous culture, but I also specifically point to surviving African elements and traits. The political opposition in Ghana is, however, not indigenous or "tribal" as McCord argues. The opposition was led by a colonially-bred elite, whose regionalism was based upon the new political and economic interests of chiefs, the related affluent cocoa interests, and antagonism to national planning. Dr. Danquah, whom McCord mentions, probably the most distinguished member of the opposition, is still formally associated with the United Party, is practicing law in Accra, and was released from preventive detention about six months ago. Professor Busia was never in detention, having gone into voluntary exile. Busia was last heard from when he testified in Washington before a closed hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security that Ghana was a pro-communist dictatorship, etc. The State Department was thereby moved to announce that:

> The government of Ghana follows a policy . . . of positive neutralism and in furtherance of this policy has established relations with both Western and Eastern bloc countries. *Ghana has not aligned itself with either grouping.* Ghana has a long history of close association with the West and there exists basic good will among the Ghanaian people for the United States and the West in general.

The Department also characterized Ghana's economy as "mixed," which is correct.

The Ghanaian government interpreted Busia's testimony, which played with the curious allegation that there were 500 Ghanaian soldiers in Cuba, as an effort to sabotage American aid to his country. Even so, it should be pointed out that Ghana is financing fifty per cent of the Volta project, the remaining half stemming from American, British and other sources, the American aid being, as mentioned, a loan. The fact is, that the backbone of the domestic opposition in Ghana *is* reactionary and conspiratorial.

6. McCord misquotes when he states that I and other "liberals and social democrats," who are also linked with anthropologists, Stalinists, and "Marxists," conclude that: "The revolution . . . can hardly tolerate an opposition . . . " My actual statement from which this is lifted out of context, reads as follows:

> Thus we may conclude that the surprising thing is not that there has been so *little tolerance in Ghana for an opposition that sought to fragment the country before the revolution had gotten off the ground* . . . but rather so much tolerance when compared with similar situations elsewhere.

If McCord knew anything about the history of the CPP relative to the NLM in Ghana, he would understand the background of that remark. More significantly, he simply misrepresented my opinion which was that there had been considerable tolerance when it is recognized that *the Busia-led opposition sought to negate independence unless the little country was divided into semi-autonomous regions, and they were in London pleading the case at the very*

$27,000,000 at 3½% for 30 years; from the Export-Import Bank to the Volta River Authority, $10,000,000 at 5¾% for 25 years; from the Export-Import Bank to VALCO (Volta Aluminium Co.—a Kaiser-Reynolds subsidiary) $110,000,000 at 5¾% for 20 years.

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time that independence was being granted. That, Mr. McCord, is not the same as making the generalization you attribute to me: "The revolution . . . can hardly tolerate an opposition . . ."

7. McCord implies, without warrant, that I have stated a rigid preference for heavy industry to the detriment of agriculture, fisheries, and village industries, etc. in countries such as Ghana. In the first place, I referred to the necessity of developing "a balanced agricultural-industrial economy including the growing of food crops for consumption at home." My major argument was against the maintenance of a mono-crop economy.

Concerning the Volta hydro-electric aluminum project, McCord simply does not know the facts. The dam will create one of the largest man-made lakes in the world, approximately 300 miles in length; this will lead to an expanded inland waterway system and the development of fishing villages, an important element in the Volta scheme. The power generated will service a large part of the country for a wide spectrum of purposes; ultimately the aluminum factory will utilize Ghana's substantial bauxite reserves. In other words, the Volta project is a step forward out of a colonial economy into an era of balanced growth.

8. By underplaying the role of industrialization, and insisting that "decentralization corresponds well to social reality in the developing nations . . . in countries divided by ethnic, regional, religious and tribal conflicts . . . ," McCord slides into a politically colonialist position. Although he claims to be referring only to heavy industry in his stricture on industrialization, the only vague references that he makes to industry are: "village industries" and "cottage forms of production." He also refers to the need for advancing agricultural techniques; but nowhere is there any recognition of Ghana's cocoa economy, of the need for national planning if diversification is to be achieved, nor of the tremendous energies that must be utilized in order to create a network of modern communications, to exploit local resources. McCord would have Ghana, and presumably the other emerging African nations, quietly fragment themselves into their so-called "ethnic, regional, religious and tribal segment" *(vide* Katanga), abandon their national and international needs (which led to the anti-colonial movement in the first place), content themselves with a primary product oriented peasantry, and all in all cultivate an impossible condition of stasis. Even if this could be achieved, and it cannot be, for both internal and external reasons, it would only serve to attract a new breed of domestic and foreign opportunist.

9. In identifying the industrialization that he does talk about (e.g., Volta) with a Stalinist conception, McCord scatters his shot wildly. He has already bracketed liberals, social democrats, Stalinists, democrats, anthropologists and intellectuals of a certain persuasion as the misled or deliberate Enemy, that is, as a group undifferentiated by virtue of supposedly sharing views opposed to his. The fact is that all United Nations economic reports have consistently stressed that industrialization is the only escape from the downward spiral of underdevelopment. Myrdal, and the other economists of the prominent Scandinavian school, have the same view; it is indeed the prevailing attitude of the leaders in the underdeveloped world and of the great majority of mod-

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ern economists, of whatever theoretical persuasion. To imply that this is a communist idea, is, among other things, simply inaccurate.

10. It may be instructive for Mr. McCord to learn that the distinguished Indian diplomat, K. N. Panikkar, characterizes the C.P.P. in Ghana as a "bourgeoise nationalist party." Ghana has gone out of its way to attract and protect Western investment. The British High Commission in Ghana stated last time that the new investment Act is a model for other developing countries seeking to attract capital: "The investment law meets every test I have ever encountered for encouraging and protecting investors." It is a view shared in official Washington.

Nigeria's investment policy is no more "reasonable" than Ghana's—both are flexible and friendly. No new African nation has shown any serious inclination to "confiscate" foreign enterprises, but McCord's bland attitude toward colonialism does reveal the shallowness of his understanding of its economic and psychological aftermath in Africa, and helps illuminate the slant of his thinking.

11. Finally, I must confess that I am unmoved by McCord's plea against the "self-fulfilling prophecy that tyranny in Africa is inevitable." No one has made this prophecy except a few newspaper reporters and journalistic observers. For a man so loose with his facts, and promiscuous with his concepts, it is absurd for him to invoke the spirit of Camus, who was a man of utmost scrupulosity, an Algerian, and a fierce and honorable anti-colonialist.

Let McCord and others like him address their concern for freedom to their own countries, about which they are presumably better informed.

KING AND REUTHER FOR 64!

(continued from page 300)

the major parties dares attempt. *Now,* even more importantly, because the question of civil rights forces upon the nation other issues too long ignored: unemployment and automation. These are interlocking problems; the Negro cannot enter an economic and social system in dissolution. With a sudden and dramatic urgency, he requires us to face the duty of transforming that system. And *now,* finally, because all these issues are indissolubly linked to foreign policy and because the United States is woefully unprepared for the peace that threatens to descend upon us. We are in deep crisis with unabated arms production. Cutting back is likely to exacerbate all the troubles that have beset us since 1929. If we are to extend the reach of our democracy, including for the first time in history all American citizens; if we are to overcome the widespread poverty which shamefully survives and is fed by unemployment; we need to plan not only for automation but also for peace. But an economy without discrimination, without unemployment *and* without a gigantic arms industry seems far beyond the ken of either Democrats or Republicans.

Only a third party can bring such a vision within the range of democratic discussion and debate. Only a third party can push President Kennedy,

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who is almost certain to be re-elected, in the direction of international economic planning, toward the total emancipation of Negroes and other underprivileged Americans, toward the creation of an environment in which creative leisure could be the lot of Everyman. Like the Socialists in 1932, the leaders of such a party might well provide the next Administration with a program for social change.

Civil Rights stands at the center of a broader American struggle, and Martin Luther King is its brilliant symbol. How fitting that he should be a Negro leader of Negroes. But how sad if his cause were restricted to Americans with dark skin—who could never attain their full stature short of a general commitment to the welfare of their fellow Americans, and indeed, to mankind at large. We therefore deem the notion of a Negro party not only to be narrow and offensive, but self-defeating as well. King's techniques, his whole outlook, are those of the universalist. He has necessarily been identified with Negro liberation; there is nothing to prevent that movement from being broadened to embrace a vision of the good, peaceful, abundant and fraternal life for everyone.

Organizing the Ticket

Today one vital component is lacking in the civil rights struggle, namely political representation. The Negro, like all those voiceless ones in our depressed third of a nation, is effectively disenfranchised—whether or not he is legally entitled to vote. Embittered by the Republocrats' failure to meet his elementary needs, the Negro begins to see some merit in separatism, a position enthusiastically endorsed by the Black Muslims, the Communist party—and the American Nazi party. We need today a political party with a program that includes but transcends the struggle for equal rights, a party that can accommodate Negroes *and* whites with a conscience—like Walter Reuther, our most intelligent and enlightened, and at present, most frustrated labor leader. Despite his regrettable absorption during the last decade and a half with the bureaucratic imperatives of union organization, Reuther still represents the best sentiments of American labor. He has participated in the drive for civil rights; he has worked with the peace movement. Perhaps his involvement in independent political activity would arouse other unionists from their slumbers.

King and Reuther could not win the election. Yet the good they would do as candidates is incalculable.

We therefore put forward this proposal to the left and liberal public, as an idea to be considered and a possibility to be acted upon. How such a ticket might be set up, what organizational forms would be required, it is of course premature to say. It would have meaning only if large elements of the labor movement, the intellectual community and the Negro movement were to accept it.

King and Reuther in '64!

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BOOKS

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DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, by David Singer. Ohio State University Press. $5.50.

STUDIES OF WAR, by P. M. S. Blackett. Hill and Wang. $3.95.

Among all the spurious "sciences" that have grown up around the notion that to abstract one's propositions from reality is to be truly "scientific," most pernicious has been the new "science" of strategy. Armed by their supposed knowledge of game theory, social psychology, economics, and operations research—and occasionally (but only occasionally) military operations—a new breed of "scientist" has arisen, who declaim on their subject with all the authority of a professional Frothist lecturing on the Science of Frothism..

One of the immediate reasons for the proliferation of this sort of thing has been the feeling that it is hard to criticize even spuriously authoritative pronouncements unless one has a firm base of opposing authority from which to do so; probably such a feeling of inadequacy oppressed the first men to whom came the wild speculation that phlogiston might not really exist after all. Thus, even in the peace movement, those who might be accounted intellectuals rather than mere propagandists have too often been seduced by the idea of studying the theory of "conflict resolution" rather than conflict, models of "deterrence systems" rather than Cold War politics.

J. David Singer's book is, unhappily, a product of this tendency, in that he succumbs to the authority of the new science even while attempting to demolish its pretensions. I say "unhappily," because Singer is the deterrence theorist most sympathetic to the peace movement, because he has elsewhere written excellently on such matters, and because in this book he offers a useful and penetrating critique of Kahn, Kissinger, etc. His assault on the idea of civil defense, his well-argued preference for minimum deterrence rather than counterforce capability and a continued arms race, and his insistence that weapons create tension as much as tension creates the desire for weapons, are notions which I—undoubtedly like most DISSENT readers—find congenial. Insofar as this book is an act of criticism of received doctrine its publication is a helpful event. It is therefore all the more unfortunate that Singer feels compelled to couch his argument in the often obscurantist jargon of the trade, and worse, to build abstract models of deterrence capabilities and arms control systems, complete with "probability-utility" graphs which are pretentiously supererogatory. Singer avoids the political world at many key junctures in order to build a Singer Theory of Disarmament, of the same old abstract variety.

The result of his act of abstraction

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is his conclusion that all proposals for disarmament are impractical—except his. He proposes that the U.S. and the USSR turn over nuclear weapons to a UN "third force," until the latter is stronger than either of them, and can thus enforce a complete disarmament scheme. I really do not think this requires much comment. Disarmament of any kind may indeed be impractical because it may be rejected by those who count; if so, we are all out of luck. But if there are many proposals for disarmament more impractical than this one, then I think the world must be upside-down. Singer can only come to a conclusion that defies common sense because he has bought the formalistic approach to deterrence peddled by his colleagues.

As he puts it, he has recognized that "all aspects of our armament policy must be evaluated by the same criteria and subjected to the same stringent mode of analysis." But the problem is that the "stringent" analysis of deterrence theory justifies a peculiar kind of rationalizing attitude toward the political world, in which possibilities are discussed as though they were likelihoods, potentialities as though they were realities, and practical alternatives as though they were logical ones. Thus, Singer argues that a "finite" (minimum second-strike capability) deterrence force, controlled at key points by various arms control measures which will lessen tensions somewhat, can lead logically to his disarmament scheme. But in the real world, the United States is building up a massive first-strike capability strategic force, which cannot be dismantled nearly so simply. Singer does this sort of thing less than most other U.S. deterrence theorists, but still he is caught up in what seems to be a national style of thought.

It is with relief, therefore, that one turns even from the best results of the American approach to a book like *Studies of War*, P.M.S. Blackett's collected essays on military strategy. Because he does not share either their vocabulary or their mode of thought, the Englishman Blackett is able to tear the new clothes off the emperors of academic strategy far more tellingly than Singer. Reading Blackett, one suddenly sees that strategic model-building is not so much an abstraction *from* reality as a substitute for knowledge *about* it. Out of fear, perhaps, of having nothing to say unless they are "scientific," the new academic strategists have forgotten that experience and ability to reason intelligently about the evidence of one's senses are still the foundations of knowledge.

Blackett as a strategic thinker has only three qualifications; they are such that by the standards of many American social scientists he would be considered "untrained" for work in this specialized "discipline."

He has a scientific training; he is experienced in military operations during wartime; and he has the ability to observe events. That is all: no immersion in the "science" of strategy or nuclear decision-making. Yet while "hard-headed" American analysts—who need a model, a team of researchers, and a computer before they can make their "scientific" statements—have been talking in their dream-language about dream-wars, fabulous missile gaps, legendary vulnerabilities, etc., Blackett has become a prophet for the nuclear age. In 1948, for instance, Blackett, in setting forth an almost universally condemned viewpoint, showed such remarkable prescience that fifteen years later one could adapt his argument with little change, as a criticism of the

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same dominant *kind* of thinking he was criticizing then:

> If the American stockpiles of atomic bombs are looked on as the main deterrent to Russian expansion, rather than as a means of forcing her to contract her sphere of influence, then the diplomatic and strategic initiative is in an important sense handed over to Russia. For suppose that no Russian aggression, say by expansion over the Yalta line, does take place in the next few years, and suppose further that this lack of aggression is widely held in the West as due to the threat of atomic bombing, then the West will, in its own view, have saved the world from a third world war at any rate for some years.... The dilemma comes later. For this policy inevitably implies leaving Russia time to make at least some atomic bombs, and when this has happened there are only three possibilities open to the West: to wage preventive war before Russia has acquired a large number of bombs, that is under less favorable military conditions than at present; to initiate a new approach to control of atomic energy on terms much more favorable to Russia; or finally to continue the atomic arms race, with a devastating atomic war with bombs available to both sides as a final outcome.

This kind of writing and thinking reaches a level of common-sense political generalization that Singer, for example, never attains. Informed debate is still catching up with Blackett's remarks here, as well as with other of his strictures on limited war, tactical nuclear war, the problems of NATO; the reader may observe for himself the instructive fact that virtually every one of Blackett's attacks on English defense policy during the 1950's has been vindicated, in the sense that those policies have been abandoned. Blackett's attacks are unsurpassably trenchant; he annihilates the pseudo-distinctions between, or rather reifications of, "counterforce" and "countercity," first strike" and "second strike," "vulnerable" and "invulnerable," etc.

What is really important about all these analyses, though, is not alone their content, but more particularly Blackett's method; the following passage is characteristic:

> The intellectual level of much of this discussion is of the highest, so high that I find much of it very hard to understand, and I wonder sometimes whether it is all rooted in military and political reality. The policies recommended by many of these studies seem not always to have been felt through to actual potential action. I think the essential prerequisite of sound military advice is that the giver must convince himself that if he were responsible for action, he would himself act so. During the war, when the Operational Research Group at the Admiralty had proved intellectually to themselves that big convoys were safer than small ones, before we advised the Navy to make this major change, we had to decide whether we really believed in our own analysis. I personally convinced myself that I did, by the conviction that if I were to send my children across the Atlantic during the height of the U-boat attacks I would have sent them by a big rather than by a small convoy. I think that occasionally analogous personal tests of belief in one's own recipes may be useful in the study of nuclear war.

The most striking thing not only about this passage but about the whole book is Blackett's conception of "Operational Research," which he elaborates in Part II of *Studies of War*. I thought at first glance that these pages would prove to be of little political interest. Indeed, after wading through the American approaches to what we call "operations research," I had begun to

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think the whole idea a gigantic hoax designed to give employment to out-of-work economists. In fact, however, these chapters form the core of Blackett's work. "Operational Research" is *his* expertise, and a real and important expertise. How to protect convoys; how to get more sightings of surfaced U-boats; whether or not to engage in strategic bombing of German cities—these were real problems that Blackett and his wartime colleagues analyzed, and analyzed successfully. (The success of Blackett's analysis of strategic bombing lay only in its intellectual cogency, unfortunately. His recommendation against that disastrous program was overruled at the top.) Compared to Blackett's report on his work, Herman Kahn's "Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense," for example, is shown up for the meaningless performance that it is—one might as well call it "Study of Sara Lee's Cake Mixes" for all his contact with the reality of its supposed subject.

The difference is that Blackett writes as a military man and a political man: as an *actor in* the situation, rather than as a *consultant to* those who define it. Thus, even when politically on the outside, as he has been since World War II, he retains that knowledgeability about how military and political things are done, that all the RANDs in the world cannot synthesize out of their computers, and that is also sadly missing in intellectual outsiders such as Singer, Fromm, Etzioni, et al., valuable as their work may otherwise be. It may be, of course, that the Cold War does not generate the kind of experience that Blackett makes such excellent use of. But then, that tells us something ominous about the Cold War: about the likelihood that a military definition of it can be anything but disastrous. In any event, if war is too important to be left to the generals, it is certainly too important to be left to the abstracted academicians.

PHILIP GREEN

A Case Poorly Made

ALIENS AND DISSENTERS, by William Preston, Jr. Harvard University Press. $6.75.

The author of this book has a case to make. He argues that the "Palmer raids" and the Red scare of 1919–20 were not an aberration due to World War I and the Russian revolution. Rather, these events stimulated the revival of an old American identification of aliens and subversives—an identification which had it roots in the period of the Alien and Sedition laws and had reappeared in the 1890's.

Preston argues his case by stressing the persistent popular feeling that immigrants were potentially radical and the extensive use of deportation to punish the immigrant radical as it could not punish the native. But while the book is a well-documented account of events, it is an inadequate study of popular prejudice and its victims.

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Any meaningful sense of the plight of the deported alien must be supplied by the understanding sympathy of the reader.

As one who lived through the years Mr. Preston discusses and was very active in trying to defend civil liberties, I do not think the war hysteria of 1917–21 was primarily a consequence of feeling against aliens. It was, in fact, directed against radicalism. But of course it was easier for the government and the public to focus its suspicions on the alien—and easier also to get rid of him. (Nowadays we don't deport our radicals, who are mostly citizens. On the contrary, we refuse them passports.)

Strangely, Preston stops his story, except for an epilogue, with President Roosevelt's 1933 Christmas pardon to all those convicted under the Draft and Espionage Acts of World War I. "Fifteen years after the prosecutions and during a much greater crisis, a New Deal Administration was ready to close those wounds opened by the anti-radical hysteria of its Democratic forebears." But that Administration was not ready to revise any of the postwar legislation which virtually cut off immigration to the U.S. And the same Roosevelt was guilty of the most outrageous and discriminatory anti-alien action in our history: the evacuation of Japanese and Japanese-Americans without trial or hearing from the West Coast. Even in the epilogue there is no reference to this event, and in general the racial aspect of the problem of aliens in the U.S. is slighted. Preston quotes the familiar provision of the naturalization laws that "any alien being a white person," is eligible for citizenship without commenting on the poisonous prejudice in the insistence on color, or even on the exceedingly liberal attitude toward white immigrants and the ease with which they could become citizens. By historical and contemporary standards, the U.S. was freer of restrictive prejudice than the white countries from which the immigrant came. That fact helped make it strong.

Preston dismisses the role of aliens or at least of the foreign-born in radical movements before World War I too lightly. The majority of immigrants were conservative enough, though not, as he reiterates, simply because they had been peasants; there were also other reasons. But the foreign-born furnished many of the most conspicuous leaders and more than their proportionate share of members of radical and socialist parties. The crisis of 1933 may have been far more serious, as Mr. Preston alleges, than the crisis of 1917–21 but it was of a different order. And by that time immigration had been almost shut off, and the radical leaders were native-born. Roosevelt's amnesty required little courage in 1933.

In brief, Preston's thesis is too superficially stated and argued. One final comment on it is in order. In 1912 the Socialist Party convention adopted the following constitutional provision: "Any member of the party who opposes political action or advocates crime, sabotage or other methods of violence as a weapon of the working class to aid in its emancipation shall be expelled from membership in the party." Apropos of this provision Preston writes: "The Socialists were the first group to create an index of permissible belief and action within the framework of discontent. The Socialist anti-sabotage clause was the ideological forerunner of the criminal syndicalism laws and the deportation statutes

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aimed at dissident members of the community. It was not surprising, moreover, that the more conservative and moderate elements of society should rush in where the Socialists had not feared to tread. When political necessity or public hysteria required it, Progressives, Republicans, and Democrats were equally eager proponents of a repressive antiradicalism."

This is grossly unfair. Whether or not the 1912 resolution was wise, it is entirely legitimate for a political party to exclude members because of their beliefs. At the same time these people are entitled to the full protection of the law and certainly the right of residence in this country. The Socialist Party opposed the Red raids before, during and after A. Mitchell Palmer's shocking administration of his office. But it also had every right to set up standards for political action in its own name and for its own members.

NORMAN THOMAS

MISCELLANY

A Visit to Jackson, Miss.

This summer, with my family on a camping trip, I passed briefly through Jackson, Mississippi. I don't want to write my impressions of that unhappy town, but to limit myself to telling of our meeting with Charles Butts, the young editor of a rather extraordinary paper called the *Mississippi Free Press*. Mr. Butts, a white college graduate of a northern school who has transplanted himself to Mississippi, proved to be as he had previously been described: polite, reserved, "unyielding on principle" and positive in approach. As we looked for him in the Negro part of town where he works, we were conscious of being "looked over" by people in the streets. I would guess that our New York license plates helped out here—but I doubt strongly that Charlie Butts is aware that the Negro community in which he operates has a protective eye out for him.

The *Free Press* now has 4,500 paid subscribers and sells approximately 4,000 more copies in bulk. This, incredibly, makes it Mississippi's largest weekly! It began publication in December, 1961 and during the first six months of operation was managed and edited by untrained students on a volunteer basis. At one point it almost ceased publication, but Butts got fresh capital into the operation and for the past ten months it has been self-supporting.

What does the *Free Press* seek? Its two themes are: how Negroes can register to vote in Mississippi and how economic opportunity can be brought to the state. Butts sees his paper not primarily as an organ of protest, but as a paper proposing practical and constructive solutions. "The biggest thing controlling white Mississippians today is fear," he says. "But if we make opportunities available to all —jobs, education, industry—then the whites won't feel threatened. The race issue won't be as important. Give everybody a chance to live decently in Mississippi, and they'll all want to stay; black and white." The heart of its program consists of the vote, better jobs, open education.

Charlie Butts is frankly looking for help in continuing the *Free Press*. He is looking for a total of $20,000 in contributions that can be used for single $1-a-year subscriptions. He calculates this would add 20,000 new subscribers in Mississippi and make the *Free Press* second in size to only two daily newspapers. From what I could judge, his aims are modest and realistic.

I think readers of DISSENT will want to support this unique and courageous undertaking. Subscriptions and contributions can be sent by using the box below.

S. P.

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Michael Walzer

In Defense of Spying

Before World War II arms control agreements never involved national or international inspection systems; the great powers relied upon their own intelligence agencies to detect violations. That old method has a certain appeal: spies instead of inspectors. And Allen Dulles has recently assured us, in the midst of the Profumo affair, that despite continued reliance upon the lure of sex, espionage is a profession only for the high-minded —he offered himself as an example. Still, the spy seems more interesting than almost any other government employee, and more fallible; he is a man who takes risks in this age of security; he experiments continually in human relations. To spy may be more human than not to spy.

The apparent inability of the great powers to agree on inspection reinforces this romantic appeal. Perhaps we would be safer—as well as happier—–if we forgot about elaborate inspection and signed agreements relying entirely on spies. The purpose of inspection is to guarantee an *exchange* of information; the purpose of espionage to ensure a one-way flow. Inspection presumably generates trust, spying distrust. The two seem hardly capable of serving the same purposes. In fact, however, there are certain defects built into each which lessen the differences between them.

Inspection seems always to involve an *unequal* exchange of information; that is why it is so difficult for the great powers to agree upon a particular inspection system. At the present time, for example, any practical plan would apparently provide considerably more information for the United States than it would for the Soviet Union. Given any two countries of unequal strength, with divergent strategies and different political systems, the dispatches of the inspectors would never constitute a perfect exchange. And so diplomats debating the precise form inspection might take are struggling in time-honored fashion for bits of advantage, gains in safety or strength for their own country. And if this is so, no substantial agreement is likely to be reached until one or another of the powers finds itself forced by external circumstances to accept some *dis*advantage. Whatever inspection system results is hardly likely to lead to that rapid collapse of distrust between the powers which many Americans appear to anticipate.

Inspection at best would ensure only an imperfect exchange of information; and this espionage seems to achieve equally well. The advanced technology which makes inspection so much easier and safer does the same for espionage; indeed, the technologies of the two are at times identical. After the exposure of the U-2 flights, President Eisenhower offered his "open skies" plan, which was intended to legitimize as inspection the espionage we had already been engaged in for several years. But what was technically possible in either form was in practice possible only in one, only as espionage; the Russians had perfectly good strategic and perhaps political reasons for refusing to accept the flights. They preferred to take their chances with secrecy.

We ought not to have been overly disturbed by this, for secrets are very difficult to keep. The function of all spies is twofold: to discover one sort of secret and prevent the discovery of another sort. But it is in the nature of the trade that the first of these is easier than the second. The reason is quite simple: the individual spy has a private purpose which often supercedes his assigned task, and that is to profit by the discovery or retention of secrets. And he is more likely to profit by discovery than by retention. This, at least, is the conclusion which seems to follow from recent disclosures about double agents in the West German, British and Russian intelligence agencies. Espionage is revealed to be one of the most important forms of cold war cooperation and its actual function is precisely the exchange of information. This extraordinary situation is symbolized beautifully by the simultaneous awarding of a German plaque and a Soviet commendation to Heinz Felfe, director of the East Division of the West German intelligence agency (N.Y. *Times*, July 12, 1963). A former Nazi official, Felfe seems to have been carrying out for the past ten years the very task which men of peace still

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only dream of—the sharing of military secrets.

Since, however, not all spies are double agents, the flow of information is not entirely reliable. Moreover, false information may be "fed" to a double agent in the hope of confusing an opponent. But then, neither side ever knows how many double agents there are and how much of the false information is believed. Consequently, the flow of information appears to be beneficial whether the particular secrets which are exchanged are real or invented. Confidence is built up on both sides—surely a primary function of the exchange. There is no necessary or compelling reason, then, to replace a man like Heinze Felfe with an inspector; it hardly seems possible, since the inspection schemes proposed thus far go nowhere near so far as Felfe went. Nevertheless, there might be times when a more openly cooperative arrangement would be preferable. Premier Khrushchev's recent proposal to station observers in major transportation centers (reducing thereby the risks of surprise attack) is a good example of the limits of inspection. The it might be helpful to transform them from spies into observers (unless it turns out that the observers too have to be watched).

In his book *On War,* John Strachey speculates that there is growing up a kind of international allegiance, and with it a new class of international civil servants. This may be true; but it is equally likely that there is growing up a new kind of international underworld, its members not necessarily criminals, but men free of national and ideological loyalties, if also less idealistic than the UN officials whom Strachey presumably had in mind. The Keeler-Profumo-Ivanov affair suggests the way in which the cold war may be ignored or forgotten in this underworld, as does the espionage of the Swedish diplomat Stig Winnrestrom which so shocked his colleagues because it had no ideological reason, or the conscientious work of the West German double agent, or of the Russian Oleg Penkovsky. In a sense, the very idea of a mere *double* agent comes to seem anachronistic to this international underworld. The nation-states who seek spies among its members have little call upon the loyalty of the men they hire: these men are mercenaries without patriotism or ideology—and precisely for this reason they seem more likely than spies recruited from loyal citizens of particular nations to serve the public good by facilitating the flow of information. British Laborites, then, are certainly mistaken when they emphasize the "security aspects" of the Profumo affair or attack the Macmillan government because of other cases involving actual "leaks" to the Russians. This is all to the good, especially when it is accompanied by the occasional defection of important Russian spies (with secrets to "discover") to the West. One would wish to maintain the intelligence agencies not because of their efficiency—how absurd is the idea which the Laborites seem to suggest: an intelligence agency improved because it is run by socialists!—but precisely because of the inefficient low-mindedness which seems to characterize the world of the spy.

In an older literature people like Christine Keeler and Heinz Felfe would have been called products of bourgeois decadence. The accusation is probably true; but the decadence of an old order has often served the interests of the new. Perhaps international society—if it ever comes into being—will be free of such people and of the distrust upon which they thrive (but which they also do a little to alleviate). But right now, surely, disarmament agreements with espionage—and especially that characteristically modern espionage which discovers secrets but cannot or will not keep them—seem infinitely better than inspection schemes which make any significant agreements impossible. We must work with what we have and here at least we seem to have something worth working with; an international espionage system which continually undercuts the efforts of particular powers to win advantages through secrecy.

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LETTERS

Hungarian Revolution

Editors:

I read with great interest Lewis Coser's article "The Hungarian Revolution Revisited," [Summer, 1963], in which he wrote (referring to the beginning of the revolutionary movement in Budapest in Ocober, 1956): "Nobody in the West, certainly, had any inkling of the events to come."

I know that at least one person in the West foresaw what was going to happen in Hungary. For the record, I would like to tell you about an interview I had with Natalia Sedova, Leon Trotsky's widow, in Mexico in September 1956, a few weeks before the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution. The old freedom fighter, in one of the most lucid analyses made on the neo-Stalinist period, not only traced the profiles of Stalin's heirs, but also made reference to the slavery existing in the so-called people's democracies. With prophetic vision, she announced the beginning of the movement of the masses, referring specifically to Hungary.

Upon my return to Brazil, I published the interview in the newspaper *Tribuna da Imprensa,* in Rio de Janeiro, early in October 1956. Three weeks later the revolutionary movement of Budapest, so clearly foreseen by Mrs. Trotsky, took place.

STEFAN BACIU
Seattle

The Praeger Edition

Editors:

As one of the editors of the Praeger edition of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*—thus obviously a not disinterested party—I would like to comment on Mr. Siegel's review of this important novel [DISSENT, Spring 1963].

Mr. Siegel states that Praeger "denounced" Ralph Parker as a "fervent apologist for the Soviet regime." Is a statement of fact a "denunciation"? He also disagrees with Praeger's opinion that Mr. Solzhenitsyn deserves better interpreters. Would Mr. Siegel be similarly offended if an unrepentant former employee of Goebbels' propaganda ministry were to translate a book by an Auschwitz inmate? But perhaps the services rendered to Soviet totalitarianism are not to be equated with those rendered to other totalitarian regimes.

However, the clarification of this point is not the central reason for my letter. It seems to me that Mr. Siegel completely abdicates his responsibility as a reviewer when, after having mentioned the dual publication of the book, he fails to comment on the respective merits of the two editions. Are both equally good or poor? Is Mr. Parker's version superior to that of Messrs. Hayward and Hingley? Or vice versa? This omission is the more startling in that Mr. Siegel quotes from the novel without informing the reader whose edition he is quoting from. Was his failure to mention the fact that the quotations are from the Praeger edition a mere oversight? Most literary critics agree that Solzhenitsyn's novel is a truly great work of literature. Is the reader not entitled to a comparative literary value judgment, as well as being treated to a dismissal of the political factors surrounding the publication of the book?

JEAN STEINBERG

GEORGE SIEGEL *Replies:*

Editors:

I am of course aware that Ralph Parker was a notorious Stalinist and apologist for the Soviet regime but unless it can be shown that his political beliefs have influenced his translation what relevance do they have?

I had written in some detail on the respective merits of the two editions of *One Day* but these passages were cut—with my knowledge—by the editor. I do think the Hayward-Hingley version is somewhat better than the translation by Ralph Parker, but not overwhelmingly so. As Irving Howe has written: "... the book survives both renderings and can be read with absorption in either." (*New Republic,* May 11, 1963.)

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